

# Indonesian Sea Power and Regional Maritime Security Challenges

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## Abstract

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The main objective of this paper is to examine the regional maritime security challenges facing Indonesia. As it is known that entering to the 21st century has come a new term in regional architecture in the Asia-Pacific region, namely the Indo-Pacific region. This region consists of the Indian Ocean and Pacific. These areas became more interconnected than in the previous period. These two regions became a single, significant system in the global order. Key players in the Indo-Pacific region are China, India and the United States. Of course, their actions have created new challenges in maritime security. These challenges include maritime disputes, pirates, and maritime power competition. The dispute in the South China Sea has spawned a security problem in the Asia Pacific region that Indonesia must face in the future.

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## Introduction

Indonesia is a maritime nation. Its geographical characteristics demand such a nation. Its long history at sea is its very foundation, together with international acknowledgment of its status as an archipelagic state through the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982).<sup>1</sup> Its abundant natural resources promises the required essentials to develop a prosperous and sovereign state. At the same time, however, having such vast waters and territory pose challenges and threats to Indonesia. Defending and guarding a coastline of 81.000 km is not an easy task for the country's maritime forces, particularly the Indonesian Navy. In the past few years Indonesia has developed its Maritime Domain Awareness through existing and new infrastructures as well as various plans and initiatives with national and regional stakeholders. This is a part of developing Indonesia's sea power.

Under the current administration, Indonesia is now on track to realize its long-awaited dream to become a prosperous maritime nation through the Global Maritime Axis strategy. It is supported by the Five Pillars to strengthen the archipelago's means and infrastructure in the maritime sector, not only for domestic purposes but also for the region and the world.

The 21<sup>st</sup> century gave rise to a new regional term; the Indo-Pacific. It comprises the Indian and Pacific Oceans since both regions are now more interconnected than ever before, rising as a significant single system in the global order. The key players in the Indo-Pacific region are China, India and the United States and it brings along various challenges in the maritime security domain. These challenges include maritime disputes, piracy and major power rivalry. The East and South China Seas disputes have taken most of the media spotlight in the past few years,

<sup>1</sup> UNCLOS 1982 Article 46.

particularly with Philippines' case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration against China's claims in the South China Sea and the United States' Freedom for Navigation operations (FONOPs) in the past few months. In the Indian Ocean, although the activities of Somali pirates have dramatically decreased in the past year, concerns remain.

Indonesia is at the heart of the Indo-Pacific region and it holds a unique as well as strategic role. It is not, for instance, one of the six claimant states of the South China Sea disputes, but its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) near the Natuna Islands is located side by side with the disputed waters. Recent escalated tensions in the South China Sea would have serious implications to regional stability; an issue very important to Indonesia. The Malacca Strait, situated among Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, is one of the Indian Ocean's crucial choke-points, a strategic waterway for global shipping and energy. Any disturbance to the busy strait could bring havoc to regional and international order.

### **Maritime Security Challenges in the Indo-Pacific**

What is the Indo-Pacific? According to Ashley Tellis, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace<sup>2</sup>, "the Indian Ocean is going to be increasingly integrated with the Western Pacific". No longer can both regions and the international community view the dynamics of the Indian and the Pacific Oceans as separate. The importance of such understanding was delivered during the 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, where then-Australian Defence Minister Stephen Smith stated that the Indo-Pacific "has risen as a region of global strategic significance including the growth of military power projection capabilities of countries in the Indo-Pacific".<sup>3</sup> Both the Indian and Pacific Oceans, connected by the archipelagos of Southeast Asia, are "emerging as a single strategic system" (Scott, p. 86).

This vast and diverse region have some of the world's most complex and dynamic maritime security challenges; from maritime disputes, conflicts, piracy to major power rivalries. This paper looks at the number of the most influential maritime security issues of the Indo-Pacific region.

### ***The South China Sea Dispute***

The complex nature of maritime disputes very well exemplified by the South China Sea dispute. The area in dispute, at least around 1.3 million square miles claimed by China<sup>4</sup>, stretches from Singapore and the Malacca Strait to the Taiwan Strait. Each of the six claimants – Brunei, China, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam - has presented its respective reasoning for either claiming the islands of Paracel and Spratly or the rights of the exclusive economic zone in the waters. Some even have their own names for the South China Sea. The dispute is not new. Nevertheless, the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident between China and the Philippines as well as China's reclamation and island building activities in the Spratly Islands since January 2014 have taken the case into a different level where tension escalation could easily happen. Reactions came not only from other claimant states but also from non-claimant states.

It is important to note that China is not the only nor it is the first to undergo construction and reclamation activities in the islands and reefs of the South China Sea. However, the scale it is making in the Spratly Islands are staggering compared to other claimant states' developments.

<sup>2</sup> David Scott, 'The "Indo-Pacific": New Regional Formulations and New Maritime Frameworks for US-India Strategic Convergence,' *Asia Pacific Review* 19, 2 (2012): 86.

<sup>3</sup> Scott, 'The "Indo-Pacific"', 85-86.

<sup>4</sup> Amit Singh, 'South China Sea Dispute: Regional Issue, Global Concern, Maritime Affairs,' *Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India* 8, 1 (2012): 117-118.

Malaysia, for example, has taken on reclamation at Swallow Reef since the 1980s, expanding it from 25 to 85 acres and constructed an airstrip, a resort and a small naval base.<sup>5</sup> Vietnam, on the other hand, is estimated to have added around 65,000 square meters to West Reef and 21,000 square meters to Sand Cay, both in the Spratly Islands (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative or AMTI, 2015). China, on the other hand, expanded Fiery Cross Reef more than 900,000 square meters, including an airstrip.<sup>6</sup>

Besides constructing airstrips, China has also established facilities on these artificial islands, which may be used for military purposes. This has, eventually, raised concerns of the country in the region. One report explored how China could use these artificial islands for possible military uses, from enhancing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), maritime domain awareness capabilities, power projection to establishing an air defence identification zone (ADIZ) and submarine bastion.<sup>7</sup> China has defended its actions through its Foreign Ministry's regular press conferences, claiming it is building shelters and aids for navigation as well as for search and rescue due to the threat of typhoon in the region. Understandably, these arguments could not ease the region's anxiety upon the possible use of these artificial islands and their facilities, particularly for military use.

Sakhuja (2015) warned how China's continuous aggressiveness in facing other claimant states in the South China Sea may cause restraints in terms of its friendship with these countries residing in Southeast Asia. In fact, it may be the very reason why the Philippines has taken China's claims to the Permanent Court of Arbitration or PCA.<sup>8</sup> The Philippines presented its case on 22 January 2013.<sup>9</sup> On 29 October 2015, PCA issued its ruling that it does have the jurisdiction upon the case. Some consider this as a victory for the Philippines as well as international law.<sup>10</sup> Although China continues to reject adhering to the court's ruling, stating that it has no such jurisdiction upon maritime dispute cases, continuously rejecting the norms of international law may look bad on its efforts to be seen as a country that respects international law and order (Calvo, 2015).

Prior to the PCA's preliminary ruling on its jurisdiction, USS *Lassen*, the U.S. Navy's destroyer, conducted a freedom of navigation operation (FONOP)<sup>11</sup> within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef, one of China's artificial islands in the Spratly Islands in late October 2015. The operation has been in the media for months, allowing China to prepare its reaction and statement toward such operation. Besides protesting the operation in diplomatic ways, the USS *Lassen* was shadowed by two PLA Navy ships within a safe distance. Even though the United States did not provide details into the operation in Subi Reef, its Defence Secretary, Ash Carter, has confirmed future FONOPs in the South China Sea.

A non-claimant state to the South China Sea dispute, it is important for the United States that all South China Sea parties abide international law and norms in settling the dispute. Glaser explained the failure to do so may detriment the United States' interests in the region and other

<sup>5</sup> Bonnie Glaser, "China's Island Building in the Spratly Islands: For What Purpose?", in *Examining the South China Sea*, Murray Hiebert, Phuong Nguyen and Gregory B. Poling (CSIS 2015), 31-41.

<sup>6</sup> <http://amti.csis.org/fonops-primer/>.

<sup>7</sup> Glaser, "China Island", 35-39.

<sup>8</sup> Jay Batongbacal, "Arbitration 101: Philippine V. China," 1 January 2015, retrieved from <http://amti.csis.org/arbitration-101-philippines-v-china/>.

<sup>9</sup> Permanent Court of Arbitration Case View, see <http://www.pcacases.com/web/view/7>.

<sup>10</sup> Alex Calvo, "South China Sea: International arbitration moves forward as PAC rules on jurisdiction", 6 November 2015, retrieved from <http://cimsec.org/south-china-sea-international-arbitration-moves-forward-pac-rules-jurisdiction/19737>, see also Edsel Tupaz and Daniel Wagner, "China should be concerned about the Hague Tribunal," *The Jakarta Post*, 3 November 2015, retrieved from <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/11/03/china-should-be-concerned-about-the-hague-tribunal.html#sthash.VqW2C2j8.dpuf>.

<sup>11</sup> For more information on FONOPs, see <http://amti.csis.org/fonops-primer/>.

parts of the world as well as threatening the freedom of navigation of not only Washington but also other countries in the region.<sup>12</sup>

Moreover, regional countries remain dependent upon the United States ensure free trade, the safety and security of important SLOCs and regional peace and stability.<sup>13</sup> Singapore Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen confirmed such notion during his speech on 9 December 2015, stating Singapore's ongoing belief in the important role the United States play in the region and urged it to "continue to provide clear and consistent signals and commit physically to remain engaged in this region".<sup>14</sup> This was said just days after the United States and Singapore their enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) in conjunction with the 10th anniversary of the 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement on defence and security cooperation and the 25th anniversary of the 1990 Memorandum of Understanding on the US use of military facilities in Singapore. called the new DCA as the "third major iteration in the last quarter-century" for the bilateral defence relations since the 1960s.<sup>15</sup> Two days prior to this statement, both defence ministers announced the deployment of U.S. Navy's P-8 Poseidon to Singapore from 7 until 14 December 2015 in support of cooperative efforts in the Indo-Pacific region.

### ***The important yet complicated Indian Ocean Region (IOR)***

Stretching from Cape of Good Hope to the Strait of Malacca, there are 51 coastal and landlocked states along the Indian Ocean in five of its sub-regions, namely the Middle East and Gulf, Red Sea and Horn, East Africa and Sub-Sahara, South Asia and Southeast Asia/Oceania. It has some of the world's vital sea lines of communications (SLOCs) and strategic chokepoints, namely the Straits of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb and Malacca. Ports along the Indian Ocean manage around 30 percent of the world's global trade and 50 percent of the overall global container traffic). As global economy's center of gravity shifted to Asia, the Indian Ocean has become more important than ever.

This now important region, nevertheless, inherits complex dynamics, characteristics and issues. Most states in the region are developing countries, in which the level of development varies dramatically, including for stability and security. In its report on global conflicts, Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research found 42 percent of global conflict can be associated with countries in the IOR.<sup>16</sup> The 2009 "Failed State Index" from *Foreign Policy* included 11 IOR states in the list of 20 failed and failing states.<sup>17</sup> The rise of piracy, human and drug trafficking as well as maritime terrorism is driven by these "politically unstable" countries in the IOR. In turn, these maritime security issues have urged major powers and smaller naval powers to increase their naval presence in the waters of the Indian Ocean in order to protect their maritime and trade interests. With such background, the Indian Ocean does not have

<sup>12</sup> Bonnie S. Glaser, "Armed Clash in the South China Sea," Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14, Council on Foreign Relations Press, April 2012, retrieved from <http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883>

<sup>13</sup> Glaser, "Armed Clash," 2.

<sup>14</sup> See [http://www.straitstimes.com/world/united-states/us-presence-remains-critical-for-stability-in-asia-says-defence-minister-dr-ng?utm\\_medium=Social&utm\\_source=Twitter&utm\\_campaign=Echobox&utm\\_term=Autofeed&link\\_time=1449730429#xtor=CS1-10](http://www.straitstimes.com/world/united-states/us-presence-remains-critical-for-stability-in-asia-says-defence-minister-dr-ng?utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter&utm_campaign=Echobox&utm_term=Autofeed&link_time=1449730429#xtor=CS1-10)

<sup>15</sup> Euan Graham and Tim Huxley, "The US-Singapore enhanced defence agreement: A third upgrade for bilateral collaboration", 10 December 2015, retrieved from <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/12/10/The-US-Singapore-enhanced-defence-agreement-A-third-upgrade-for-bilateral-collaboration.aspx>

<sup>16</sup> Potgieter, "Thean, Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean: Strategic Setting and Features," *Institute for Security Studies Paper*, August 2012, No. 236, 2.

<sup>17</sup> Lee Cordner, "Progressing Maritime Security Cooperation in the Indian Ocean", *Naval War College Review*, Autumn 2011, Vol. 64, No.4, p. 68-88.

“region-wide security architecture, a common regional identity, a history of regional cooperation, or accepted regional leadership frameworks”.<sup>18</sup>

It is not to be said that there is no existing regional framework in the IOR. For maritime security, there is the voluntary-based Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS).<sup>19</sup> Initiated by Indian Navy in 2008, the forum is similar with the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), which comprises of navies of the Western Pacific region. IONS bring the chiefs of the Indian Ocean navies into a single forum to discuss relevant regional maritime issues and increase maritime cooperation among regional navies. The forum, however, does not include extra-regional navies with significant presence in the region.<sup>20</sup> There is also the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS),<sup>21</sup> an ad hoc international forum for state and non-state actors (organizations and industry groups) interested in combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden, established on 14 January 2009. Still, the region lacks a regional security framework similar to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to further discuss regional maritime security issues.<sup>22</sup>

In terms of piracy in the Horn of Africa, there has been a significant decrease of piracy and hijacking threats as can be seen in NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield 2014 fact sheet.<sup>23</sup> In 2009, according to the fact sheet, the operation recorded a total of 45 hijacks, 130 attacks and 62 disruptions. Cordesman and Toukan (2014) cited the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) report of 75 incidents in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea in 2012.<sup>24</sup> As of August 2014, IMB reported only 10 major cases that include two hijackings. They believe such reports do indicate a significant decrease in piracy and hijacking cases in the area, and multilateral naval efforts have played a role in the process.<sup>25</sup> Nevertheless, they also state that Somali’s piracy problem would not end as long as the country continues to lack security and stability, and that piracy remains to provide better economic rewards.

It is therefore clear that the IOR has its own complex security issues, particularly maritime. On the other hand, there is also an increased rivalry among great powers in the Indian Ocean, in particular between China and India, the world’s rising powers.

There is no doubt that the Indian Ocean is very important to India’s national interests, and as its economy grows, it has exerted more efforts in securing and stabilizing the region. In the past decade, India’s trade has increased around 8 to 10 percent annually, which largely depends on the Indian Ocean.<sup>26</sup> Hence, it is understandable that India has kept an eye on China’s growing naval presence and activities in the Indian Ocean since the end of 2008. During its early deployment in the region, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy experienced difficulties in terms of logistic support due to not having ports for resupply and replenishment. For India, for PLA Navy to have the support of ports in the IOR would be translated into a “string of pearls encirclement”.<sup>27</sup>

In early December 2015, Djibouti Foreign Minister Mahamoud Ali Youssouf informed the media during a summit of African leaders in Johannesburg that China will build its first naval

<sup>18</sup> Cordner, “Progressing Maritime Security,” 69.

<sup>19</sup> For more information on IONS, see its official website at <http://ions.gov.in/>

<sup>20</sup> Van der Putten, et.al., “Geopolitics and Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean: What Role for the European Union?,” *Clingendael Institute Policy Brief*, August 2014, 6.

<sup>21</sup> For more information on CGPCS see <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/piracy/contactgroup/>

<sup>22</sup> Van der Putten, et.al., “Geopolitics and Maritime,” 6.

<sup>23</sup> See [http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_topics/141202a-Factsheet-OceanShield-en.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/141202a-Factsheet-OceanShield-en.pdf)

<sup>24</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan, “The Indian Ocean Region: A Strategic Net Assessment,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Working Paper*, 2014, 187.

<sup>25</sup> Cordesman & Toukan, “The Indian Ocean Region,” 188.

<sup>26</sup> Catherine Lea, “India’s extending naval horizons and partnerships” in Euan Graham & Henrick Z. Tsjeng Ed., *Navigating the Indo-Pacific Arc*, RSIS Monograph No.32, November 2014, 29.

<sup>27</sup> Lea, “India’s extending naval”, 31.

base in the country as the negotiations between the two countries have been concluded. Prior to this announcement, China informed the media on its plans to establish its first overseas military logistic post in the former French colony in late November 2015, although it did not use the term "military base". Nevertheless, this move has significant impact upon the region and strengthens China's influence and presence not only through economy through its New Maritime Silk Road and 'One Belt, One Road' (OBOR) strategy, but also in terms of maritime security.

The major powers rivalry in the IOR, particularly in the maritime domain, is unlike the one in the South China Sea - China and the United States. India, for example, has yet to state China as a threat to its maritime security.<sup>28</sup> However, for both countries to maintain their significant economic growth comes a need to ensure safe and secure SLOCs for resource transportation. Almost 80 percent of India's energy resources are imported, while in 2012 alone 84 percent of China's energy resources are transported through the Malacca Strait from the Indian Ocean.<sup>29</sup> Both countries are expanding their political and economic influence in the region, as well as enhancing their respective navies' capabilities of power projection and undergoing fleet modernization.<sup>30</sup> Therefore, Sino-India maritime competition should not be overblown.

### **Indonesian Sea Power**

In the face of such regional challenges and situated strategically in the middle of the Indo-Pacific region, Indonesia should prepare itself to tackle possible implications of these challenges, both present and future. This is the very reason why it is important for Indonesia to develop its sea power.

How do you define sea power? Till (2013) argued there is hardly a definitive definition of sea power, even from Alfred Thayer Mahan who coined the term for the first time.<sup>31</sup> However, he has made it evident that sea power is not just about navies as its constituents include the maritime capabilities of both military and civilian.<sup>32</sup> In other words, sea power is not only about deploying warships at sea, but encompasses all national components related to sea; from law enforcement agencies at sea, merchant fleet, laboratories, and maritime industries and hospitality.<sup>33</sup> If all these activities are organized under the framework of specific governmental policies and are considered as national interest, Indonesia will be on the right path to become a maritime nation.

There are six important instruments in the establishment of Indonesian sea power, derived from Mahan's six fundamental elements to establish a nation with formidable sea power, which are geography, physical confirmation, extent of territory, population, character of the people and character government.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Lea, "India's extending naval", 31.

<sup>29</sup> Eleanor Albert, "Competition in the Indian Ocean", *CFR Backgrounders*, 23 November 2015, retrieved from <http://www.cfr.org/regional-security/competition-indian-ocean/p37201>

<sup>30</sup> Daniel S. Markey, "Armed Confrontation Between China and India, Contingency Planning," Memorandum No. 27, Council on Foreign Relations Press, November 2015, retrieved from <http://www.cfr.org/china/armed-confrontation-between-china-india/p37228>.

<sup>31</sup> G. Till, *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*, Third Edition (London: Routledge, 2013), 23.

<sup>32</sup> Till, *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*, 24

<sup>33</sup> Marsetio, *A World Class Indonesian Navy: The New Paradigm*, Second Edition, (Jakarta: Indonesian Navy Headquarters, 2014), 24.

<sup>34</sup> Explanation on these six elements is cited from Marsetio, *Indonesian Sea Power*, Second Edition (Bogor: Indonesian Defence University Press, 2014), 72-80.

### ***Geographical Position***

Indonesia consists of 17,499 islands with 5.8 million km<sup>2</sup> of sea and is situated in the crossroads of two continents, Asia and Australia, as well as two oceans. This geography fact has provided the very reason why the maritime is of vital importance for the people of Indonesia. Port facilities are the lifeline of the country's connectivity. Not only are they essential for trade, but also for the livelihoods of the people in the surrounding areas as well as providing bases to develop new energy and food resources. In the future, ports will be developed off shore under the concept of sea basing.

Physical confirmation allows the development of a country's defence and supported by the establishment of ports and bases. Adequate and standardized ports provide many advantages to exploit resources; hence port development should become first-priority. Determining such priority is in line with the cost and benefit ratio analysis, detail can be seen in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Indonesia's Strategic Location  
Source: Processed from Google Map, 2013.

### ***Physical Confirmation***

Indonesia has full sovereignty over the areas within its 12 nautical miles of territorial waters and sovereignty rights along the 24-nautical-mile contiguous zone, the 200-nautical-mile EEZ and continental shelf. It should be noted that any activity that reaches as far as the continental shelf will be defined by the level of technological advancement of a nation.

Developing an archipelago, including its outer islands, require immense funding and resources. The connectivity it creates, nevertheless, will in turn be highly effective in improving prosperity for the people and country. Therefore, physical confirmation in this matter signifies accessibility since it reflects how a country manages its defence, transportation, and communications at sea.

Indonesia has designated a number of Archipelagic Sea Lanes (ASLs) to allow ships and vessels to pass from one area of EEZ or open seas to another. Ships sailing through Indonesian waters outside these ASLs must comply with the principles of Innocent Passage stated in UNCLOS 1982 as well as national law. This distinctive physical confirmation necessitates control to monitor all kinds of vessels moving on the surface or beneath as well as in the air in all choke points.

### ***Extent of Territory***

Indonesia necessitates a maritime spatial planning to achieve its national goals as well as having sound strategy to maintain its maritime interest in all kinds of situations. There are many opportunities to be explored and exploited for the development of maritime economy. Nevertheless, these opportunities are met with various constraints, from the national merchant fleet's lack of capacity, high taxation and credit difficulties for ship building industries and high interest rates for maritime businesses. The latter is due to the fact that this business is high in risk and slow in generating profit.

Another constraint is the current condition of those national ports that are not managed as main ports for export-import and feeder. Many have doubts over the efficiency and security, particularly in terms of fulfilling the requirements of the International Ship and Port Safety (ISPS) Code. Logistic costs in Indonesian ports are as twice as high as those in Singapore or Malaysia. Thus, decreasing competitiveness.

The sea provides prospects to improve prosperity and welfare whereas at the same time it delivers contention potentials in future; the struggle over marine resources. Technology is crucial in this case and should be supported by surveys, researches, and professional human resources on marine development. The establishment of maritime universities will assist the country to have generations of maritime-oriented human capital, mastering maritime technology, maritime energy, and maritime economy.

### ***Population***

With a population of more than 250 million people, Indonesia currently has over 21 percent of work force. It is estimated to increase to 33 percent in the next 10 years. This number is more than enough to be projected into coastal areas and the sea. Beaches are always an interesting tourist attraction, allowing most of the people living in the surrounding area to work in the service or hospitality fields. Coastal areas are also open for cultivation and aquaculture.

Around 60 percent of current population live along, or near, the coastal areas, providing huge potential for economic activities from trade, fishery, aquaculture, mining, sea transportation, and maritime tourism. The spread of population in many of the islands is a strategic asset in improving economic activities between islands as well as national security.

From a total of 64,439 villages in the country, around 4,735 of them are categorized as coastal villages. Half of these villages are located in rural areas, and 75 percent of them are in big and middle-sized cities with population of over 100,000 people in the shores of the Strait of Malacca, South China Sea, Java Sea, and Makassar Strait.

There is an ample number of maritime-related human resources, but the quality needs to be increased. For Indonesia to have better maritime products, it must first improve the ability of its human resources to use, develop and master maritime science and technology. As the world's fourth most populated country, and one that is designated as an archipelagic state, Indonesia should have the largest maritime work force and, therefore, dominate the sea.

### ***Character of the People***

Maritime nations such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the United States and Japan can achieve their maritime greatness because the sea is the core of their development. By going to the sea, they could develop, expand, and prosper. This is known as geographical awareness.

More than a half of century after we proclaimed independence, the character of our beloved nation no longer reflects the glory of Srivijaya and Majapahit. Most of us even consider the sea as a "scary" and "unpleasant" place. The people have heard more myths, mysteries, and scary tales from the sea than heroic adventures and brilliant accomplishments. We have yet to



see the story of Hang Tuah become as iconic in the public minds as the legends of Sinbad or even comics and cartoons of Popeye. This weakness in character has taken away our ability to fully explore and exploit marine resources, whereas national development policies are still continental-oriented.

Embodying a maritime character does not always suggest a nation of mostly fishermen and sailors. A maritime nation is populated by those who are aware that their survivability and future depends on the sea and how they could manage the resources well. The nationalism of a maritime nation lets the people become as one, like the water, without differentiating groups or religions and with the will as strong as rocks on the coastline, defiant against the pounding of the ocean waves. This is the character needed to realize a maritime society to achieve prosperous Indonesia.

### ***Character of Government***

Pro-maritime government has always been a challenge for Indonesia; it will remain a challenge in the future. Citizens of Indonesia have the right to choose their leaders in the executive and parliament through a periodic election in this era of democracy. The character of a government can be developed through maritime leadership; having a maritime vision sourced from (1) history-cultural hemispheric, a maritime nation is Indonesia's true identity and history has proven that the empires of Aceh, Srivijaya, Majapahit, Mataram, and Bugis achieved their greatness and glory after their kings ruled with a maritime vision.<sup>35</sup>; (2) geo-politic nationalism, where Indonesia's geography as the world's largest archipelagic state is a national concept and is the basis of its political national interest at and/or through the sea in international community and dynamics; and (3) geo-strategy republicanism, a national strategy must soon be formulated to face challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, which most are maritime-oriented, in order to achieve national goals as mandated in the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.

Maritime leadership aspires to realize the ideals of the nation by developing national capabilities in utilizing the sea, marine resources as well as other resources from all the islands to their full capacity, including the airspace above.

A maritime vision can ensure future Indonesian leaders to accelerate the journey to realize the country's greatness and glory. Maritime leadership similar with strong naval leadership of a commanding officer as he and his crew sail the vast oceans.

Today, as the world's center of gravity has shifted from the West to Asia, the desire to rekindle Indonesia's maritime spirit is very much strong. This aspiration is manifested in President Joko Widodo's Global Maritime Axis (GMA) concept and supported by the Five Maritime Pillars, which are; (1) rebuild Indonesia's maritime culture, (2) maintain and manage marine resources, with a focus on building marine food sovereignty through the development of the fishing industry, (3) provide priority to the development of maritime infrastructure and connectivity by constructing sea highways along the shore of Java, establish deep seaports and logistical networks as well as developing the shipping industry and maritime tourism, (4) through maritime diplomacy, Indonesia invites other nations to cooperate in the marine field and eliminate the source of conflicts at sea, including illegal fishing, territorial disputes and marine pollution, and (5) development of maritime defence forces. This concept is the foundation of Indonesia's national development and the goal is to strengthen the archipelago's means and infrastructure in the maritime sector, not only for domestic purposes but also for the region and the world.

<sup>35</sup> Prof. Dr. Slamet Muljana has discussed this in much detail in his books on the history of Indonesia's empires and kingdoms, and is confirmed by D. G. E. Hall, *A History of Southeast Asia*, Fourth Edition (London: Macmillan, 1981).

### ***Managing Sea Power of the Archipelago***<sup>36</sup>

Managing sea power will be an issue of importance, including during war time. The Indonesian Navy is the main component of the Indonesian sea power concept, supported by non-military components ranging from merchant fleet both government-owned and of private sector, state-owned ships of various agencies, ports and maritime industry and hospitality. At the same time, it is also the main component for defence at sea. Theoretically, it requires the authority to utilize these non-military components, especially since the Indonesian Navy has set a precedence on this matter during the military campaign to free West Irian in 1962.

Non-military components are under the management of different government agencies. For example, Ministry of Transportation and Ministry of Fishery and Sea Affairs both have the authority to manage state-owned vessels, while the development of state-owned enterprises on maritime industry and hospitality is under the supervision of Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises. Ministry of Industry handles all private-owned maritime industries and hospitalities. In short, in regards of securing national interest in the maritime domain, the Indonesian Navy does not have direct or even indirect authority over the management of these non-military components. The consequence of such condition influences the readiness of these components in supporting the Navy to take on its responsibilities.

Law Number 3/2002 has been in effective since eleven years ago, however the government has not issued a legislation on mobilization and demobilization to replace the previous regulation. The complexity of the sea and the aspects involved in the use of power or force in this domain necessitates a new regulation on mobilization and demobilization for the importance of national defence at sea. It is not only politics that is in play since legal and economic aspects are very close to the sea and its functions.

Law Number 34/2004 on TNI Article 9, point e. legitimizes the role of the Indonesian Navy to develop Indonesia's sea defence areas. This article can also be the legal basis for the navy to take on national sea power management. Nevertheless, since Law Number 34/2004 only regulates TNI, it is not sufficient enough to support a broader naval role in sea power management. Therefore, it requires a thorough readjustment of national sea power management, focusing on the legal aspect. The support of a set of adequate legislation will ensure the Indonesian Navy has ability to conduct its main functions as well as lead using national sea power. The establishment of *Badan Keamanan Laut* (Maritime Security Board or Bakamla) by President Joko Widodo on 13 December 2014 requires further development of Indonesia's sea power management.

### **A World Class Navy**

Sea power is more than just how we could utilize the sea; it is also about "the capacity to influence the behaviour of other people or things by what one does at or from the sea" (Till, 2013, p. 25). It is fair to say that among the sea power constituents, the Indonesian Navy has played an important role in the development of Indonesia's sea power in terms of the military's maritime capabilities. It aspires to do more in the future.

In line with its world class navy aspiration, the Indonesian Navy should be excellent in four specific areas: human resources, technology, organization and operational capability supported by adequate intelligence, logistics and command and control capabilities. Each has its own benchmark, which consists of values as well as risks when it is not well implemented. The new paradigm's importance is even stronger as the Indonesian Navy implements its universal role of military, diplomacy and constabulary in effective and efficient ways while also exerting hard, soft and smart powers in taking on its duties as the country's line of defence at sea.

<sup>36</sup> Explanation on Indonesia's sea power management is Marsetio, *Indonesian Sea Power*, 81-82.

A world class Indonesian Navy came at a time where globalization and the development of the strategic environment dictate global order.<sup>37</sup> Equality is the key for countries to live side by side and prosper by adhering to universal values. It also lays down the standards of Indonesian Navy's human resources in accordance to world class competency and capacity, allowing the organization to be compatible with other naval organizations in the world. Both competency and capability complement naval technology acquired to achieve mission success in military operations and military operations other than war.

A world class organizational functions and structure will ensure that the interactions of the Indonesian Navy with other navies will strengthen our crucial role; to guard national interest at and/or through the sea. To maintain regional maritime security stability, the country's national interest can be harmonized with those of other countries in the region. This is apparent in the Indonesian Navy's efforts to support regional peace and stability as one of Indonesia's national interests. For example, although Indonesia is not a claimant state in the South China Sea, it is important for Indonesia to do its part in ensuring the peaceful settlement of maritime boundary dispute.

Forums for dialogue and discussions are crucial to increase understanding among countries in the region, particularly claimants of disputed areas. This year Indonesia hosted the second International Maritime Security Symposium (IMSS), which focused on "Maritime confidence building and mutual-cooperation for peace and prosperity". Chiefs of Navy and Sea services of Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) participated in the symposium and shared their experiences, best practices and new ideas on the topic.

On a more practical level, Indonesia is the host of Asia Pacific's non-warfighting multilateral exercise code named Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo (MNEK). In 2016 this biennial exercise will focus on maritime peacekeeping operations. During the same time, Indonesia will also host the International Fleet Review 2016 and the 15<sup>th</sup> Western Pacific Naval Symposium. During the 1<sup>st</sup> MNEK, navies of the ASEAN-Plus countries participated actively in HA/DR exercises. The next will have the participation of navies from IONS and WPNS.

In terms of naval power development, the Indonesian Navy continues its force development program in line with the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) Program. It also fully supports strategic national defence industries in fulfilling the navy's procurement needs of weapon systems as well as undergoing transfer of technology requirements for all foreign procurements.

## Conclusions

The emergence of the Indo-Pacific region signifies the intimate connection between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Both regions have its own maritime security challenges that require a different set of possible solutions. Nevertheless, the connectivity between these oceans suggest the possibility of influence among these issues.

Indonesia is strategically situated in the middle of the Indo-Pacific region. Regional maritime security challenges, such as the South China Sea dispute, the complex IOR and major power rivalries, are happening right upon the country's shores; they are very close at home. As Indonesia implement its Global Maritime Axis policy to realize itself as a true maritime nation, any disturbance to regional security and stability would have serious implications upon Indonesia's national interest.

<sup>37</sup> Marsetio, *Indonesian Sea Power*, 64.

Indonesia has all the fundamental elements to foster a formidable sea power. As part of the constituents of sea power, the Indonesian Navy has played its role in the development process through its world-class navy policy as well as bilateral and multilateral cooperation and efforts in the region; a reflection of the country's commitment to ensure regional stability and security.

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