

# Ethnolinguistic Pluralism and Multiculturalism in Contemporary Indonesia: A Case Study of Minority Javanese Muslim Migrants in Bali

I Nyoman Wijaya<sup>1\*</sup>, Sri Lestari<sup>1</sup>, Mosli Tarsat<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Department of History, Faculty of Humanities,  
Udayana University, Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia

<sup>2</sup>History Programme, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities,  
Universiti Malaysia Sabah, Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia

\*Corresponding Author: inyoman\_wijaya@unud.ac.id

DOI: <https://10.14710/ihis.v9i1.26624>

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## Abstract

This article examines how majority-minority relations in Bali, Indonesia, have changed in the last decade, in the context of multiculturalism and multilingualism. It does so through a case study of the socio-cultural practices of minority Muslim migrants in a predominantly Hindu community in the village of Sumerta, which is part of Bali's capital city of Denpasar. The study shows fresh evidence for the dynamic nature, issues and challenges of inter-ethnic/religious relations at the most local level, a matter of great significance in debates on cultural pluralism, multilingualism, tolerance and modern democracy on the broader national and global levels. Our discussion and analysis makes use of methodological and theoretical insights from socio-ethno-linguistics, in combination with history and cultural studies. We argue that the cultural-religious and social practices of the different ethnolinguistic groups in this village are based on culturally plural community interactions, where the different ethnic and religious groups remain separate. Intergroup relations, however, show positive forms of cultural and linguistic engagement, primarily symbolic in nature, and thus tend towards multilingualism as an indicator of multiculturalism.

**Keywords:** Minority; Migrant; Islam; Cultural Pluralism; Multilingualism; Multiculturalism; Intergroup Relations; Tolerance.


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## Introduction

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Bali was experiencing heightened ethnic and religious tensions after the fall of President Suharto and crises in the tourist industry. These tensions led to what social historian Henk Schulte Nordholt called "entrenched identities" amongst Balinese, fostering an attitude towards the island of it being an "open fortress" (Nordholt, 2008, pp. 387-416). In the period since his research, there have been marked changes and a lessening of these tensions. By examining a small Javanese Muslim migrant community and their inter-ethnic/religious relations with the Balinese in the predominantly Hindu village (or *kelurahan*) of Sumerta (Figure 1), in the eastern part of Bali's capital city, Denpasar, we ask how Hindu-Muslims relations are currently being managed within everyday interactions on Bali. Of particular importance to this question is the everyday nature of language use, which

we argue is indicative of a tendency towards multiculturalism and positive interaction.

One major point of tension examined by Schulte Nordholt was the high influx of Muslim migrants from other islands to predominantly Hindu Bali. Sumerta, as a site of such migration by Javanese Muslims, is an important test case. In 2009, the migrants of Sumerta formed an organisation called *Paguyuban Umat Muslim Akasia* (PUMA), or the Akasia Muslim Community (Akasia refers to the name of the road on which most of the migrants live). This organisation marks a form of identification that in many ways represents the local dynamics of inter-ethnic/inter-religious relations of contemporary Indonesia, where groups are formed within communities. The local majority-minority power relation is a reverse image of relations on the national level, where Muslims are the majority. Both locally and nationally, inter-groups relations are a sensitive issue, and are the subject of major Indonesian debates about the nature of multiculturalism.



**Figure 1.** Maps of the village of Sumerta in Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia.

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics. (2019). Geospatial maps. Retrieved from <https://geoportal.bps.go.id/maps/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=b47355787be7484f9ba023a407a5a15a>.

Multiculturalism is a complex notion, with many different usages and contexts, in which it can serve as an ideology, a policy, or a postmodernist discourse with different meanings as it is characterized in different ways and used in different contexts, e.g. Inglis (2018) and Oktay (2016, p. 77). Crucially, it assumes tolerance to the religious and cultural difference, and perhaps recognition of group or cultural rights (Kymlicka, 1995; Kukathas, 2003; Ashcroft & Bevir, 2018, p. 12). The emergence of home-grown radicalism or extremism is often considered as indicating the 'failure' of multiculturalism in its ideological and policy agenda, and the most dramatic Indonesian example would be the terrorist Bali Bombing of 12th October 2002. However, 'multiculturalism' as a broad descriptive term characterizes the ethno-linguistic diversity of society, in which there are always challenging inter-related issues of how majority-

minority group relations, human rights, and collective identities are best handled in modern democracy.

There have been few studies of multiculturalism in Bali investigating interactions of ethno-religious groups of the type seen in the village of Sumerta (Sujana, 2004, p. 7; Suacana, 2004; Wisarja & Sudarsana, 2023). They all recognise that the Balinese society has been increasingly diverse. All of them, except Atmadja (2009, p. 19), claim that the Balinese society is multicultural.

They do not, however, distinguish multiculturalism (as defined by Rex's, 2010, pp. 217-229) from what Furnivall's (1956, pp. 304-305) calls 'plural society'. The key difference between culturally plural and multicultural societies lies in the nature of the cultural integration and synchronization in the lives of member groups in the society. In a culturally plural society, each group lives in its own cultural world, maintaining its cultural boundaries more or less firmly, with almost no (or very minimal) cultural interaction with other groups (Wang, 2024, p. 6). Even if there is an interaction, the interactional situation is typically limited; for example, of the type seen in the market or other public space where it is because of a specific occasional purpose. In addition, in culturally plural societies, different groups are incorporated in different ways, typically with different degrees of asymmetrical political power with relationships commonly characterized by social segregation, domination, and discrimination (in some kind of disguise). In contrast, in a multicultural society, there are ample active cultural interactions among the social groups in their everyday lives. The intensive interactions are more than simply of the type in the market, rather in various public spaces with various socio-cultural interests. Socio-politically in modern context, a multicultural society is typically characterized by democracy and egalitarianism with individuals and groups in the society synchronizing equivalently. People and social groups (including minorities) are equal before the law. They are considered to have equal rights in exercising power, for example, through voting or other means.

While distinguishable, the distinction between multiculturalism and cultural pluralism is arguably not clear-cut, but gradient in nature. There are multiple variables across individual and societal levels involved whose characteristics may be analysed as in between cultural pluralism and multiculturalism. In line with the previous studies, particularly Naya Sujana's (2004, p. 7) and Suacana's (2004), our study confirms the increasingly diverse nature of the Balinese society, which is susceptible to conflicts. We outline our findings in the ensuing subsections, showing that there has been promising evidence of local community members' embracing certain degrees of inter-ethnic/religious integration and engagement, and displaying on-going informal public civic education towards a multicultural society at the local village level in Bali.

Issues of pluralism/multiculturalism and minority rights have been debated in the context of western liberalism and democracy. The debate is whether ethnolinguistic, cultural and religious diversity should be publicly recognized in a democratic society, giving rise to two opposing views, which Kymlicka and Opalski (2002, p. 1) call the 'orthodox liberal' view and the 'liberal pluralist' view. These views differ as to the role of the private versus the public sphere, with the orthodox liberal view negating totality and rejecting homogenizing forms of nationalism. Rather, every cultural community has the right to define itself without having to turn to or refer to a universal standard. This view is strongly influenced by the classical liberalism that emphasizes the necessity of legal restrictions to state power in managing its people to protect human rights.

Individuals should be considered equal insofar as they have equal opportunity in

expressing the differences. The concept of a multicultural country is in this orthodox liberal view a country that maintains its distance to ethnolinguistic issues and that it guarantees each cultural community to take care of its own cultural affairs. The state respects cultural plurality but there is no need to formulate ideal (ideological and cultural) frameworks for its ethnolinguistic communities to adopt. In this view, if the state guarantees the rights of every citizen equally through the concepts of citizenship and individual rights, then in theory there is no minority issue.

## Method

The liberal pluralist view advocated by Kymlicka (1995, pp. 11-33), in contrast, argues that justice in relation to minorities requires the public recognition and accommodation of diversity. The liberal pluralist view of multiculturalism combines the liberal values of autonomy and equality with the communitarian values (Leung & Valdes, 2019, p. 365) and the values of cultural membership. Cultural membership is crucial for an individual's self respect; hence it is a 'primary good' (Nathan, 2015, p. 124; Kymlicka, 2016). It is a condition of personal autonomy, providing meaningful options and scripts with which people frame, revise and pursue their goals (Stockemer & Sundstrom, 2025, p. 274). Individuals/minority groups are entitled for special protections because the inequalities and circumstances that they are under are not of their own choice. Kymlicka (1995, p. 109) argues that a liberal egalitarian theory emphasizes the importance of rectifying unchosen inequalities. In Kymlicka's view, individuals are not part of the state in the universal sense where each citizen is in direct relationship with the state; rather, through a process of membership in one of the ethnolinguistic communities. Then, the nature of individual rights and the opportunities for individual members to exercise them tend to vary according to the cultural communities.

In the liberal pluralist view, to resolve multicultural issues, individual rights must be supplemented by collective minority rights, or what Kymlicka (1996) calls 'group-specific or group-differentiated rights' (Ragazzi, 2016, p. 737). The ultimate result of the interaction between the state and the minority group would be the recognition 'group-differentiated rights' such as self-government rights (through some form of federalism), polyethnic rights (for financial support and legal protection for their cultural/religious practices), and special representation rights (e.g. guaranteed seats in central institutions of the country).

Using liberalism as the basis of analysis does not really work in Indonesia, however, where there is no strong tradition of liberalism. Liberalism is in fact specifically rejected on the level of the state. Indonesia's constitution explicitly states the adopted ideology of Pancasila (Five Principles) with the national motto of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity) recognizing multiculturalism as the central foundation of the Indonesian society. The Indonesian system therefore does not provide room for the implementation of forms of liberalism in determining the most appropriate multicultural model.

Indonesian multiculturalism (or rather 'plural society' in Furnivall's term) has a long history, characterised by its indigenous multilingualism (Vaughan & Singer, 2018, pp. 83-90). Its nature as seen in Bali and elsewhere in Indonesia is quite different from that in western countries. While the situation in Sumatra is undoubtedly a product of increasingly mobile era in modern Indonesia, indigenous multiculturalism has long existed in Indonesia. We have seen, for example, the case where a group of Buginese Muslims from south Sulawesi who have settled in the Loloan village in western Bali since the 18th century and have lived in harmony with their Balinese Hindu neighbours since then (Sosiowati, et al, 2019, pp. 586-617). The diversity of Indonesian ethnolinguistic make-up has led to complex indigenous

multilingualism and multiculturalism.

The founding fathers of Indonesia were all too aware that the size and ethno-linguistic diversity of Indonesia is not only a source of pride and strength but also a source of problems (Arka, 2013, pp. 74-105). To resolve the problems, the concept of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* ('Unity in Diversity') was introduced in the early stages of the formation of Indonesia. It has become the foundation of the Indonesian multiculturalism model, officially determining the design of the nation's culture as stated in the explanation of Article 32 of the 1945 Constitution: Indonesian cultures are the peaks of local or regional cultures of Indonesia (Suparlan, 2002, pp. 98-104). The status of Indonesian as the national language has always been important to the idea of national unity, one of the five principles of the national ideology, Pancasila. *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* and have been often enforced vigorously by the government, unfortunately with the emphasis on unity rather than diversity via forceful Indonesianisation especially during the era of Soeharto, Indonesia's second president (1966–1998).

While having a clear constitutional and ideological reference, multiculturalism in Indonesia is arguably an on-going project. The question is whether or not its ideals and goals as embodied by concept of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* and the ideology of Pancasila have been achieved. Indonesian Pancasila-based multiculturalism recognizes and glorifies ethnic-religious-cultural differences with equality and balance of the rights of individual and local ethnolinguistic groups within the framework of the unity of Indonesian State.

The post-Suharto era, which began with the Reformation Era of 1998 to 2008, saw the return of democracy in combination with greater autonomy given to the local government. These changes have given rise to more space for freedom of expressions of political, ethnic/religious aspirations and identities. Unfortunately, however, these changes have also given rise to the resurgence of the so-called *politik aliran*, the politics of 'ethno-religious streams', a form of identity politics (Nurjaman & Jainuri, 2019, p. 241). Indonesian multiculturalism is therefore paradoxically under threat. In Bali, local identity politics has been seen in the emergence of the movement the formal version of which was called *Ajeg Bali*, 'Bali first' in 2002 (Rosalina et al., 2023, p. 1). The movement is on-going in response to the perceived threat of the growing dominance and influence of Islam and Muslims on Balinese culture and local economy (Budiasa & Gunarti, 2016).

The recognition of both individual and collective rights of ethnolinguistic groups is definitely not unique to Indonesian multilingualism. This idea is in a way seen in Rex's liberal pluralist approach mentioned earlier. Salient to Indonesian multiculturalism model, however, is that a society is seen as having a common national mosaic culture, covering all salient cultures of local societies of Indonesia. What this means in practice is not always straightforward. One might wonder whether the Indonesian society nowadays is already a multicultural society as envisaged by the founding fathers of Indonesia, and/or as seen by outsiders.

Scholars have been engaged in Indonesian multiculturalism, and put forward various thoughts and proposal how to achieve the ideals. For example, an international symposium organised was organized lasting for 4 days in July 2002, entitled "Rebuilding Indonesia, a Nation of Unity in diversity: Toward a Multicultural Society." It was a big academic event, attended by 400 participants, with 200 presentations across 25 panels. It was attended by both domestic speakers coming from different parts of Indonesia, and international speakers coming from different countries across the globe (Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, Australia, France, England, USA, Italy, Denmark, etc.).

One of the important topics discussed in the symposium, still relevant today, is

multicultural education and tolerance. Parsudi Suparlan, a prominent Indonesian Anthropologist, in the opening of the symposium, proposed that the Ministry of National Education should include multicultural education in school curriculum, from elementary to senior high schools. According to him, there is a pressing need for this, especially for areas where bloody communal conflicts among ethnic and religious groups have happened such as in Poso Central Sulawesi and West/Central Kalimantan. The proposal was unanimously agreed and supported. Multicultural education should be promoted and is believed to be the best strategy to prevent the recurrence of such communal bloody conflict ("Kompas", July 31, 2002).

Azyumardi Azra, Professor of Social-Intellectual History and Rector of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University Jakarta, proposed that the curriculum of multicultural education in Indonesia should include subjects such as tolerance, themes on ethno-cultural and religious differences, the dangers of discrimination, conflict resolution and mediation, human rights, democracy and plurality, humanity universal, and other relevant subjects. Multicultural education as discussed in the symposium had in fact been advocated in the 1980s as 'an inclusive concept used to describe a wide variety of school practices, programs and materials designed to help children from diverse groups to experience educational equality', to deal with serious problems in society that can evoke strong emotions, feelings and highly polarize opinions' (Yang, 2022, p. 4).

However, the formulation and implementation of multicultural education in Indonesia, according to Azyumardi Azra, still requires serious and specific discussions. For example, a careful consideration is needed to decide whether multicultural education should become a separate and independent subject, or integrated into existing subjects, given the fact that Indonesian school curriculums have been quite crowded ("Kompas", July 31, 2002).

Eighteen years on, there is still a question whether the Indonesian society is indeed already multicultural, in line with the concepts of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* and *Pancasila*, and consistent with universally adopted values such as human rights and tolerance. Such question arises in light of recent troubling development of intolerance in Indonesia, where ethno-religious sentiments have been utilized for political gains; e.g. in the 2017 Jakarta's governor election and the imprisonment of former governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok. The Jakarta's case is phenomenal as it received national and international coverage for its significance. However, at the grass root and most local level in other parts of Indonesia, there is an ongoing underlying tension reflecting the dynamics of intergroup relations in the process of achieving a multicultural society, to which we now turn by looking at the case of Muslim migrants in Kelurahan Sumerta in Denpasar.

### **The Arrival of Muslim Migrants in The Village of Sumerta**

The Sumerta Muslim migrants began to settle in this village within the city of Denpasar in 1997-1998, when Indonesia was hit by the Asian economic crisis (Kayun Suhairi, personal communication, March 18, 2017). They came as economic migrants seeking work in Bali's tourist industry and related enterprises. Since then, the number Muslim migrants coming and living in Sumerta village has increased significantly, even though there was a halt temporarily due to the Bali Bombings of 2002 and 2005. Bali's tourism began to recover after 2008, resulting in a substantial increase of the number of Muslim migrants in predominantly Hindu Sumerta. This was the stimulus for the establishment of the association, PUMA. The association was initiated and established by the Muslim community leaders, who argued that such an organization was badly needed to accommodate the needs, or 'aspirations' in Indonesian

discourse, of its members. The organization would also help Muslim migrants handle a range of issues in their daily social lives, something for which the traditional banjar structure supported Hindu Balinese (Kayun Suhairi, personal communication, March 18, 2017).

### **The Birth of PUMA**

The birth of PUMA was informally proposed during a Quran recitation session organized by a migrant named Samali. He invited Muslims living in Jalan Akasia to hold such recitations regularly. In one session, after the recitation, some of the male community leaders sat around, talking about the increasing number of Muslim migrants living in Sumerta. One of them, Waluyo, proposed to form an organization. Other fellow Muslims agreed, and Waluyo was then elected as the chairperson of the association, which he was happy to accept. Currently, its members are more than fifty-four families; most of them are from Jember and other areas in East Java (Waluyo, personal communication, March 18, 2017).

In addition to Quran recitation activities, PUMA also organises social-religious events such as taraweh (prayers during the month of Ramadan) and halal-bihalal (social gatherings to celebrate the end of Ramadan), usually held outdoor in Bedugul Recreational Park in central Bali. However, if the activity takes place at the PUMA office, then the non-Muslim banjar officials including elders, community leaders, and Sumerta's Lurah (official head) are invited as guests of honour. During Idul Fitri celebration (marking the end of Ramadhan fasting), Sumerta's Village Head is invited to convey the greetings and other information to be sent to PUMA members. They also organize other celebrations, in particular the celebration of Maulid (the Prophet's birthday) and, Isra Miraj (the Prophet's spiritual journey). All of these religious activities require the proper approval or permit from such local authorities as the kelian banjar (the head of the traditional sub-village neighbourhood unit), Bintara Pembina Desa (the village military security apparatus). To maintain security during the events, pacalang ('traditional' village security) are always invited (Waluyo, personal communication, March 18, 2017). These security groups developed in the late 1990s in response to Balinese perceptions that society was becoming more dangerous, although in popular discourse they are said to have always existed.

### **The Relation Between Islamic Migrants and Local Hindus in The Sumerta Village**

Since its establishment in 2008, there have been no serious troubles in the relation between Islamic migrants and local Hindus. There have been even virtually no activities breaching from PUMA's organizational statutes. This is because no matter however small the problem is, it has been promptly resolved by the PUMA's board (Waluyo, personal communication, March 18, 2017). The interaction of Muslim PUMA members with local Hindu residents and government officials in Sumerta Village has been going well. The local government at the village level has done its function as the guardian of all religious people quite well making sure that different ethnic/religious groups can do their cultural practices freely and safely. In terms of multicultural ideals, such socio-cultural practices as seen in Sumerta can be thought of as a form of civic education in the public sphere for multiculturalism.

While on the surface there is no turmoil, one might wonder what the underlying condition is. For this, we investigated Muslim-Hindu intra/inter-group interactions, scrutinizing important intertwined identity-related symbolic variables, especially language, religion and ethnicity. Language is more than simply a means of communication; in its broad sense, it covers "not only words but also other languages of art, of gesture, of love, and the like (Taylor, 1994, p. 32.)."

Language has crucial socio-cultural symbolic functions particularly in complex multilingual settings as is the case in Bali, where it serves as a means of expressing group identity, and has unique pragmatics of inclusion and exclusion (Sosiowati et al., 2017, pp. 273-282). In this respect, the phenomenon of multilingualism and code switching/mixing is of particular interest as it is sociolinguistically motivated, as will be shown in the later part of this article (Nguyen, 2024).

Religion and ethnicity are two most important socio-cultural variables that make up groupings in Indonesian's pluralistic societies. They come with a set of shared values and common histories, identities/memberships. Pluralism/multiculturalism becomes a problem when members of different ethno-religious groups cannot manage cases when these different ethno-religious values (or the interpretation of them) are in conflict, or cannot be comfortably accommodated within the same society. Therefore, a harmonious plural, especially multicultural, society requires tolerance. This is one of the issues examined in this study as it is relevant in contemporary Indonesian context, following the widespread intolerance practices in this country in the last two decades, for example as evidenced from the attacks of Christians, Churches, and police stations and police headquarters by terrorists affiliated with groups of Muslim extremists in several places in Indonesia during recent years.

In the context of multiculturalism, ethnicity, and tolerance, the fulfilment of civic duties is very important, as has been done by the British, who have implemented multicultural education since the 1960s (Sutherland, 2024, p. 104; Callan, 2000). In the case of Sumerta, there are good lessons from this study about the interactional dynamics of minority and majority groups in the public sphere. Before discussing this, we first clarify the key terms, debates and approaches in the context of the previous studies of pluralism/multiculturalism in Bali, Indonesia and beyond.

### **Linguistic Practices**

Linguistic practices in Bali, including in the village of Sumerta, are characterized by multilingualism, used here in a broad sense to cover bilingualism. Multilingualism is defined as 'the ability of societies, institutions, groups, and individuals to engage, on a regular basis, with more than one language in their day-to-day lives' (the Council of Europe in (Krawczyk-Neifar, 2017, p.172). It is a norm in Bali, and elsewhere in Indonesia. The Balinese people speak their mother tongue, Balinese, and Indonesian equally well. The PUMA members speak their mother tongue, Javanese, and the national/lingua franca Indonesian. Some of them also speak Balinese although their Balinese is typically restricted to the low/common register. In this section we provide examples of linguistics practices of PUMA migrant members, and then discuss their significance in the context multiculturalism.

The subject of whether the Balinese language should be a compulsory subject in all Balinese education has been hotly debated in formal and social media contexts in recent decades. Prior to the 1980s, one could still find many Balinese who did not have a very good knowledge of Indonesian, and so Balinese language was present in formal education. This situation changed markedly after the 1980s, to the point where younger Balinese grew up with Indonesian as their first, rather than second language. Fearing the marginalization of their language, the Balinese have successfully advocated making the Balinese language a compulsory element of the educational curriculum ("Kompas," May, 4 2013). Based on 2006 legislation, a minimum of Balinese language was mandated in 2013. In 2018, advocates of Balinese lobbied for its compulsory use in government offices ("Antara Bali," February, 1 2018). Such use of language sends signals to non-Balinese about relations between insiders and



outsiders.

The first notable pattern of linguistics practices of PUMA migrant members is the prevalent use of Indonesian in intergroup communication, or even in intragroup communication among the PUMA members. The use of Indonesian as a lingua franca in inter-ethnic communication is not surprising, definitely not unique to the village of Sumerta. Indonesian for wider inter-ethnic communications elsewhere in Indonesia has been widely reported in previous studies (Abas, 1987; Fachrurozi, 2017, pp. 216-217).

The second pattern is the use of Javanese. It is typically used in domestic settings among the family members of the migrants. However, Indonesian, instead of Javanese, is also often used in intragroup communication among the migrants, as reported by Waluyo, a PUMA member. This is rather surprising. A plausible explanation for this is that the Muslim migrants come from different parts of Java with different Javanese dialects. Indonesian is then used as a lingua franca, an egalitarian language levelling the need to have distinct social registers, also geographical dialectal differences. In addition, the use of Indonesian appears to be motivated by a practical need in inter-group communications. Mistari explained it this way:

“As for Indonesian, we usually use it during meetings; when there is a meeting with the attendees of mixed people; so yes, we won’t use the local language but we must use the Indonesian language so that all can understand.” (Mistari, personal communication, March 24, 2017)

The third pattern is code switching done by certain PUMA members who have acquired some competency in Balinese. This is a common practice of linguistic engagement with ethnic difference in the interactional sphere. Limited code switching is possibly done by using simple tags/particles (like ‘nggih ‘yes’, tan ‘not’, both high Balinese forms) and kin terms of address like bli ‘(elder) brother’. This is a strategy to index a willingness to accommodate the local language of the ‘host’ group. A more extensive code switching is typically encountered with migrants who have settled in Sumerta for long time and/or who are married to the Balinese. Puji Suwanto, for example, from Jember East Java, moved to Bali in 1990 and married a Balinese from Singaraja, North Bali. His family members are multi-linguals, with code switching (Indonesian-Balinese-Javanese words or phrases) is a common practice in the family. The same code-switching practice in the family domain has been reported by Waluyo and Mistari.

According to Waluyo, the PUMA migrants consider that they feel obliged to use Balinese, or code switching with Balinese, or Indonesian, instead of using Javanese when they communicate among themselves in public space in the presence of the Balinese around. This is to avoid misunderstanding. For the migrants who have acquired competence in Balinese, the PUMA members are encouraged to use Balinese especially when communicating with the local Balinese. In fact, as reported by Mistari, they do prefer to speak Balinese in such a situation. This is a deliberate choice of symbolic gesture to show cross-cultural awareness and respect to the local Balinese. They expect that such linguistic practice would lead to a harmonious inter-ethnic/personal relation. This symbolic engagement is a kind of linguistic accommodation to efface conditions of ethnic, ingroup/outgroup difference and possible local resentments (Lele, 2021, pp. 8).

However, when they know that the Balinese interlocutor is of high caste (which requires a proper high register in Balinese), they usually switch to Indonesian. Mistari described the language choice in such a situation as follows:

"In order not to make mistakes, we just use the Indonesian language when we talk to a high-caste Balinese. I may still be able to speak (proper/high register) Balinese (for this), but my fellow Javanese migrants may not understand it; so we just use the Indonesian language so that there won't be any problems." (Mistari, personal communication, March 24, 2017)

Such issues are not uncommon in urban settings, where Balinese too are anxious not to offend by using the wrong language level, although in the case of Balinese usage, this is usually handled by using high status forms of words. Balinese also use a lot of Indonesian vocabulary in their use of Balinese language.

To conclude, linguistic practices so far outlined reflect some degree of diglossic (indigenous) multilingualism: Indonesian is used as a language for wider inter-ethnic communications, also used in formal context and perceived as having high social status. Balinese and Javanese as local ethnic languages are used typically in informal contexts e.g. in domestic and intragroup communications. Code switching in inter-ethnic communication is deliberately used with symbolic pragmatic intent to show respect and engagement with the local culture in the context of harmonious inter-ethnic relations.

Turning to the relation between multilingualism and multiculturalism, we can have a space as represented in Table 1 below. Multilingualism and multiculturalism are complex notions, and the relation of the two is also equally complex. The binary notation of +/- in each of the two should be understood as representing the opposite ends of the degrees of presence and absence of multilingualism/multiculturalism. That is, their presence at the individual and societal levels is a matter of continuum. In what follows, we only discuss the spaces that are relevant for our present study, namely cell (3) "multilingual societies/individuals that are not multicultural", and cell (4) "multilingual societies/individuals that are also multicultural". We ignore cells (1)-(2) as we are not dealing with monolinguals. It should be noted that on the notion of multilingualism at the societal level, [+multilingual] in Table 1 could mean a society comprising of distinct monolingual groups. Thus, cell (3) represents ambiguous situations. First, it captures the common case with individual members of the society being multi/bilinguals (to be discussed below). Second, it also captures the society comprising of monolingual groups, counted as 'plural society' in Furnivall's sense (Kusumaryati, 2023, p. 202). This is extremely unusual in modern era, not attested in Sumerta and it perhaps does not exist elsewhere in contemporary Indonesia.

		multicultural	
		-	+
multilingual	-	(1): -/-	(2): -/+
	+	(3): +/-	(4): +/+

**Table 1.** The Interrelation of Multiculturalism and Multilingualism

On the basis of what we know about the patterns of linguistic practices (i.e. multilingualism) and patterns of cultural practices as discussed earlier (i.e. multiculturalism) as shown in Table 1, we argue that the Sumerta society is essentially within cell (3), with some sign of properties leaning towards (4). As mentioned in the beginning of this subsection, the Sumerta society is multilingual in the sense that individuals or ethnic-groups in Sumerta, in this case the Balinese and PUMA members, are able to engage with more than one language

in their daily lives. Of course, their proficiency of engagement across different languages is of varying degrees. For example, certain PUMA migrant members who are able to speak Balinese can engage only in the common/low register of Balinese, and switch to Indonesian if they know that their Balinese interlocutors are of higher caste status.

On the basis of 'engagement', parallel to the definition of multilingualism given in the beginning of this subsection, we can also define multiculturalism as the proficiency of cultural engagement: the ability of individuals or groups of individuals to engage with more than one culture in their day-to-day lives. On this view, while PUMA migrant members have been demonstrated to show some degree of cultural awareness in multicultural communication (e.g. using code-switching with certain pragmatic intent as discussed earlier), on the basis of our ethnographic work, they are typically not (yet) proficient multicultural agents. That is, most of them are not yet able to perform a high level of engagement with the Balinese culture in their everyday lives. Most of the engagements are symbolic in nature, as we shall discuss below.

In fact, because the Balinese culture is primarily Hinduism based, and the PUMA's is Islam based, active cultural engagements of the PUMA migrant members in Balinese culture (or vice versa, the Balinese group in Islamic culture) would only be possible within certain limits. In other words, full or deep cultural engagements may not be allowed on religious grounds. An individual for example cannot be both a Muslim and a Hindu at the same time in the current legal system in Indonesia. Thus, a PUMA migrant who married a Balinese wife has to choose either religious affiliation. Being a Muslim, he may have acquired a high degree of Balinese cultural knowledge, potentially allowing him to have an active engagement in the Balinese culture. However, as a Muslim, he will be prohibited by the Hindu based *awig-awig* (i.e. customary laws) to participate in local Hinduism related cultural events. Note that his Islam religion will also prohibit him from active engagement in non-Islamic cultural practices.

Thus, a truly multicultural society with deep inter-group cultural engagement would be in theory impossible. The engagements are therefore understandably typically symbolic, confined to certain non-religious roles; e.g. the involvement of the *pacalang* as the security as mentioned earlier. Likewise, certain ritual practices and arts performances linked to religious identity are highly sensitive, and cannot be mixed. For example, it would be impossible if the Hindu Balinese to participate in the collective ritual prayers of *sholawatan*. Likewise, it is impossible for the migrants to perform Balinese dances such as Rejang Renteng, a sacred dance usually performed in Hindu temples during the *piodalan* ritual. The participation of the Balinese or the migrant in these events is at best as helpers and on-lookers.

To conclude, the individuals and ethnic/religious groups in Sumerta are primarily engaged with their own cultural practices. This suggests a characteristic of Rex's (2010, p. 155) cultural pluralism as each group maintains its cultural boundaries. They, however, show awareness of each other's cultures, and have demonstrated limited cultural engagements characterizing multiculturalism for symbolic reasons. These facts support the analysis that we primarily have a culturally plural society in Sumerta.

## Conclusion

This paper has discussed indigenous multiculturalism involving majority-minority intergroup relations in the village of Sumerta in Bali, contributing to the debate on the distinction of cultural pluralism and multiculturalism. It has presented the complex dynamics how inter-ethnic/religious group relations have evolved, with the Javanese Muslim migrants successfully maintaining harmonious relations with the dominant Hindus.

The behavioural characteristics exhibited by both groups as seen by their religious, cultural and linguistic practices suggest a village-level plural society mirroring the society of Bali and Indonesia. Individuals and ethnic/religious (sub)groups are well aware of the ideals of Pancasila-based multiculturalism because such multiculturalism is part of the national ideology of Indonesia. Ethnic groups show active engagements with different cultures in the society. The engagements are however essentially symbolic and limited in nature, typically intended as a public display serving as informal civic education to the public towards a socially tolerant and harmonious society.

### Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank I Wayan Arka, Professor of Linguistics, FASSA, FAHA, School of Culture, History and Language, Australian National University, who not only read [this work], but also provided comments and taught methods for analysing data on the relationship between multilingualism and multiculturalism, as presented in Table 1 in this article. The first author acknowledges the support of the grant "Cultural Practices of Bali Culture in Sumerta Denpasar Timur Village 2002-2017" from the History Study Program Faculty of Arts Udayana University, 2017. The first author also thanks the students of the History Program who have participated in the research.

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