

Dynamics of the Indonesian Parliament in Formulating Food Laws to Achieve Food Security at the End of the New Order

Agustina Wilujeng Pramestuti*, Yety Rochwulaningsih, Singgih Tri Sulistiyono

Doctoral Program of History, Faculty of Humanities, Universitas Diponegoro

Jl. Dr. Antonius Suroyo, Tembalang, Semarang, Central Java - Indonesia

*Corresponding Author: awpbening@students.undip.ac.id

DOI: 10.14710/ihis.v7i2.21316

Abstract

The Indonesian draft law on food explicitly recognizes food as a basic human need and a fundamental right for every citizen. Staple foods are also commodities that significantly influence the nation's economic life. Therefore, food issues in Indonesia have always been a government concern. In the early days of independence, Indonesia faced the threat of a food crisis. This ongoing threat has consistently garnered attention from both the executive and legislative branches throughout various eras. Using a historical method, this article outlines the dynamics of the Indonesian parliament during the New Order era in formulating food laws. The urgency of these laws lies in regulating food production and distribution to ensure the fulfillment of the Indonesian people's food needs. Furthermore, government policies should ideally be oriented towards food sovereignty. Research findings reveal that the Food Law formulated and passed at the end of the New Order era actually attempted to be oriented towards food security and was critical of capitalism. This can be seen from the opinions of the factions in parliament during the formulation of the Food Law.

Received:
December 11, 2023

Revised:
July 29, 2024

Accepted:
July 29, 2024

Keywords: Food Law; Food Security; Food Sovereignty; New Order.

Introduction

Food systems in various countries often change with the development of urbanization, technological shifts, and industrialization, which also alter the way food is produced, marketed, and consumed. Several issues arise, especially in developing countries where food policy often becomes a long-term agenda with various challenges. Maxwell and Slater (2003) argue that initially, food regulations were limited to food policy and did not address food security. Yet, what many countries need is "food security" (Maxwell & Slater 2003, 531-553).

The term "food policy" is said to have revived nostalgia for the 1970s and early 1980s, a time of breakthroughs and programs related to food, including the first World Food Council meeting (1974), the establishment of the International Food Policy Research Institute (1975), the publication of Food Policy (1976), and other advancements. These breakthroughs were developed in response to the 1972-1974 world food crisis, which raised awareness of the interdependence between sectors. In other words, discussions about food must involve production, distribution, and consumption. Furthermore, production issues also encompass other areas such as

agriculture and land availability.

The 1970s saw the development of modern food law, even referred to as a "food law explosion," which began around the mid-20th century. World War II also influenced food issues, accompanied by technological advancements and the emergence of food laws in various countries. In addition to the sovereignty achieved by many nations, food laws were also established alongside growing public awareness of nutritional quality.

Food issues in Indonesia also have their own dynamics and have always been a government concern throughout different periods. During the food crisis in the mid-1950s, both the executive and legislative branches of the Indonesian government addressed the issue of food needs in parliamentary meetings. However, the discussions were still partial and did not reach the stage of drafting a specific food law. These partial discussions covered matters related to food production and distribution, such as agriculture, irrigation, land distribution, and so on. Discussions regarding a specific food law only took place during the New Order era. Political consolidation was not the sole challenge faced by the New Order government in its early years. Economic recovery was also a pressing social demand that could not be ignored, as failure to address it promptly would jeopardize political stability. A key aspect of this economic recovery was ensuring food availability for the entire population, especially after the political crisis of 1965/1966, which had led to food shortages. The collective memory of long queues for rice and kerosene, essential for daily life, remains vivid.

In October 1996, a Drafting Team of 20 individuals (divided into five groups) was formed. The team comprised eight members from FKP, three from FABRI, two from FPP, and two from FPDI, and was led by the Deputy Chair of the Special Committee, Fachrudin. The team's focus extended beyond the preamble, recitals, and general explanation to the specific articles of the draft bill. Chapter II of the draft bill, addressing Food Security, consisted of six sections. Articles 4 through 23 underwent significant revisions, with the title changing from "Food Safety Requirements" to "Food Safety." Chapter II focused on Food Quality and Nutrition, covering Articles 24 to 29. This article examines the dynamics of food law development in Indonesia during the New Order era, focusing on the initiating parties and the dynamics of parliamentary deliberations.

Method

This article is structured based on the historical method. The critical historical method is a set of systematic principles and rules to help effectively collect historical sources, critically assess them and then present a synthesis of the results in the form of scientific historical writing (Garaghan, 1957, p. 33). This article uses primary sources as explained in the historical method in the form of contemporary newspaper and magazine articles. In addition, this article also utilizes sources in the form of minutes of the DPR RI meeting discussing the Draft Food Law. The minutes of the meeting are very important because they have provided an overview of the perceptions of political parties regarding food security.

Background of Food Law Formulation

The legislative productivity of the parliament during the New Order era, from the 1971 election to the 1997 election just before the regime's collapse, was relatively low. The parliament's right of initiative to propose legislation was underutilized, possibly due to a mindset that placed the legislature subordinate to the executive. In this context, Ismail Hasan Metareum, then Chairman of the United Development Party in 1996, predicted that it would take over 20 years for the DPR (House of Representatives) to achieve equal footing with the executive branch (Metareum, 1996, pp. 41-45).

Despite being elected by the people, the influence of the executive branch, which held significant power in shaping the regime, was ever-present. Furthermore, the military's support in various domains, from political and social to economic, was palpable. The executive bureaucracy could readily use the pretext of "disloyalty to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution" to terminate the careers and futures of individuals, including legislators. The sole monumental legislative product of the New Order parliament in the realm of food security was Law No. 7/1996 concerning Food. This law was enacted two years before the regime's collapse and was initiated by the executive branch, not a manifestation of the parliament's right of initiative.

Interestingly, despite the executive's initiative in drafting Law No. 7/1996, the series of trials and discussions revealed a critical yet constructive stance from members of parliament, as evident in the views expressed by various factions within the DPR. This section focuses on the discourse surrounding the law's development, reflecting the parliament's role in shaping food legislation. The perspectives of DPR members from different factions demonstrated a commitment to achieving food self-sufficiency or sovereignty.

The draft Food Law was received by the DPR RI (Indonesian House of Representatives) through Presidential Decree No. R.OS/PUN/1996 dated May 28, 1996 (DPR RI, 1996a). As a follow-up, Level I Discussions were held on June 28, 1996, with the agenda of hearing the Government's Explanation of the draft bill (DPR RI, 1996b). This explanation was presented in a plenary session of the DPR RI by the State Minister for Food Affairs. Subsequently, Level II Discussions took place on July 11, 1996, featuring General Views from all factions (DPR RI, 1996c). The government responded to these views in a session on July 16, 1996 (DPR RI, 1996d).

To draft the law, the DPR RI's Consultative Body entrusted the discussion process to a Special Committee (Pansus) formed on August 30, 1996. The committee consisted of 62 members from various factions (DPR RI, 1996e). Based on Article 128 of the DPR RI Rules of Procedure, the Pansus, in collaboration with the government, had the authority to discuss, review, and refine the draft bill according to a set schedule. Level III Discussions, the core of the deliberations between the DPR RI and the government, took place from September 20 to October 11, 1996. To streamline its work, the Pansus established working groups, smaller teams, and drafting/synchronization teams (1996f).

To optimize the available time, the Working Committee, Small Team, and Drafting/Synchronization Team carried out their tasks simultaneously. Additionally,

to address crucial issues at both the working group and special committee levels, several lobbying forums were held. This aimed to facilitate consensus-building in deliberations and foster a cooperative and understanding atmosphere. Through this approach, a spirit of togetherness and mutual understanding grew among the involved parties, allowing for the accommodation of various inputs and aspirations from both DPR RI factions and the government (DPR RI, 1996f).

Several factors appear to have driven the emergence of the food law, encompassing both external and internal factors. External factors relate to the increasingly prominent phenomena of trade liberalization and global economic globalization at that time. Indonesia was among the countries actively supporting global economic liberalization (Sulistiyono, 2017, pp. 10-27). This is unsurprising, as Indonesia's economic development strategy aligned closely with Western capitalist-liberal countries. This external pressure seemingly compelled the government, as a signatory to the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement, to harmonize national regulations with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Widodo, 2004, pp. 156-177). The GATT agreement includes two key principles: the non-discrimination principle, requiring equal treatment of all trading partners, and the national treatment principle, mandating equal treatment of domestic and imported products. The draft Food Law was formulated in this context, during an era characterized by a move towards trade liberalization and economic globalization, to accelerate economic growth and increase income. The Indonesian government approved the establishment of the WTO, became a member, and agreed to GATT decisions in the Uruguay Round in 1993, as reflected in Law No. 7/1994 concerning the Ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.

The roots of the liberalization spirit in Indonesia during the New Order era can be traced back to the economic contraction following the oil boom's end in the late 1970s. With the oil boom over, Indonesia had to seek alternatives to sustain its rapidly growing economy. To achieve this, the government intensified non-oil exports. However, these exports were dominated by raw materials, offering little added value to the Indonesian economy and even causing environmental damage. Simultaneously, to address rising unemployment, the government began to rely on foreign investors to establish labor-intensive industries in Indonesia. Consequently, economic liberalization gained momentum through deregulation and debureaucratization in the 1980s to attract foreign investment (Hanggoro, 2020).

Indonesia made a monumental move in 1994 by hosting and initiating the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), as mentioned earlier. The prevailing slogan at the time was, "Like it or not, ready or not, Indonesia supports liberalization and globalization." The euphoria surrounding liberalization led to the neglect of developing strategies and policies to strengthen national competitiveness and protect national interests. The government often overlooked and even forgot that liberalization is not about charity but fierce competition. In this context, China serves as a prime example. The bamboo curtain country implemented liberalization cautiously, accompanied by strategies to enhance competitiveness, particularly in the

real sector. Liberalization in finance, banking, insurance, and investment was launched after the real sector was prepared. They believed that liberalizing the financial sector would strengthen the thriving real sector (Sulistiyono, 2017, pp. 10-27).

Indonesia experienced a different scenario. Liberalization was approached without suspicion and even misinterpreted. Economic cooperation and openness were pursued aggressively, with the belief that these policies would address social and economic issues like underdevelopment, unemployment, and poverty. Consequently, Indonesia consistently spearheaded economic liberalization in both international and regional cooperation. Besides being a compliant member of the IMF and WTO, Indonesia also exemplified aggressiveness in initiating Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) in subsequent periods, such as agreements with China, Japan, Korea, India, Australia, the USA, Europe, and others. While regional and international cooperation are inherently beneficial policies, they should be preceded by internal preparedness (Sulistiyono, 2017, pp. 10-27). The New Order government initially hesitated to embrace economic liberalization, but the demands of economic growth necessitated substantial investments. This made economic liberalization inevitable, with foreign investment becoming an unavoidable choice. In this context, Indonesia was compelled to liberalize its economy. The principle of self-sufficiency or food sovereignty began to shift towards the principle of availability or food security, prioritizing the mere presence of food (in this case, rice), even if it meant importing, in line with the principles of a free-market economy.

The impact of liberalization became evident in the subsequent period. From 1995 to 2003, the Import Dependency Ratio (IDR) increased significantly. For rice, the IDR rose by 9.2%, corn by 7.92%, soybeans by 47.28%, and sugar by 47.39%. More concerningly, this increased dependency stemmed from a decline in domestic production. During 1995-1997 and 1998-2003, soybean production fell by about 25.36%, while imports surged by approximately 54.49%. Meanwhile, domestic sugar production plummeted by 17.80%, while imports increased by 58.70%.

The internal factors driving the Food Law's emergence were closely linked to the targets of Repelita VI (the Sixth Five-Year Development Plan) or the First Stage of the Long-Term Development Phase II (PJP II), initiated in 1994. This stage emphasized improving the climate for foreign investment to enhance the national economy and industry. Therefore, establishing international cooperation to boost national economic performance became crucial. The Indonesian government deemed it necessary to actively participate in international collaborations, including the WTO and GATT. While agricultural economic development had been prioritized in Pelita I (1969-1974) to meet basic needs and infrastructure, with an emphasis on agriculture, the agricultural sector seemingly remained a domestic and populist sector in name only. In the era of free trade, this sector was also forced into the realm of free trade (DPR RI, 1996g).

Dynamics of Food Law Development

In discussing the dynamics of the New Order parliament, it is important to note that

the New Order government itself emerged under the shadow of Sukarno's dominant administration. Initially, the New Order government did not want to create the impression of drastically severing ties with the previous government's policies. Soeharto, as the leader of the New Order government, initially displayed the spirit and jargon developed by President Sukarno's administration, particularly the spirit of "berdikari" (standing on one's own feet) and the ethos of officials having an "ampera" spirit (mandate of the people's suffering) (Kroef, 1968, pp. 245-261). Berdikari typically refers to economic independence, a national economy not reliant on other countries. Economic dependence on other nations was feared to lead to political dependence and control. In the realm of food, especially rice, the spirit of berdikari was manifested in the form of food self-sufficiency. This entailed production efforts to meet domestic food needs, particularly rice, which was expected to support political stability (Manning, 1987, pp. 66-82).

Several key policies, evolving over time, were introduced by President Soeharto's administration concerning food, particularly rice. These included: 1) Presidential Instruction No. 2/1973 and No. 1/1974 to handle local rice stock purchases between 1973-1975; 2) Presidential Instruction No. 4/1973 for the establishment and development of Village Unit Enterprises and subsequently Village Unit Cooperatives, aimed at supporting farmers' livelihoods through credit and assistance, both during and after harvest; 3) Presidential Instruction 17/1974 on rice milling costs to support food self-sufficiency efforts; and 4) Presidential Decree No. 82/1995 - Mega Rice Project, intended to cultivate rice on unproductive land in Kalimantan to prevent food shortages (this program failed due to a lack of feasibility studies and resulting environmental damage). As previously described, these policies were among the driving forces behind Indonesia's achievement of rice self-sufficiency in 1984.

Law No. 18/2012 defines Food Independence as the ability of the state and nation to produce diverse food domestically, ensuring sufficient food for individuals by utilizing natural, human, social, economic resources, and local wisdom with dignity. Meanwhile, Food Security is defined as a condition where food is fulfilled for the country down to the individual level, reflected in the availability of sufficient, safe, diverse, nutritious, evenly distributed, and affordable food that does not contradict religious beliefs, convictions, and cultural practices, enabling a healthy, active, and productive life in a sustainable manner (Patunru & Ilman, 2019).

Furthermore, in the early 1990s, there was an evolution in the thinking and paradigm of meeting food needs, shifting from the paradigm of food independence (self-sufficiency) towards the paradigm of food security (Syahyuti, Wahyuni, Sejati, & Azis, 2015, pp. 95-109). The essence of food security is meeting food needs, regardless of whether the food can be self-sufficiently met by domestic production or must be imported from other countries. President Soeharto even envisioned farmers and agribusiness entrepreneurs utilizing the vast domestic food market ("Presidential State Address," 1996, pp. 70-78).

This paradigm shift was closely linked to the expansion of liberalism and free markets by capitalist countries in the agricultural sector. The liberalization of

international agricultural trade had been ongoing since the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) and coincided with the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO no longer focused on food self-sufficiency but emphasized national food security strategies within the framework of international trade as regulated by the WTO (Widodo, 2004, pp. 156-177). The impact of international trade became significant, with 70% of developing countries, including Indonesia, becoming dependent on food imports (Santosa, 2009).

In 1994, the Indonesian government agreed to implement the IMF agreement on market liberalization, including food commodities, which mandated a maximum 5% reduction in import tariffs. This ultimately opened the floodgates for rice imports into Indonesia, weakening efforts towards food self-sufficiency and making it difficult to replicate the success achieved in 1984 (Patunru & Ilmah, 2019). Law No. 7/1996 no longer mentions the terms "food independence" or "food self-sufficiency." Instead, "food security" is mentioned five times, indicating a shift in the approach towards meeting domestic food needs from the paradigm of independence to the paradigm of food security. This clearly suggests that the New Order government was influenced by the free market in food commodities, allowing for a surge in food imports from abroad. This paradigm shift towards the dominance of liberalism and free market systems faced considerable criticism from members of parliament through their respective factions.

In the General Views session on July 11, 1996, aimed at providing input to the draft Food Law proposed by President Soeharto's government, the Functional Groups Faction (FKP) emphasized the importance of the government maintaining consistency with the paradigm of food independence or self-sufficiency. Through its spokesperson, Popong Otje Djundjuran, the FKP provided clear examples of the impact of food self-sufficiency on the development of life, nationhood, and statehood. They cited the 18th-century Irish famine caused by potato blight, which led to mass emigration to America, and the collapse of the heavily armed Soviet Union due to its economic ruin, largely attributed to food availability issues. During President Sukarno's administration, food scarcity triggered socio-political unrest, ultimately leading to the downfall of the regime. Consequently, the New Order government at that time focused on developing the economy, particularly food independence. Until the second Five-Year Development Plan (Pelita), Indonesia remained the world's largest rice importer, but by 1984, it achieved rice self-sufficiency.

The FKP reminded the government that this achievement had earned Indonesia recognition for food self-sufficiency and the "Food for All" award from the FAO. If Indonesia failed to re-establish food self-sufficiency, it would lose significant foreign exchange to purchase or borrow food from other countries. The FKP also urged the government not to forget the 1993 Broad Guidelines of State Policy (GBHN), which emphasized increasing food production to solidify food self-sufficiency, raise incomes, particularly for farmers and fishermen, and improve nutrition through food diversification. Additionally, the FKP stressed that efforts to diversify food and food sources should strengthen food self-sufficiency, especially those originating from

within the country (DPR RI, 1996h). One FKP member from DPR RI Commission VII noted indications that domestic food products were being displaced by imported products (Rangkuti, 1996). However, some DPR RI members remained optimistic that with the implementation of a free market, Indonesian agricultural products could compete with foreign products (Alkadrie, 1996, pp. 34-37).

In line with the FKP's views, members of the Armed Forces Faction (FABRI) also strongly supported efforts to improve people's welfare through food self-sufficiency. Through their spokesperson, Supriyadi, the FABRI emphasized that food development should be a top priority as food is a basic human need that must be available sufficiently, fairly, and equitably, with its fulfillment being a fundamental right for every Indonesian citizen. However, the FABRI seemed to signal the strong currents of capitalism and the free market, which positioned rice not only as a foodstuff but also as a commodity with increasing commercial profit potential (DPR RI, 1996i).

Interestingly, the FABRI's stance appeared to align with the government's evolving paradigm shift from food self-sufficiency to food security. Meeting food needs would not solely rely on domestic production. Imports would be allowed to fulfill consumption needs that domestic production could not meet. Conversely, if production exceeded domestic needs, food could be exported or provided as foreign aid to countries in need on humanitarian grounds. Therefore, Indonesia could not escape the demands of free trade (DPR RI, 1996i).

According to the FABRI's perspective, rice as a commodity played a crucial role in enhancing national food security and served as a significant source of non-oil foreign exchange. In the era of trade liberalization, food commodities faced challenges and opportunities for the Indonesian economy. Opportunities existed for competitive commodities, while threats loomed for those with lower quality. To achieve high competitiveness, meeting quality and safety standards was imperative. Importing countries for food and processed food products strictly enforced these standards. Countries in Europe, the United States, and Japan, for example, implemented specific minimum requirements that exporters had to meet, with penalties for non-compliance, including product rejection or retaliatory measures under international trade regulations.

In this regard, the FABRI believed that the draft Food Law was crucial in providing protection to food entrepreneurs, enabling them to produce commodities that met international standards. Meeting these standards in international trade would further boost food exports and foreign exchange earnings, increase production and investment, raise farmers' and workers' incomes, and ultimately improve public welfare (DPR RI, 1996i).

Meanwhile, the United Development Party Faction (FPP) seemed wary of President Soeharto's government's inclination towards liberalism and free markets. While other factions had begun to shift their paradigm from self-sufficiency to food security, the FPP appeared to hold firmly to the spirit of food self-sufficiency or independence. Through their spokesperson, Saleh Khalid, the FPP reminded that the food industry is a complex leading industry with extensive multiplier effects.

Therefore, the modernization of the food industry should always align with the spirit of a people's economy, particularly the development of people-centered agro-industry in rural areas. The FPP expressed criticism (DPR RI, 1996j; Churmen, 1996, pp. 38-40).

"In other words, the development of the national food industry must avoid the practices of monopoly, oligopoly, and monopsony that still plague our national economy today. Furthermore, the development of the national food industry must be capable of becoming a model, medium, and instrument for national economic growth through a strategy of equalizing business and employment opportunities by developing the potential of small businesses, medium enterprises, and cooperatives... The United Development Party Faction is deeply concerned about the ongoing marginalization of farmers' land in rural areas on one hand, and the accumulation of land by urban dwellers on the other, resulting in an increasing number of landowning farmers becoming laborers on their former land and an increasing amount of unproductive fertile land owned by urban residents. The decline in agricultural land has become a sensitive issue and a shared concern alongside rapid industrialization."

The General Views session was also used by the FPP to criticize the government regarding the conversion of agricultural land, reflecting the expansion of capitalism in rural areas. This was evident in the process of agricultural land conversion. The FPP spokesperson stated that over a decade since achieving rice self-sufficiency in 1983, agricultural rice fields had shrunk to 15.9 million hectares from the original 16.7 million hectares, a decrease of 0.8 million hectares. The most significant reduction occurred on the island of Java, where no less than 0.9 million hectares of agricultural land were lost, offset by an increase of 0.1 million hectares of rice fields outside Java. In 1983, the agricultural land area in Java was 5.5 million hectares, which decreased to 4.6 million hectares in 1993. Meanwhile, land outside Java increased from 11.2 million hectares to 11.3 million hectares. The increase in land outside Java was not comparable to the decrease in Java, both in terms of area and productivity (DPR RI, 1996j).

Similarly, the FPP criticized the role of national banks in disbursing credit and its share to various economic sectors over the past five years, which had shown fantastic growth. However, credit allocation to the agricultural sector in the last five years up to 1994 occupied the smallest position, only 7.6 percent. Meanwhile, the industrial sector received 31.2 percent, the trade sector 23.8 percent, and the service sector 25.5 percent (DPR RI, 1996j). This meant that the agricultural production sector received inadequate capitalization, making it difficult to achieve rice self-sufficiency again and, conversely, opening opportunities for food imports, which increasingly benefited traders. Thus, the free trade regime in the food sector was the primary beneficiary, while the previously fought-for food self-sufficiency was undermined.

Although the Indonesian Democratic Party Faction (FPDI) reminded the government that Indonesia's food policy should aim to increase food production to meet domestic needs, this faction had relaxed its stance to accommodate the growing

wave of liberalization and free markets in the food trade, adopting the paradigm of food security. The FPDI spokesperson, Djuwardi Effendi, stated:

"We can imagine that the absence of food or a shortage in food supply will lead to an unstable societal condition, even leading to potential social vulnerability, which could trigger social unrest that endangers the social order. Therefore, providing sufficient food and distributing it evenly throughout the archipelago is paramount to maintaining national resilience and ensuring the continuation of national development... The implementation of National Food Security is a complex logistical task that requires professional personnel and optimal utilization of available resources. The Indonesian Democratic Party Faction underlines and fully supports the main objective of Indonesia's food policy, which is to ensure sufficient food with adequate nutritional quality for all segments of society."

It appears that the FPDI also supported the direction of the national food policy based on the food security paradigm established by the government, namely the availability of sufficient food, even if it meant importing rice. The national rice requirement was 26 million tons per year. However, rice production in the past three years had not been enough to meet the rice demand, let alone fulfill national stocks. One obstacle to increasing domestic production was that not all farmers were ready to adopt modern agricultural innovations, despite liberalization demanding innovation and modernization (Efendi, 1996, pp. 48-52). Consequently, in 1994, Indonesia imported 2.4 million tons of rice, and in 1995, 2.9 million tons. Considering this, the FPDI strongly supported Presidential Decree No. 82 of 1995 concerning the development of peatlands in Central Kalimantan for food crop agriculture, popularly known as the one million hectare project. The FPDI's food security paradigm became more evident when they emphasized that the ultimate goal of food policy was not only to increase food production but, more importantly, to ensure sufficient food for the entire population at affordable prices (DPR RI, 1996k). However, in practice, increasing food production was neglected. The food security regime, which opened the door wide for food imports based on the logic of food sufficiency, grew stronger over time. The spirit of food self-sufficiency ultimately became a myth.

During the discussions on the Food Law, each faction had the right to present their general views. The Functional Groups Faction (FKP) proposed that the term "food security" be included in the draft law. In addition to explicitly regulating the responsibilities of the government and society, the concept of food security was also introduced to utilize the potential of food diversification from various traditional crops. This was because Indonesia is a fertile region, with each area possessing diverse food crops. Diversification was considered a strategic effort to gradually reduce dependence on specific food crops, thereby avoiding food vulnerability. Besides diversification, the FKP also proposed that the issue of food reserves, both for the government and the public, be included in the discussion on Food Security.

After extensive discussions among the factions, the FKP's proposal was

eventually accepted, albeit placed at the end. Previously, Chapter VIII of the draft law discussed Guidance, Control, and Supervision, which was then agreed to be changed to Food Security and moved up to Chapter VII. Meanwhile, the title of Chapter VIII, previously positioned as Chapter VII, became Community Participation. This title change led to the proposal of new articles. The change, as suggested by the FKP, was expected to alter public perception, which viewed the draft Food Law as solely regulating consumer protection. The chapter on Food Security served as an umbrella for previous laws that partially regulated specific aspects of food issues and ensured food price stability for the well-being of the people.

Conclusion

During the New Order government, the role of creating food independence was primarily an executive initiative, indicating the dominance of the executive branch and the relative weakness of parliamentary power during that era. As in the transitional period, the parliament's right of initiative to propose legislation remained underutilized, demonstrating the weak legislative mentality influenced by the notion of executive superiority over the legislature. However, the parliament should ideally be an initiator in addressing various national issues, particularly food, which is a fundamental source of human life. Despite being elected by the people, the influence of the executive branch, which still held significant power, was evident. Law No. 7/1996 concerning Food was the sole monumental legislative product of the New Order parliament in the realm of food security, enacted two years before the regime's collapse and initiated by the government or executive branch. Nevertheless, the process leading to the enactment of this Food Law indicates that members of parliament displayed a critical attitude towards the executive's initiative, highlighting a paradigm shift from food self-sufficiency to food security adopted by the executive.

References

- Alkadrie, S. S. (1996). Pengembangan agribisnis bisa dilakukan dengan kemitraan. *Parlementaria 15 (XXVIII)*, 34 – 37.
- Churmen, I. (1996). Masih ada waktu untuk membenahi agribisnis. *Parlementaria 15 (XXVIII)*, 38–40.
- DPR RI (1996a). Amanat presiden. Retrieved September 12, 2021, from http://berkas.dpr.go.id/armus/file/Lampiran/leg_1-20200227-081313-3659.pdf
- DPR RI (1996b). Keterangan pemerintah. Retrieved September 12, 2021, from http://berkas.dpr.go.id/armus/file/Lampiran/leg_1-20200227-081422-9854.pdf
- DPR RI (1996c). Pemandangan umum. Retrieve September 23, 2021, from http://berkas.dpr.go.id/armus/file/Lampiran/leg_1-20200227-081455-5008.pdf
- DPR RI (1996d). Jawaban pemerintah. Retrieved September 25, 2021, from http://berkas.dpr.go.id/armus/file/Lampiran/leg_1-20200227-081532-2867.pdf
- DPR RI (1996e). Mekanisme pembahasan. Retrieved August 5, 2021, from http://berkas.dpr.go.id/armus/file/Lampiran/leg_1-20200227-081649-6086.pdf

- DPR RI (1996f). Laporan hasil kerja Panitia Kerja. Retrieved August 7, 2021, from http://berkas.dpr.go.id/armus/file/Lampiran/leg_1-20200227-082047-6696.pdf
- DPR RI (1996f). Laporan hasil kerja Panitia Kerja. Retrieved July 15, 2021, from http://berkas.dpr.go.id/armus/file/Lampiran/leg_1-20200227-082047-6696.pdf
- DPR RI (1996i). Pemandangan umum Fraksi ABRI atas Rancangan Undang-undang Republik Indonesia tentang Pangan. Retrieved February 2, 2022, from http://berkas.dpr.go.id/armus/file/Lampiran/leg_1-20200227-081455-5008.pdf
- DPR RI (1996j). Pemandangan umum Fraksi Persatuan Pembangunan DPR RI terhadap Rancangan Undang-undang tentang pangan. Retrieved February 3, 2022, from http://berkas.dpr.go.id/armus/file/Lampiran/leg_1-20200227-081455-5008.pdf.
- DPR RI (1996k). Pemandangan umum Fraksi Partai Demokrasi Indonesia DPR RI terhadap Rancangan Undang-undang tentang pangan. Retrieved March 5, 2022, from http://berkas.dpr.go.id/armus/file/Lampiran/leg_1-20200227-081455-5008.pdf
- DPR RI. (1996g). Keterangan pemerintah di hadapan Sidang Paripurna Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat R.I. mengenai Rancangan Undang-Undang tentang pangan. Retrieved January 6, 2022, from http://berkas.dpr.go.id/armus/file/Lampiran/leg_1-20200227-081422-9854.pdf
- DPR RI. (1996h). Pemandangan umum. Retrieved July 14, 2021, from http://berkas.dpr.go.id/armus/file/Lampiran/leg_1-20200227-081455-5008.pdf
- Efendi, D. (1996). Petani kita belum seluruhnya siap menerima inovasi. *Parlementaria* 15 (XXVIII), 48–52.
- Kroef, J. M. van der (1968). Sukarno, the ideologue. *Pacific Affairs* 41 (2), 245-261.
- Manning, C. (1987). Public policy, rice production and income distribution: A review of Indonesia's rice self-sufficiency program. *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science* 15(1), 66-82.
- Metareum, I. H. (1996). Optimis 20 th lagi posisi DPR akan seimbang dengan eksekutif. *Parlementaria*, 15 (XXVIII), 41 – 45.
- Patunru, A. & Ilman, A. S. (2019). Political economy of rice policy in Indonesia: A perspective on the ASEAN economic opportunity. *Discussion Paper*, 6 (2019), Center for Indonesian Policy Studies (CIPS)
- Rangkuti, P. A. (1996). Agribisnis primadona untuk memperkuat ekonomi rakyat. *Parlementaria* 15 (XXVIII), 26 – 27.
- Santosa, D. A. (January 13, 2009). Ketahanan vs kedaulatan pangan. *Kompas*.
- Sulistiyono, S. T. (2017). Indonesia in the globalization trap: A historical perspective. *Paramita: Historical Studies Journal* 27(1), 10-27.
- Syahyuti, S., S. Wahyuni, W. K. Sejati, & M. Azis. (2015). Kedaulatan pangan sebagai basis untuk mewujudkan ketahanan pangan nasional. *Forum Penelitian Agro Ekonomi* 33(2), 95–109.
- Widodo, S. (2004). Pengaruh globalisasi terhadap ketahanan pangan nasional. In Sunyoto Usman (Ed.) *Politik Pangan* (pp. 156-177). Jakarta: Cired.