

Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: From Confrontation to Normalization (1963–1967)

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Abstract

This study examines the evolution of Indonesia-Malaysia relations during the confrontation and normalization phase from 1963 to 1967, employing historical analysis. Initially characterized by collaboration after Malaysia gained independence in 1957, the bilateral ties worsened between 1961 and 1965 due to conflicts and hostilities. The study emphasizes significant elements of Indonesia's confrontation strategy, such as the Dwikora policy, which aimed to bolster the Indonesian revolution and support revolutionary activities in Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak, and Brunei. It also examines the enforcement of Komando Operasi Tertinggi (KOTI) Order No. 1 of 1963, which severed economic and trade ties with Singapore and Malaysia, and Indonesia's 1965 decision to exit the United Nations. Additionally, the research outlines the conflict's resolution, highlighted by the 1966 Bangkok conference where both nations agreed to restore relations, followed by Indonesia's return to the United Nations later that year. These insights enhance the comprehension of the political and diplomatic transformations influencing Southeast Asian interstate relations during this pivotal era.

Keywords: Indonesia-Malaysia Relations; Confrontation; Dwikora Policy; Komando Operasi Tertinggi (KOTI); Normalization Period.

Introduction

Indonesia and Malaysia had built its relations since ancient times. Nowadays, the two countries are still collaborating in several fields, including economic, social, education, tourism, etc. In the economic sector, both Indonesia and Malaysia have agreed to work together in developing oil palm plantations. Meanwhile, in the field of education, Indonesia and Malaysia are also keen to carry out student exchanges (Asmarani, 2013, p. 6).

Indonesia-Malaysia relations has gone through various periods, the first is the relationship during the golden age of Malay-Indonesia, the second is the era of Western and Japanese colonialism, and the last is the period of the struggle for independence (Muniandy, 1996, p. 5). As we know, in the Hindu Buddhist era, the Southeast Asian region was full of great kingdoms whose legacies we can still see today, namely Srivijaya, Majapahit and Malacca. Both countries are proud to recognize the greatness of the kingdoms that developed

in the Malay Archipelago (Maksum, 2017, p. 6), because these kingdoms brought the Malay Archipelago in a more advanced direction, especially in the field of economic trade. Favorable geographical factors mean that the Nusantara (Indonesia) and the Malay Peninsula (Malaysia) regions are visited by many foreigners, therefore cultural assimilation and the spread of religion are also very easy to form so that relations between the people of the Archipelago and Malaya become closer.

The second stage began when Western nations began to enter Southeast Asia, such as the Portuguese, Dutch, and British. The arrival of Western nations who wanted to dominate Trade and expanding territory in Southeast Asia made local people want to fight back. Even though it took a long time, a sense of nationalism began to grow in the hearts of the people of the archipelago and Malaya. The arrival of Japan to the Southeast Asia region in the World War II era also strengthened their sense of nationalism, even at that time the idea of forming a Greater Indonesia was heard, which was a combination of the powers of Indonesia and Malaya.

Continuing from the previous era, revolution after revolution had occurred in Indonesia as proof of resistance against the Dutch, the Malayan people who felt the same fate helped Indonesia in various forms, from moral, financial, to sending volunteers to help the Indonesian people on the battlefield. After Indonesia and Malaya became independent in 1945 and 1957, the two countries officially formed a new bilateral relationship which was expected to bring many benefits and preserve the long-standing relationship.

That background shows that Indonesia-Malaysia relations have deep and complex historical roots. These strong historical, cultural, and emotional ties then became the foundation for the establishment of official bilateral relations after both countries gained independence (1945 and 1957). However, despite this historical and cultural closeness, Indonesia, Malaysia relations have experienced ups and downs, including periods of tension and open confrontation in 1963–1966, before ultimately rebuilding cooperation in various sectors (economy, education, tourism) as seen today. The gap between this profound historical, cultural closeness and the reality of relations that were at times marked by conflict is the central problem requiring further study, especially to explain the actors involved in the dynamics of these relations, from the era of confrontation to normalization.

Rahman and Adriani (n.d.), in their work titled “Role of the Armed Forces on the Normalization Between Indonesia and Malaysia: A Socio-Politics Perspective,” outline the important role of the armed forces in the process of normalizing diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Malaysia. Their focus is on the dynamics of Indonesian military politics during the 1960s, particularly in the transition phase from confrontation to normalization. To analyze this phenomenon, the authors employ several theoretical frameworks: conflict theory, which sees conflict as an inevitable power relationship between those in power and those who are not; status incongruity theory, which explains the emergence of conflict due to status disparities in social mobility; and military or praetorian leadership theory, which illustrates how the weakness of civilian governments can allow the military to resume control.

In addition, Rahman and Adriani (n.d.) position Indonesia–Malaysia relations in a historical context as a close-knit community or family that simultaneously exhibits both love and hate, influenced by shared geopolitical, geographical, economic, cultural, and emotional conditions. They conclude that the political–military dynamics of Indonesia in the 1960s played a central role in both the confrontation and normalization processes between the two countries, analyzed through a political science perspective. In this work, the process toward normalization and its impacts are explained chronologically, focusing on several key

questions: how the historical and cultural ties formed since the era of the Malay–Nusantara kingdoms through the independence struggle have influenced the bilateral relationship patterns of the two countries; why, despite strong historical and emotional closeness, Indonesia and Malaysia’s relations still underwent periods of confrontation and political tension; how the role of the armed forces and Indonesian military politics shaped these dynamics during the period from confrontation to normalization; and how the transition process from confrontation to normalization took place and what factors encouraged both countries to rebuild bilateral cooperation after conflict.

Method

This research employs the historical method, which consists of four stages: heuristics, source criticism, interpretation, and historiography. The first stage, heuristics, involves the activity of seeking sources to obtain data, material, or historical evidence. Sources are the most essential aspect in composing historical works, as historical sources are materials that can be used to gather information concerning events that occurred in the past and are needed to reconstruct those events. The primary sources used in this research comprise legislation and contemporary documents, including Law No. 5 of 1966 regarding agreements to normalize relations between the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia; Presidential Decree No. 112 of 1967 concerning the transfer of responsibility for the normalization settlement between Indonesia–Malaysia and Singapore from the Chief of Staff KOTI to the Presidium of the Ampera Cabinet; the document Foreign Operations Appropriations For 1965 from the Congress House Appropriations (1964); as well as official publications of the RI Department of Information, *20 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka Volume VI* (1965). Additionally, records of institutional contemporary history were also used, such as *Sejarah TNI-AD, 1945–1973* from the Army Historical Service (1979), *Sedjarah TNI-AD Kodam VII/Diponegoro* from Military History Kodam VII/Diponegoro (1971), and *Tandjungpura Fighting: History of Kodam XII/ Tandjungpura* from Semdam XII/ Tandjungpura (1970).

The second stage is source criticism, which is the assessment and examination of the historical sources that have been collected, both internally (internal criticism) and externally (external criticism). Internal criticism relates to the credibility or the level of reliability in a source’s content, while external criticism concerns the authenticity or originality of the source itself. This stage determines the next steps in the interpretation stage. The third stage is interpretation, which is the interpretation or understanding of facts that have undergone the process of source criticism. In reconstructing history, the researcher attempts to unravel sources that sometimes contain various possibilities, so that a logical structure can be found based on existing facts. These various facts are then arranged into sequential generalizations so that they assume form and structure, after which the data collected are woven together into accurate facts. This stage is divided into two steps: analysis and synthesis; analysis means breaking down, while synthesis means uniting. In the interpretation stage, the researcher is expected to be able to discover missing links from the sequence of past events and to explain the historical realities that occurred. The final stage is historiography or the writing of history, namely the presentation of the synthesis obtained through research. After conducting data analysis, a synthesis of the research findings is produced and presented in the form of a written historical work. The author explains all data that have been selected and interpreted based on the principle of chronology. This stage is the final stage for the researcher to present all facts in written form, as writing (synthesis) is the last step in the writing of history (Gottschalk, 1969, p. 56).

Background and Forms of Indonesia's Confrontation with Malaysia

Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia in this case is considered an 'undeclared war'. It also considers that the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia is the biggest form of conflict that caused misery to the relationship between two countries in Southeast Asia (Ghani and Paidi, 2013, p. 129). The confrontation that occurred between Indonesia and Malaysia was actually not just limited to Sukarno's confrontation with the formation of the Malaysian Federation. In this case, Soekarno considered the formation of the Malaysian Federation to be a form of neo-colonialism that could endanger Indonesia (Kusmayadi, 2017, p. 24).

The formation of the Malaysian Federation was first initiated on 27 May 1961 by Tengku Abdul Rahman who was the Prime Minister of Malaysia. The Malaysian Federation was formed to unite former British colonies in Southeast Asia such as Malaysia, Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei (Habiastuti and Sumarno, 2016, p. 416). The formation of the Malaysian Federation in this case certainly received support from the British because it provided benefits for them. It can be said that because the Malaysian Federation was a way for Britain to decolonize Southeast Asia but still maintain the existing military base in Singapore. Maintaining a military base in Singapore via Malaysia allowed Britain to remain a global power in a cheaper and more effective way (Ghani and Paidi, 2013, p. 130). The plan to form the Malaysian Federation was initially accepted by the Indonesian government, especially at that time the Indonesian government was focused on the West Irian issue. The plan for the formation of the Malaysian Federation then reached an agreement with the British in June 1962 to ratify the formation of the Malaysian Federation on 31 August 1963 (Nur and Ravico, 2021, p. 6).

Regarding this matter, the Indonesian government then realized that the formation of the Malaysian Federation endangered the continuity of Indonesian government. In this case, Soekarno as the president of Indonesia considered that the Malaysian Federation should be rejected because it was a form of neo-colonialism. Malaysia in this regard was seen as a British puppet by Soekarno. If Indonesia allows the Malaysian Federation to be formed, it will make British control in Southeast Asia stronger, which in this case could endanger the existence of independent Indonesia. Apart from Indonesia, the Philippines is also a country that does not agree with the formation of the Malaysian Federation. In this case, the Philippines is making demands on the Sabah region because it is motivated by historical factors through the Hulu Sultanate. On January 20, 1963, Subandrio, as the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, then stated that Malaysia had openly become a lackey of imperialism and was carrying out a form of hostility towards Indonesia. Regarding this matter, the Indonesian Government in this case then made efforts to block plans for the peaceful formation of the Malaysian Federation. This effort was carried out by holding meetings such as a conference attended by the deputy foreign minister in Manila on 9–17 April 1963, a Tokyo meeting attended by Soekarno and Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman on 31 May to 1 June 1963 (Kusmayadi, 2017, p. 26).

Apart from holding meetings in Manila and Tokyo, on 7–11 June 1963 a meeting was also held which was also attended by Foreign Ministers from Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. Through this meeting, the President of the Philippines then created the idea of creating a Malay national group which was later named Maphilindo (Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia). The meeting also produced important points regarding the political attitudes of Indonesia and the Philippines towards the formation of the Malaysian Federation. In this case, the two countries agreed to agree to the formation of the Malaysian Federation provided that it must be compatible based on the right to free and neutral self-determination. A series of

meetings were held in Manila, namely on 30 July – 5 August 1963. In these meetings, there was an agreement in the form of asking the UN to form a referendum regarding the willingness of the Sabah and Sarawak regions to be willing to join the Malaysian Federation or reluctant. When the referendum results come out, both Indonesia and Malaysia will accept the results of the decision (Irshanto, 2019, p. 95).

Regarding this matter, the UN on August 15 sent Laurence Michelmore as chairman on a mission to carry out an opinion poll to determine the willingness of the Sarawak and Sabah regions to join the Malaysian Federation. Regarding this mission, Tunku Abdul Rahman responded to the opinion poll by postponing the inauguration of the formation of the Malaysian Federation. The inauguration of the Malaysian Federation, which was initially planned for 31 August 1963, was then postponed to 16 September 1963. The postponement by the Malaysian Government was protested by the Indonesian Government. According to the Indonesian government, it is feared that the postponed inauguration could affect the results of decisions based on opinion polls.

On September 14, 1963, the results of the opinion poll came out. Based on this opinion poll, the UN in this case stated that the majority of the people who inhabit Sabah and Sarawak are in favor of forming a federation. In response to this, Indonesia and the Philippines protested because they thought there was a conspiracy from England. For this reason, Indonesia and the Philippines submitted a rejection. Not only that, Indonesia and the Philippines also rejected the formation of the Malaysian Federation which would be inaugurated on September 16, 1963, because it was not in line with UN Resolution No. 1541 article 9 concerning the colonization and decolonization of colonial countries. However, the objections submitted by the two countries were not responded to by the UN.

In accordance with the plan, Malaysia then officially formalized the formation of the Malaysian Federation on September 16, 1963. This made Indonesia break diplomatic relations with Malaysia on September 17, 1963. After the termination of relations, both Indonesia and Malaysia were filled with demonstrations, namely from the date 18 September to 21 September 1963. On 23 September 1963, Soekarno formally issued a slogan called "Ganyang Malaysia" as the beginning of the confrontation after the Malaysian Federation was officially formed. Indonesian government carried out of confrontation in both economic, political and military aspects as follows.

Dwikora Policy

Dwi Komando Rakyat (Dwikora) policy was formed in Jakarta on May 3, 1964. It consists of two main points: (1) increasing the resilience of the Indonesian revolution; (2) helping the revolutionary struggle of the people of Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak, Brunei to thwart the puppet state of Malaysia (Humaidi, 2020, p. 52).

Since Dwikora was issued, Soekarno in this case also formed the Komando Siaga to regulate the implementation of the war against Malaysia (Operation Dwikora). Komando Siaga was a command which later became known as the Komando Mandala Siaga (Kolaga). Colleagues in carried out their duties were formed based on several commands, namely (1) Komando Tempur Satu (Kopurtu) which is intended for the Malay Peninsula area, (2) Komando Tempur Dua (Kopurda) which is aimed at the North Kalimantan area, (3) Komando Armada Mandala Siaga (Koarlaga), (4) Komando Strategi Siaga (Kostraga), and (5) Komando Logistik Siaga (Kologa) (Dinas Sejarah Militer Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat, 1979, pp. 163 -164).

Sukarno announced confrontation with Malaysia by issuing again the famous jargon,

namely "Ganyang Malaysia" on July 27, 1964, (Maksum, 2017, p. 15). On August 16, 1964, troops from the Di Raja Askar Melayu Regiment faced fifty Indonesian guerrillas. Although the Philippines did not participate in the war, they broke diplomatic relations with Malaysia. Tensions are growing on both sides in the Malacca Strait. Two days later rioters burned the British embassy in Jakarta. Several hundred rioters seized the Singapore embassy in Jakarta and the homes of Singaporean diplomats. In Malaysia, Indonesian agents were arrested and mobs attacked the Indonesian embassy in Kuala Lumpur. Along the border in Kalimantan, border wars occurred. Indonesian troops and unofficial troops tried to occupy Sarawak and Sabah, without success.

In 1964 Indonesian troops began attacking areas on the Malay Peninsula. In May 1964, the Standby Command was formed which was tasked with coordinating war activities against Malaysia (Operation Dwikora). This command later changed to Mandala Siaga Command (Kolaga). Kolaga is led by Air Admiral Omar Dani as Commander in Chief, assisted by two deputy commanders, Marine Rear Admiral Mulyadi, and Brigadier General Achmad Wiranatakusumah and Chief of Staff of Air Commodore LWJ Watimena (Pusponegoro and Notosusanto, 2019, p. 466).

Kolaga itself consists of three commands, namely the First Combat Command (Kopurtu) based in Sumatra which consists of 12 TNI-AD battalions, including three Para Battalions and one KKO battalion. This command's operational target is the Malay Peninsula and is led by Brigadier General Kemal Idris as Pangkopur-I. The Second Combat Command (Kopurda) is based in Bengkayang, West Kalimantan and consists of 13 Battalions originating from KKO, AURI and RPKAD elements. This command was led by Brigadier General Soepardjo as Pangkopur-II. The third command is the Standby Fleet Command which consists of elements of the TNI-AL and the KKO. This command is equipped with a Landing Brigade and operates on the borders of Riau and East Kalimantan.

In August 1964, sixteen-armed Indonesian agents were arrested in Johor. The activity of the Indonesian Armed Forces at the border has also increased. The Royal Malaysian Navy deployed its troops to defend Malaysia. Only a small number of Malaysian troops were deployed and had to rely on border posts and the supervision of commando units. Their main mission was to prevent the entry of Indonesian troops into Malaysia. Most of the parties involved in the armed conflict with Indonesia were England and Australia, especially their special forces, namely the Special Air Service (SAS). It was recorded that around 2000 Indonesian troops were killed and 200 British/Australian (SAS) troops were also killed after fighting in the jungles of Kalimantan (Angkasa, 2006).

On 17 August 1964 paratroopers landed on the southwest coast of Johor and tried to form a guerrilla force. On 2 September 1964 paratroopers landed in Labis, Johor. On 29 October 1964, 52 soldiers landed in Pontian on the Johor-Malacca border and killed troops from the Askar Melayu Regiment in Raja and New Zealand and destroyed the General Movement of the Royal Malaysian Police in Batu 20, Muar, Johor. When the UN accepted Malaysia as a non-permanent member, Sukarno withdrew Indonesia from the UN on January 20, 1965, and tried to form the Conference of New Emerging Forces (Conefo) as an alternative. As a rival to the Olympics, Sukarno even organized GANEFO (Games of the New Emerging Forces) which was held in Senayan, Jakarta on 10-22 November 1963. This sporting event was attended by 2,250 athletes from 48 countries in Asia, Africa, Europe and South America, as well as covered by around 500 foreign journalists.

In January 1965, Australia agreed to send troops to Kalimantan after receiving numerous requests from Malaysia. Australian forces fielded the 3rd Royal Australian Regiment and the

Australian Special Air Service Regiment. There were approximately fourteen thousand British and Commonwealth troops in Australia at the time. Officially, British and Australian troops could not follow the attackers through the Indonesian border. However, units such as the Special Air Service, both British and Australian, entered in secret (see Operation Claret). Australia recognized this intrusion activity in 1996.

In mid-1965, Indonesia began using its official troops. On 28 June 1965, they crossed the border into eastern Sebatik Island near Tawau, Sabah and were confronted by the Askar Melayu Di Raja Regiment and the North Borneo Armed Constabulary Police. On July 1, 1965, the Indonesian military with a strength of approximately 5000 people attacked the Malaysian Navy base in Semporna. Attacks and sieges continued until 8 September 1965 but failed. This event is known as the "68 Day Siege" by Malaysians. Since it was formed in 1963, Operation Dwikora then stopped in 1966. Troops taking part in Operation Dwikora were little by little withdrawn from the field of duty since May 1966 (Sedjarah Militer Kodam VII/Diponegoro, 1971).

Termination of Economic Traffic Relations

Based on KOTI Order No. 1 of 1963, the Indonesian Government decided to terminate economic/trade traffic relations with Singapore and Malaysia. In this case, the termination of economic relations carried out by Indonesia has shaken traders and industrial players in Singapore. It can be said that because Indonesia is one of Singapore's trade sources. Apart from Singapore, the termination of trade relations carried out by Indonesia has made goods export activities not run smoothly because usually the process of exporting goods from Indonesia is destined for and distributed through Singapore and Malaysia. This makes Indonesia must look for trade relations and other markets. This business certainly experienced obstacles due to the influence of the British which made it difficult for the Indonesian government to establish trade relations with other countries (Semdam XII/Tandjungpura, 1970, p. 65).

The severing of relations between Indonesia and Malaysia is also demonstrated by the air transportation between Indonesia and the territory of the Malaysian Federation. In this case, Garuda flights to Singapore and Kuala Lumpur are not running. Regarding this matter, the Garuda aviation service had to change the Jakarta-Bangkok-Hongkong route, which originally crossed Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, to become Jakarta-Medan-Bangkok-Hongkong. Regarding Singapore and Kuala Lumpur being removed from flight routes in Indonesia, it turns out that Garuda is still making progress. Even though Singapore and Kuala Lumpur are no longer on the list of flights in Indonesia, demand remains strong for the Jakarta-Hongkong-Tokyo route. Garuda has also succeeded in increasing the frequency of its Jakarta-Bangkok-Hongkong-Tokyo flight service to three times a week (Departemen Penerangan RI, 1965, pp. 498-499).

Apart from that, the Indonesian government is also dedollarizing or converting rupiah in Tanjung Pinang, Riau Islands. Starting October 15, 1963, Singapore and Malaysian dollars were not used in Tanjung Pinang. The currency was confiscated and converted into KR.RP (Riau Islands Rupiah) at an exchange rate of 1:1. In this case, KR.RP 3.0 is the same as 1,000, -.

The de-dollarization carried out by the Indonesian Government as a form of confrontation has caused difficulties for the people living in Tanjung Pinang. It can be said that this is because the prices of goods are rising and crucial needs for society are becoming increasingly difficult to obtain. In this case, trade relations with the Singapore market as mentioned have stopped operating. This means that people's production cannot be sold. Not only that, but several necessities also that are considered basic and originate from Singapore

have been stopped from being distributed to the region. Regarding this, necessities are then taken from Pekan Baru and other areas even though at high prices (Sutjiatiningsih and Winoto, 1999, p. 87).

Indonesia Leaves the UN

When the Indonesian government was led by Soekarno, Indonesia left the UN because Malaysia was accepted as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council on January 7, 1965. Officially, Indonesia left the UN based on a letter issued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on January 20, 1965, which in this case contains Indonesia's decision to leave the UN starting from January 1 1965. Indonesia's departure from the UN was carried out by Indonesia not participating in the session and even by leaving special agencies such as UNESCO, UNICEF and FAO (Irsahanto, 2021, p. 124).

Indonesia's departure from the UN made Indonesia cornered from the international world. However, Indonesia's departure from the UN was supported by China. Related to this, Indonesia's foreign policy when led by Soekarno was more inclined towards socialist-communist countries. In this case, Soekarno's tendency towards communist socialist countries made the Indonesian government deviate from its free and active commitment. Soekarno responded to the allied countries by forming a joint axis with the communist country, namely China. After getting support from the country, Soekarno then created a new movement known as the "Jakarta-Phnom Penh-Hanoi-Beijing-Pyongyang Axis". Soekarno stated the formation of this movement when making a state speech on August 17, 1965. In this speech, he explained that the formation of this movement was an anti-imperialism and colonialism stance, which in this case had the aim of being able to balance with Western countries (Darwis, 2019, pp. 90-91).

Apart from that, Sukarno as President of Indonesia also wanted to create a new world, which in this case gave birth to the terms Nefos (New Emerging Forces) and Oldefos (Old Established Forces) (Irshanto, 2019, p. 125). Soekarno defined Nefos as oppressed and progressive countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, socialist countries, and progressive groups within capitalist countries. Meanwhile, Oldefos is defined as a country of imperialists, colonialists, neo-colonists and capitalists who endanger world safety (Congress House Appropriations, 1954, p. 544). The embodiment of his thoughts after leaving the UN was to create a rival organization in the form of the Conference of the New Emerging Forces (Conefo). Conefo contains recently independent countries which include countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America and whose countries are guided by communism and are anti-colonialism and imperialism. Discussions in this organization are not necessarily related to politics but also to other fields, for example sports, which in this case is realized by forming a sports competition called GANEFO (Irshanto, 2019, p. 125).

Through the course that Soekarno took after leaving the UN, Indonesia finally experienced repression from Western countries. Moreover, the economic crisis occurred domestically. Soekarno in this case did not receive foreign aid because he thought it was because of his dispute with Western countries. This makes the economy in Indonesia not good, inflation and unemployment are not at low levels at all. Apart from that, political conflicts are also increasingly complicated, for example between the PKI and the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) (Darwis, 2019).

The End of the Indonesia Malaysia Confrontation

There was an important event that brought the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation towards a

final settlement. The first event was pressure from the Singaporean people, so Lee Kwan Yew held a meeting with Tunku Abdur Rahman to discuss the demands of the Singaporean people. Because there was no agreement between UMNO and PAP as the ruling parties in each region and in early June 1965 the Malaysian leaders agreed to the separation of Singapore which was officially declared by Lee Kwan Yew as the first president on August 9, 1965 (Wulandari, 2008, p. 81).

The occurrence of the rebellion in 1965 was also another cause for the end of the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation, because the Indonesian government was busy with efforts to suppress the 30 September 1965 movement. Although in the end the movement could be handled, this caused the desire to continue confrontation with Malaysia to decrease. Moreover, at that time President Soekarno handed over his position to Suharto. The domestic conflict in Indonesia caused the desire to continue the war with Malaysia to decrease and the war subsided.

On 28 May 1966 at a conference in Bangkok, despite the objections of Sukarno (who was no longer in effective control of the government), the Kingdom of Malaysia and the Indonesian government announced the resolution of the conflict and normalization of relations between the two countries. The violence ended in June 1966, and a peace agreement was signed on August 11, 1966, and formalized two days later. The fastest way to end this conflict is to use a family solution that ensures communication between the two countries is not interrupted. Evidently, the main figures in the negotiations in Bangkok, namely Adam Malik and Tun Abdul Razak, are two distant cousins (Irshanto, 2019). In the history of the two countries, both Indonesia and Malaysia, things have not always gone smoothly, there have been ripples and conflicts that have colored the dynamics of the relationship between the two countries.

Normalization of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations in 1966-1967

G30S Events and Normalization of Indonesia-Malaysia Relations

The normalization of relations between Indonesia and Malaya was the impact of the G30S incident. This incident forced President Sukarno's leadership to step down from his position and a new figure emerged during the political crisis, namely General Suharto as Indonesia's new rising star. Suharto, who was known to be close to Malaysia, clearly had an impact on the normalization of relations between the two countries which were being hit by conflict due to confrontation. Suharto's closeness to Malaysia ultimately accelerated the normalization of relations between Indonesia and Malaysia.

On 28 May 1966 at a conference in Bangkok, the Kingdom of Malaysia and the Indonesian government announced the resolution of the conflict and normalization of relations between the two countries. The violence ended in June, and a peace agreement was signed on August 11, 1966, and the confrontation officially ended in Bangkok, Thailand (Maksum, 2017, p. 20).

The two delegations met in Bangkok, the Indonesian delegation was represented by Minister of Foreign Affairs Adam Malik, and Malaysia was represented by Timbalan/Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, Tun Abdul Razak. The clear implication is that Indonesia's attitude towards Malaysia changed drastically, even having an impact on regional integration, namely the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967.

Relations between the two countries are also increasingly constructive, as stated in the form of Law Number 5 of 1966, dated 17 October 1966. Article 1 states the agreement to Normalize Relations between the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia dated eleven (11) of

August one thousand nine hundred and six twenty-six (1966) of which a copy is attached to this Law, is hereby approved. Article 2. The above agreement comes into force on the date of its signature. Article 3. So that everyone is aware, this Law is ordered to be promulgated by placing it in the State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia.

Explanation of UU no. 5 of 1966 concerning the agreement to normalize relations between the republics of Indonesia and Malaysia stated that after the G-30-S/PKI was crushed, the Government decided to negotiate directly with the Malaysian Federation, without the intermediary of a third party. One of the first steps was the sending of a goodwill mission by ABRI to Kuala Lumpur, which was followed a few days later by a meeting in Bangkok between the Deputy Regional Military for Social and Political Affairs Adam Malik and the Deputy Regional Military Minister for the Malaysian Federation Tun Abdul Razak on 1 June 1966. The Bangkok meeting resulted in an exchange of letters containing principles for an agreement to resolve the Malaysian issue (UU No. 5 Tahun 1966). This was confirmed by the enactment of the Presidential Decree of the Republic of Indonesia no 112 of 1967.

The most important principle is regarding the status of Sabah and Sarawak in the Federation of Malaysia which according to the Exchange of Letters in Bangkok will be redetermined through a general election, which is broader and directly includes the people of Sabah and Sarawak, compared to the way the UN Committee examines the wishes of the people of both This area, which is based on the Manila Agreement, is practically only limited to checking lists and asking questions to certain groups of voters.

If the Republic of Indonesia in this relationship still adheres to the letters of the Manila Agreements to resolve the main problems arising from the formation of the Malaysian Federation, then it can be calculated that the UN will not be willing to once again carry out what is stated in the Manila Agreements, moreover because the UN itself has also recognized the Malaysian Federation which also includes Sabah and Sarawak as its members. On the other hand, if the spirit of the Manila Agreements is used as a guide, then the results of the Bangkok negotiations will clearly more than fulfill what is contained in the Manila Agreements in question.

Therefore, the Government is trying again to make direct contacts with the Malaysian Federation to reformulate the formulation that was found in Bangkok in the form of an agreement. This effort was successful with the signing of an agreement that would normalize relations between the two countries on August 11, 1966, in Jakarta, as submitted to the current DPR-GR Session for approval.

This agreement is the result of a sincere deliberation between two brotherly nations to resolve a common problem. This also clearly proves that Asian problems must be resolved by the Asian people themselves in a uniquely Asian way. It is in this spirit that we can look forward together to outline a new pattern based on mutual understanding and cooperation for the common good.

This agreement is a starting point for the Indonesian people and the Malaysian people to plan to work together towards a more peaceful and happier future. The understanding and implementation of this agreement is in accordance with all information and explanations provided by the government regarding all materials related to this agreement.

Several similarities between these two countries have resulted in the return of relations which were originally tenuous to strong, the implementation of the vision and mission between Indonesia and Malaysia prioritizing regional neutrality in political policies which aims to support regional balance in relation to the stability of their respective countries. Indonesia's foreign policy prioritizes improving the strained relations with Malaysia during

the Soekarno era. Soeharto assumed that Sukarno's leadership caused relations between countries to become unharmonious, an economic crisis occurred, and space for Indonesia was closed in the international arena.

To overcome these problems by rebuilding relations between countries, especially neighboring countries that are considered brothers. After Indonesia-Malaysia relations improved, they also entered cooperation to obtain reciprocity for their country. There was an attempt to approach again to end the previous upheaval that had occurred, finally the two countries entered into an agreement stating the normalization of the two countries concerned by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Formation of ASEAN

The form of cooperation carried out by the two countries, namely Indonesia and Malaysia, can be seen as the formation of ASEAN in 1967 with three other countries in the Southeast Asia region such as the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. This is a manifestation of the beginning of cooperation carried out by Indonesia-Malaysia during the leadership of Suharto and Tun Abdul Razak.

ASEAN was officially established on August 8, 1967, in Bangkok, Thailand, signed by Foreign Ministers from five countries, namely Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. In subsequent developments, Brunei Darussalam became the sixth member after gaining independence in 1984. In line with changes in international politics, the number of ASEAN members was expanded to communist countries. The first country to join ASEAN was Vietnam in 1995, followed by Myanmar and Laos in 1997. The last country to join was Cambodia in 1999. Furthermore, ASEAN developed into a forum for cooperation between Southeast Asian countries in various fields, namely from political, economic, and socio-cultural (Yean et. al, 2008, p. 23).

In this era, an understanding of Indonesian geopolitics called the Archipelago Insight was successfully formulated. The archipelagic insight is the perspective and attitude of the Indonesian people regarding themselves and the environment which is diverse and has strategic value, by prioritizing national unity and territorial unity, in carrying out social, national and state life to achieve national goals (Majalah Santara, 2017).

Re-entered the United Nations (UN)

Soeharto as the next President of the Republic of Indonesia wanted the implementation of the principles of free and active politics to be implemented purely. He proved this by bringing Indonesia closer to Western countries and being active again in international forums, one of which was the UN. This fact can be interpreted as meaning that Indonesia is implementing the principles of free and active politics in accordance with national interests to achieve overall prosperity for the people. Therefore, in connection with Indonesia's departure from the UN, the New Order government carried out a review of the policy actions that had been taken in the field of foreign policy in the past.

Notosusanto stated that, after Indonesia experienced a situation of isolation from the outside world, Indonesia felt the need to take part in international activities. On this basis, the DPR-GR deliberation committee held a meeting to encourage the government to be willing to re-enter the United Nations, before the start of the 21st UN general assembly. Since 28 September 1966, coinciding with the 21st General Assembly, Indonesia officially joined the UN, with Adam Malik as Indonesia's official representative.

The Indonesian delegation who attended the General Assembly included Minister of

Foreign Affairs Adam Malik, Minister/Commander of Air Admiral Rusmin Nurjadin, Minister of Basic Industry M. Jusuf, LN Palar and H. Ruslan Abdulgani (State Secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia, 1987). Adam Malik in his first statement in front of the UN podium stated that Indonesia was focusing on building economic stability in his country. It was also explained that Indonesia will continue to uphold the principle of free and active politics to reduce regional and international tensions to create peace. Adam Malik also stated that Indonesia's intention to re-enter the UN was to hope for cooperation with other members in accordance with the principles contained in the world organization's charter (Kusuma and Afwan, 2021).

Conclusion

At the beginning of relations between the two countries, except during confrontations, the self-restraint attitude in relations between the two neighbors could be said to be quite strong. As said above, during Malaysia's independence struggle and a decade after independence, the collective identity of the two countries was still strong. Malaysia even welcomed Indonesian immigrants who came during the decade after independence. Apart from being able to help Malaysia's education and development, they are also secretly thought to be strengthening the position of the Malays. The confrontation did indeed disturb the sensitivity of the two neighbors to some extent. However, when the confrontation ended, the leaders of the two countries realized the common historical and cultural roots between them and considered the hostility during the confrontation to be due to the influence of external elements i.e communism.

During Suharto, when the understanding of collective identity was still strong, Malaysia was still quite sensitive to Indonesia's interests and refrained from making regional or cultural claims. This can be seen, for example, in Tun Abdul Razak's 'vision of cognate' in 1967-1975. That period is often referred to as the golden years of Indonesia-Malaysia's blood relations, because in many ways Malaysia tried to understand and even consult with Jakarta on important issues for regional stability. In ASEAN, Indonesia is considered the main country, *primus inter pares* by Malaysia. At the ASEAN level, where Indonesia and Malaysia are the core members, the ASEAN Way cooperation norm has been established as an unwritten rule in dealing with one another.

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