Bahaja Menghantjam:
Ups and Downs of the New PNI Movement 1931-1942

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Abstract

The non-cooperative nationalist organization movement in the 1930s came under pressure from the colonial government through the enactment of vergader verbod so that most of the non-cooperative nationalist organizations dissolved and their former cadres joined the cooperative organization movement. The New PNI as a non-cooperative nationalist organization was still able to survive in the midst of a repressive government and economic depression that hit the Dutch East Indies economy. The discussion in this article focuses on the ups and downs of the New PNI movement in 1931-1942. The method used in this research was the historical method consisting of heuristics, source criticism, interpretation, and historiography. The findings indicated that the New PNI was still able to survive in the dynamics of the Indonesian independence movement even though it had to experience downturn from August 1933 to 1942 as an implication of vergader verbod. The factors that allowed the New PNI to survive were changing the movement pattern to an underground movement and rearranging the organizational structure when the New PNI leaders were arrested by PID. The survival of the New PNI in the dynamics of the independence movement proved the success of cadre education carried out by the New PNI.

Keywords: PNI; Non-cooperative Nationalist Organization; Independence Movement; Indonesia.

Introduction

Indonesian National Movement was the movement of a nation to seek its own name and achieve its goals, namely the Indonesian independence of Indonesia (Yuliati, 2000, p. 1). In 1931, it faced a problem, namely the dissolution of Indonesian National Party (PNI). After the dissolution, the former PNI cadres dispersed, broadly divided into three groups. First, the group supporting the dissolution decision which later founded Indonesian Party (Partindo) on 29 April 1931 under Sartono’s leadership. Second, the group opposing the dissolution and named itself Independent Group (Golongan Merdeka). Third, the group close to other movement organizations because they did not choose to join Partindo or Independent Group.

The split of the former PNI cadres encouraged them to try to carry out the movement in their own way. Independent Group as one of the groups born from the split of the former PNI cadres received support from Mohammad Hatta and Sjahrir,
two Bumiputera students in the Netherlands who were members of Indonesian Association. Hatta collaborated with Sujadi, a figure from Independent Group, to publish a magazine called *Daulat Ra’jat* and first published on 20 September 1931. Hatta and Sujadi’s initiatives then continued to Indonesian National Education (New PNI) was established in December 1931 through a conference in Yogyakarta. Officially, the New PNI was then led by Sjahrir based on the results of the first New PNI congress in 1932.

The New PNI carried out activism in the 1930s, which was a pitch-dark era because the Dutch East Indies economy experienced a decline as a result of the economic depression. According to Ong Hok Ham (2018, p. 178), the state finances in times of economic depression were the most difficult. The colonial government’s finances were in deficit and the population of the Dutch East Indies had to face poverty and hunger on a large scale. Certainly, this phenomenon also affected non-cooperative nationalist organizations, which on the other hand had to face the repressive attitude of the colonial government under Governor General de Jonge’s (1931-1936) leadership. According to Koch (1951, p. 141), de Jonge’s arrival had brought a curse, and his government was the worst ever run in the Dutch East Indies. De Jonge applied *vergader verbod* to suppress the non-cooperative nationalist organization movement by prohibiting all meetings or rallies of the non-cooperative nationalist organizations. Any activism deemed to endanger peace and public order (*rust en orde*) would be prosecuted by *Politieke Inlichtingen Dienst* (PID) through the dissolution of meetings and the arrest of nationalist figures.

The repressive attitude of the colonial government caused the non-cooperative nationalist organizations to be unable to develop their movement. In 1936, Indonesian Party (*Partindo*) dissolved. Some *Partindo* cadres known to carry the non-cooperation principle had actually established a new organization based on the cooperation principle, namely Indonesian Movement (*Gerindo*). However, in the midst of pressure from the colonial government and the impact of the economic depression that rocked the Dutch East Indies, the New PNI was still able to survive despite its ups and downs, in contrast to other non-cooperative nationalist organizations which were eventually disbanded. Why could this happen? How did the New PNI movement maintain its activism under the pressure of *vergader verbod*? Based on the background and problems, this article examines the ups and downs of the New PNI movement in 1931-1942 able who to survive in the midst of the repression of the colonial government and economic pressure as a result of the economic depression.

**Method**

This research used historical methods including heuristics, source criticism, interpretation, and historiography. The sources used consisted of primary and secondary sources. The primary source was obtained at the National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia in the form of a classified report published by the colonial government on the activism of the New PNI. Additionally, *Daulat Ra’jat* as the magazine of the New PNI organization was also used as a source in this research. The
secondary source used in this research consisted of scientific articles and books relevant to the research topic, namely the New PNI movement in 1931-1942.

**New PNI Movement Path**

Indonesian National Education was established at the end of 1931. If its name is abbreviated, it has similarity with Indonesian National Party. Thus, the organization founded by the Independent Group came to be known as the New PNI (*De Nieuwe PNI*). The use of the New PNI as the name of the organization has shifted the original plan of the Independent Group which echoed the establishment of Indonesian *Daulat Ra’jat* Party. Although different, the organization’s ideals and movement path with the symbol of Red and White Bull’s Head were still the same as what the Independent Group has been fighting for since the beginning.

Even though founded in 1931, the New PNI did not yet have an official organizational structure and statutes of association. The New PNI Congress was then held on 23-26 June 1932 in Bandung at B.P.R.I. building to make up for the shortcomings that the New PNI still had as an organization (*Daulat Ra’jat*, 10 July 1932: 4). Burhanuddin as the congress chairman opened with remarks in front of the congress participants, followed by other congress agendas. Sjahrir was officially elected the New PNI leader. Although formally the leadership position was occupied by Sjahrir, according to Burhanuddin, who was also a New PNI cadre, that in the cadres’ eyes and in the general view, Hatta was the New PNI’s “spirit leader” (*Geestelijk Vader*) (Burhanuddin, 1980, p. 305).

Structurally, Sjahrir as Chairman was assisted by Sukemi as Vice Chairman, Hamdani as Secretary I, Murwoto as Secretary II, Maskun as Treasurer I, and Suka as Treasurer II. In addition to the main composition including the chairman, secretary, and treasurer, there were commissioners responsible for the area they occupied, namely Bondan (Batavia), Wyono (Malang), Jawoto (Surabaya), Subagio (Bandung), and Ismu (Solo). Besides, the New PNI also prepared the organization’s articles of association which would serve as the basis for the movement. The articles of association were successfully drawn up at the congress, which at the same time indicated that the New PNI was already established as a complete organization because it already had an organizational structure and articles of association.

The New PNI was a political organization that fought for Indonesian independence. Nonetheless, according to Zed (2002, p. 222), Hatta and Sjahrir did not mention the term party in the New PNI because it was feared that the colonial government would take a repressive attitude and arrest the political parties’ leaders, which obviously had implications for the intensity of *Bumiputera* political organization movement. This reason underlay why the term party was not used to refer to the New PNI movement. This attitude contrasted with other organizations, such as PNI and *Partindo*, which openly used the term “party” as the name of the organization.

Hatta preferred the term “education” as the name of the organization. It was not without reason. For Hatta, it was not an oversight, but was chosen deliberately and
not just the name of the organization. The New PNI was educational because it intended to educate cadres, instil awareness of their responsibilities in fighting for Indonesian independence. Through cadre education, it was emphasized that the responsibility of the movement towards an independent Indonesia was not only the responsibility of the organizational leadership, but also the cadres or the people in general (Hatta, 1978: 259). Therefore, the term education attached to the New PNI had a substantial meaning, including as the basis for the New PNI movement.

The urgency of education for the New PNI was reflected in its articles of association. Article 4 of the New PNI Articles of Association stated that the path used by the New PNI to achieve Indonesian independence was primarily by educating the people in political, economic, and social matters by paying attention to the people’s sovereignty principles (“Anggaran,” 1932, p. 3). In this case, it was education that distinguished the New PNI from other non-cooperative nationalist organizations that prioritized agitation and mass action.

Apart from promoting education as the basis for the movement, the New PNI was a nationalist organization with a non-cooperative principle. The definition of non-cooperation in the context of Indonesian National Movement was an attitude of refusal to relate or cooperate with the colonial government. The New PNI did not want to cooperate with the colonial government because it did not expect its assistance at all, and the colonial government could not be expected (Geheim Vervolgrapport de Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia (P.N.I.): 9). In the rally of the Independent Group in 1931, Bondan emphasized that the selection of non-cooperation was also based on a belief that cooperation would not succeed in the Dutch East Indies because life in the colony was controlled by colonialists and all policies issued were only for their own interests (“Menentang,” 1931, p. 5).

Open Movement Era

In 1932, after the first New PNI congress was held on 23-26 June in Bandung, formally the New PNI was an established organization because it had fulfilled the organizational elements including organizational structure, articles of association, and household regulations. The organizational elements were determined based on the results of the first New PNI congress, followed by the establishment of the New PNI branches in several regions, including Maninjau, Padang Panjang, Bukittinggi, Gresik, and Garut. Sjaahir as the new New PNI leader took appropriate steps by approving the establishment of the New PNI branches in both urban and rural areas. The establishment of these branches was part of the cadre effort of the New PNI.

Ong Hok Ham (2018, p. 284) categorizes the model for the cadre of the movement organization in 1930s, namely the New PNI which, according to him, focused on the villages. On the other hand, Kartodirdjo (2014, p. 206) expressed different view that the New PNI membership was limited to the big cities in Java, particularly Bandung and Batavia as the centers. Nevertheless, if you look at the New PNI movement as a whole, the big cities actually became the initial basis for the New PNI movement, such as Batavia, Bandung, and Surabaya. The cadre and movement of the New PNI then
expanded to the regions or villages. The administrative activism of the New PNI was centered in Bandung (the general manager office) and Batavia (the editorial office of *Daulat Ra’jat*), and many branches were located in non-urban areas. Absolutely, Ong Hok Ham and Sartono’s thesis gave an interesting perspective on the New PNI movement, although the New PNI did not just focus on one locus. The New PNI movement was carried out proportionally, both in villages and in cities, with the establishment of new branches.

In the period of 1931-1933 was open era for the New PNI movement before the colonial government issued *vergader verbod*. The results of the New PNI’s first congress and the increasing number of branches in various regions showed the New PNI’s establishment as a non-cooperative nationalist organization that carried out open movement. This movement was demonstrated by the New PNI through several activities aimed at achieving Indonesian independence, including cadre education and resistance to the colonial government policies.

**Cadre Education**

The New PNI General Leaders based in Bandung held cadre training at the New PNI branches as a form of cadre education. Openly, cadre training was held in public spaces such as school buildings and cinema buildings. Cadre training was provided in the form of delivering theoretical materials and analysing conditions of the Dutch East Indies at that time. The material was not limited to the political field, but also in the economic and social fields. One of them was on 5 December 1932, Hatta delivered economic material in cadre training in Bandung with the aim that the cadres were economically literate (Syeirozi, 2012, p. 46).

Cadre training was held regularly in Bandung and Batavia. In holding the cadre training, indoctrination and coercion were not carried out, but it provided understanding through discussion (Widjaja, 1990, p. 12). Face-to-face cadre training was called *debating club* (Discussion Club). The classified reports from the colonial government stated that interest in the New PNI cadre training continued to increase. The participants were gradually increasing, ranging from 20 to 100 people (*Geheim Vervolgrapport de Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia (P.N.I.): 5*). The New PNI leaders went around delivering material in each cadre training. One of them was Hatta who divided his time in a week so that he could be in Bandung and Batavia. Every Tuesday night he delivered material to the New PNI cadres in Batavia (Hatta, 1978, p. 258).

The cadre training was also carried out by the General Leaders of the New PNI by visiting the New PNI branches in Central Java. In 1933, Hatta made a visit to Bandung, Yogyakarta, Solo, and Semarang. The visit began on 23 June 1933 in Bandung, then continued to Yogyakarta, Solo, and Semarang. Every meeting he attended was supervised by PID. In Yogyakarta, his speech was dismissed by PID, the meeting in Solo was dissolved by PID, while in Semarang, Hatta attended a meeting of the Railway Workers Union (PBKI).

The New PNI cadre education was not limited to cadre training. Before the New PNI was founded, Hatta and Sujadi agreed to publish a magazine as a medium for
cadre education. The magazine was first published on 20 September 1931 called Daulat Ra’jat. Hatta (1978: 242) emphasized that the publication of Daulat Ra’jat aimed to educate cadres and the magazine would maintain populist principles in the political, economic, and social structures. The distribution of Daulat Ra’jat was carried out openly, not only to the New PNI cadres. Much of the material published was educative and contained theoretical writings, so Daulat Ra’jat was also known as theory magazine. Daulat Ra’jat also contained recommendations to cadres to realize the ideals and programs of the New PNI. One of them was the suggestion to cadres to read books entitled *Schets eener economische geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indie* and *Geschiedenis van den proletarischen klassenstrid* (Utomo, 2019, p. 96).

The press in the New PNI movement played an important role as a medium for cadre education. The role of Daulat Ra’jat in the New PNI movement was not much different from the view expressed by Djuliati Suroyo. According to him, mass media played an important role in relation to national consciousness during the colonial era. Through the mass media, national awareness, struggle ideas, and criticisms of the colonial government could be channelled to the community and form public opinion to support the struggle (Suroyo, 2002, p. 9). Many of the ideas of the New PNI leaders and cadres were published in Daulat Ra’jat which functioned as part of the cadre education process. The use of Daulat Ra’jat as a quantity education medium for cadres was more effective because it could be accessed in various regions through wide and open distribution.

**Against Colonial Government Policies**

The colonial government in the Dutch East Indies held de facto political and economic power over the colonies. All policies issued and implemented were solely aimed at maintaining and perpetuating their power in the Dutch East Indies. Not infrequently the policies issued were discriminatory, differentiating the treatment of the Dutch East Indies population based on race. Not only that, Bumiputera placed at the bottom of the colonial social structure had to face social, political, economic, and cultural discrimination. Certainly, such a policy met resistance from Bumiputera group, not to mention the resistance called for by the New PNI.

Throughout the 1930s, the colonial government maintained and issued discriminatory policies in the form of prohibitions and restrictions on Bumiputera activism, including Persbreidel Ordonnantie, Wilde Scholen, and Belasting. These policies burdened and even silenced Bumiputera activism in the political, educational, and economic fields. PNI’s response to the three policies was shown by an attitude of resistance through criticisms and slogans conveyed in writings and speeches.

The press was an important medium for spreading the nationalism ideas in the Dutch East Indies. It was recorded that various newspapers and magazines were published by Bumiputera as media of propaganda for nationalism during Indonesian National Movement. Through the press, the nationalism ideas could be distributed and reach a large number of readers. Publishing newspapers or magazines by nationalist organizations was also a common thing to happen as the mouthpiece of the
The circulation of *Bumiputera* newspaper indicated to spread the nationalism ideas had disturbed the colonial government. On 7 September 1931, Governor General De Graeff announced the enactment of *Persbreidel Ordonnantie* or Regulations on Suppressing the Press (Yuliati, 2018, p. 258). This regulation was announced at the end of de Graeff’s reign, before being replaced by de Jonge. Through *Persbreidel Ordonnantie*, Governor General of the Dutch East Indies had the authority to prohibit publications considered disturbing the peace and public order. Under de Jonge’s reign, *Persbreidel Ordonnantie* was really being used to the maximum extent possible to silence the independence movement press.

The colonial government was very wary of the importance of the press in the independence movement, so that through *Persbreidel Ordonnantie* it was hoped that it could stem the rush of the nationalism propaganda. The impacts faced by the New PNI from the existence of *Persbreidel Ordonnantie* were the suppression action of brochure “*Ke Arah Indonesia Merdeka*” and the confiscation of *Daulat Ra’jat* in 1934. In addition, the editor of *Sin Tit Po* in Surabaya, Saruhum, was sentenced to one month in prison for charges that his writings were deemed insulting to the colonial government (“P.N.I,” 1934, p. 73). Protests were then launched by Indonesian Journalists Association (*Perdi*) by sending a telegram to the authorities.

Through a speech, Hatta resisted press restrictions and suppression. He emphasized that the press in the Dutch East Indies needed to demand press freedom (*Daulat Ra’jat*, 10 November 1932: 5). He also persuaded the attending participants who witnessed his speech to come together and unite against *Persbreidel Ordonnantie*. The press who reported on the independence movement did not need to be afraid of the threat from the colonial government and from this the sincerity of the independence movement could be seen, how much they believed in continuing to fight against the colonial government.

Restrictions and restraints by the colonial government were not limited to the press, but also targeted the education sector through the illegal school ordinance enforced on 1 October 1932. Illegal school ordinance or *Wilde Scholen* according to Tsuchiya (2019, p. 253) was a tool of the colonial government to control the “illegal schools” that spread political propaganda against power. The enactment of the illegal school ordinance in fact prioritized targeting private *Bumiputera* schools because they were considered to grow the nationalism seeds. The illegal school ordinance restricted the *Bumiputera* private school movement by supervising learning and having the authority to terminate it if deemed to endanger public order. The illegal school ordinance was indeed intended for private schools, but the ordinance has awakened the people’s political attention (“Menentang,” 1932, p. 2).

The New PNI responded to the rejection and resistance to the school ordinance directly through writings in *Daulat Ra’jat* and speeches at the New PNI rally. Inu Perbatasari, a New PNI cadre, in his speech at a rally against the illegal school ordinance in Bandung expressed his rejection of the ordinance. According to him, education in the colonized country was not aimed at improving the people condition,
but to meet the capitalists and imperialists’ needs. In this way, the capitalists and imperialists in the Dutch East Indies could maintain their position in the colonies (“Pendidikan,” 1933, p. 29). Inu did not want Bumiputera children to have labor spirit who only worked for income without thinking about the nation progress.

Other New PNI figures also showed their rejection of the illegal school ordinance. Sjahrir, who used the pseudonym Realpolitiker, wrote an article entitled “Menentang Ordonnantie Sekolah Liar” voiced the rejection of the illegal school policy which limited educational activities in private Bumiputera schools. In that article, he explained the rejection of the illegal school ordinance from various Bumiputera organizations, both those based on cooperation and non-cooperation principles. Moreover, a post on Daulat Ra’jat emphasized that the ordinance of illegal schools was a strategy of imperialism to carry out colonialism by leaving the people in ignorance (domhouden van de massa) (“Ordonansi,” 1933, p. 5).

The 1930s economic depression was the worst economic downturn in the early twentieth century. Export commodity prices fell sharply, accompanied by a persistent decline in the number of exports. There was an imbalance in the colonial government’s financial balance which showed a deficit. Bumiputera economy was also in decline due to massive layoffs and agricultural products that did not sell well in the international market. Nonetheless, behind the economic downturn, Bumiputera were the group that suffered the most because they did not have the power to improve their lives. All aspects of Bumiputera life were regulated by policies issued by the colonial government.

In an effort to overcome the problems of state finances, the colonial government took steps through policies introduced during the economic depression. One of the economic policies strongly rejected by the New PNI was the enactment of tax collections (belasting) during the economic depression. If you look at the colonial government’s income from the tax collection, since 1931 it had decreased. Nevertheless, the decline was not caused by the waivers granted by the colonial government to Bumiputera. Peasants were still required to pay taxes as usual, so some of them could not pay taxes because of the impact of the economic depression that had crushed market prices. In 1931, they were still required to pay the same taxes as in 1928, before the economic depression hit (“Politik,” 1932, p.2).

In 1928 the colonial government’s income from taxes was 549.7 billion, then decreased in 1930 to 439.3 billion, and in 1931 it was 330.0 billion (“Politik,” 1932, p.2). The colonial government seemed to want to keep getting as much income as possible during the economic depression in order to maintain the stability of its financial balance. Rising and falling incomes forced the colonial government to place a tremendous burden on the incomes of some of the colonized lands by crisisheffing (“Politik,” 1932, p.2: 3). In this case, the New PNI criticized the tax-related policies, adding to the people misery. According to the New PNI, in the Dutch East Indies the peasants did not receive help (“Politik,” 1932, p. 3).
New PNI Movement New Path

**Vergader Verbod and Arrest of New PNI Leaders**

During the 1930s, the political situation in the Dutch East Indies was dynamic. The colonial government issued new policies as an effort to adapt to the difficult conditions of the times due to the economic depression. These new policies had political implications for the non-cooperative nationalist organization movement, including the New PNI. Through the policies implemented in the 1930s, the colonial government tried to not only overcome economic problems, but also silence the non-cooperative nationalist organizations’ political movements, especially when the colonial government was under Governor General de Jonge’s leadership (1931-1936).

*Vergader verbod* was the prohibition of gathering for organizations or groups considered dangerous to peace and order. The *vergader verbod* violators would be arrested and imprisoned, or even interned. Officially, *vergader verbod* was enforced on 1 August 1933, the day after the arrest of Sukarno in Batavia. The New PNI viewed *vergader verbod* as an attempt to get rid of the non-cooperative organizational movement. An article entitled “*Vergaderverbod*” in *Daulat Ra’jat* explained, “Thus, in this way, it becomes clear to us that the true form of vergaderverbod is what the white press has spewed out, namely that the leftist movement in Indonesia must disappear” (“*Vergaderverbod*,” 1933, p. 186). *Vergader verbod* had led to “movement crisis” among nationalists, including the New PNI. The New PNI cadre rally and training during *vergader verbod* could not be carried out optimally because the cadre meetings and training must be held secretly at the cadres’ homes with a limited number of participants.

Consistently, non-cooperative nationalist figures were arrested during the enactment of *vergader verbod*. PID was deployed to monitor, restrict, and arrest anyone who violated the assembly ban. The colonial government’s attitude affected the New PNI. activism which showed a decrease in intensity since the enactment of *vergader verbod*, so whether the New PNI realized that their movement was dwindling or not. The cadre training was rarely held, and rallies were starting to be held clandestinely at the cadres’ homes. The climax was when a search was carried out accompanied by the arrest of the New PNI leaders, consisting of Mohammad Hatta, Sjahrir, Maskun, Bondan, Burhanuddin, Suka, and Murwoto on 25 February 1934.

Hatta, Sjahrir, and Bondan were arrested in Batavia. *Daulat Ra’jat* office in Batavia was also searched, all letters and some publications of *Daulat Ra’jat* were confiscated by PID (“P.N.I.” 1934, p. 1). The search had implications for the publication of *Daulat Ra’jat* which had to combine the 28 February issue with the 10 March 1934 issue in one print. Attempts to reclaim some publications of *Daulat Ra’jat* confiscated by PID yielded no results. Seeing this incident showed that the arrests had a broad impact on the New PNI. The arrests became shocking news in early 1934, especially for the nationalists.

The New PNI out of control Hatta and Sjahrir, who were in detention, responded to the colonial government that the arrested New PNI leaders were innocent. Nevertheless, the colonial government used *exorbitante rechten* to be able to arrest and
intern them. Hatta, Sjahrir, and their friends could be interned without going through a court process first. Boven Digul became the destination of their exile, a camp located in Papua jungles, with malaria which at any time could attack the internees’ immunity. They were interned in January 1935 via Tanjung Priok Harbor, Batavia (Hatta, 1978, p. 349).

**Surviving Through Underground Movement**

The arrests of Hatta and Sjahrir not only affected the New PNI General Leader structure, but also influenced the New PNI movement. Technically, the New PNI movement since the enactment of **vergader verbod** was carried out in a limited manner, and the movement declined further after Hatta and Sjahrir’s arrest. The New PNI tried to stay in the dynamics of the independence movement even though it did not show the offensiveness such as in 1932 until mid-1933. As a result, starting from August 1933, the New PNI carried out an underground movement, trying to minimize PID’s repressive actions.

After Hatta and Sjahrir’s arrest, the New PNI immediately took the initiative to form a new organizational structure. On 10 April 1934 the New PNI General Leaders were appointed temporarily, consisting of Haryono as chairman, T.A. Murad as secretary and treasurer, and Sugra as general assistant. The address for the New PNI General Leader Secretariat had been temporarily moved to Lontar IX 25 Batavia ("Berita," 1934, p. 68). The preparation of a new organizational structure, both at the central and regional levels, was in accordance with Hatta’s instructions (Lukman, 2012, p. 32).

**Daulat Ra’jat** was still able to be published throughout 1934, which made Hatta relieved because the cadre training that had been carried out so far had paid off. According to Hatta in his memoirs, that was the difference between the New PNI and **Partindo** because the **Partindo** movement and its magazines disappeared while the New PNI and **Daulat Ra’jat** still continued the movement (Hatta, 1978, p. 343). De Kat Angelino had a different view from Hatta. According to him, after Sukarno was arrested, **Partindo** did not bother the colonial government anymore because the remaining fanatics began to retreat regularly, but the same thing happened to the New PNI because the remaining second-class people would be powerless (Giebels, 2001, p. 189).

The New PNI General Leader structure after Hatta and Sjahrir’s death did not last long. The colonial government by deploying PID continued to target the New PNI leaders and arrest them so that the New PNI General Leader structure changed several times due to ongoing arrests. On 17 September 1934, De Sumatra Post announced the New PNI General Leaders’ arrest. Aryono (Chairman), T.A. Murad (Secretary and Treasurer), and Sukra (Commissioner) had been arrested. Aryono and Murad were arrested in Batavia while Sukra was arrested in Cirebon. They were sentenced with article 153, on charges of sedition in **Daulat Ra’jat** ("De P.N.I.-affaire," 1934). The New PNI management was immediately re-established through a decision mutually agreed upon by the management in November 1934. The agreement included the relocation...
of the administrative office to Semarang and the appointment of the New PNI General Leaders (“De Partai,” 1934). The New PNI organizational structure consisted of Suharjo (Chairman), Sumaheru (Secretary and Treasurer), Lukman (East Java Commissioner), Sutarjo (Central Java Commissioner), Suryadi (West Java Commissioner), Chatib Sulaiman (West Sumatra Commissioner), Samidin (South Sumatra Commissioner), and M.J. Mewengkang (Sulawesi Commissioner).

In 1936 the arrest also occurred in the VIII New PNI leader located in Surabaya (Lukman, 2012, p. 33) while the last New PNI chairman was Subagyo, who carried out the underground movement during the Japanese occupation (Bondan, 2008, p. 144). PID was very aggressively hunting down the New PNI cadres and leaders. The re-arrest occurred against the New PNI leaders based in Surabaya in 1938, namely Soepiman (Chairman), Speparman (Secretary), and Partoatmodjo (Commissioner). In addition to the arrests, a search was carried out in Sukabumi by PID (“De P.N.I.-affaire,” 1938). However, the arrest did not undermine the existence of the New PNI because it still existed as a non-cooperative nationalist organization.

In 1939, under Salamoen’s leadership, assisted by Soeradji as the commissioner, the New PNI took a stance to question the objectives of the Indonesian Political Association (GAPI) and at the same time oppose the establishment of GAPI (Overzicht van de Inlandsche en Maleisisch-Chineesche Pers, 1939, No. 51, 23 December 1939, 880). The attitude of the New PNI did not have much effect on Indonesian National Movement, which was increasingly dominated by the cooperative movement. This showed the weakening of the New PNI in the stage of Indonesian National Movement as a non-cooperative nationalist organization, although it still persisted in the midst of the dynamics of Indonesian National Movement.

The cadre of the New PNI by conducting cadre education showed success with the persistence of the New PNI in the independence movement, even though it had to experience downturn and moved underground. The New PNI until 1942 was still standing, persisted in carrying out underground movements by continuing to change the organizational structure when the New PNI leaders were arrested by PID. The New PNI became a non-cooperative nationalist organization able to survive amidst the changing currents of the national movement towards cooperation in the late 1930s.

**Conclusions**

The New PNI was able to survive in the constellation of the national movement in 1931-1942 when the non-cooperative nationalist organizations were dissolved, and the former cadres of these organizations founded a new organization based on the cooperation principle. The New PNI movement during 1931-1942 could be categorized into two eras, namely the open movement era from 1931 to June 1933 and underground era in August 1933 to 1942. Vergader verbod was the main reason for the division of the New PNI movement into two eras.

While maintaining its existence, the New PNI experienced ups and downs and changed its movement strategies by actively moving “underground” so that it was able to survive the repression of the colonial government through PID deployment.
Another factor that allowed the New PNI to survive was its cadre education, which raised awareness that the responsibility for achieving Indonesian independence was not only on the leaders’ shoulders, but also on the people shoulders. Based on these factors, when every New PNI General Leader was arrested, the New PNI cadres immediately drew up a new structure. The survival of the New PNI in the dynamics of the movement in the midst of vergader verbod and the economic depression was inseparable from the success of cadre education carried out consistently, although during the late 1930s the cadres’ activism and quantity decreased due to the continuous cadres’ arrests.

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