

Falling in the Midst of Crisis: The Collapse of the Mangkunegaran Autonomous Government in the Social Revolution Era, 1945-1946

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Abstract

This article examines the social revolution in Surakarta, characterized by the anti-autonomous movement during the early years of the Indonesian Republic's independence, leading to the collapse of the Mangkunegaran autonomous government. Using historical methods, the article explores the initially positive relationship between the Mangkunegaran Duchy and the people in the late colonial period, evident in various factors such as support for education, economic initiatives, and infrastructure development. However, this relationship took a downturn during the social revolution due to external factors. Surakarta became a hub for radical movements, particularly the Anti-Autonomous movement, as the Mangkunegaran Duchy made unfortunate decisions. The study's goal is to uncover how the Mangkunegaran Autonomous Government navigated through the social revolution in Surakarta, even though it eventually collapsed. The study findings indicate that, facing a crisis after declaring independence, the Mangkunegaran Duchy made a critical error by betraying the Indonesian Republic and seeking to reinstate Dutch rule. In response, the people initiated a revolutionary movement. Ultimately, the Mangkunegaran Duchy failed to overcome the crisis, making misguided decisions and becoming victims of the revolution. They struggled to uphold the traditional politics and economy of the palace, which had endured for centuries and had been passed down through generations.

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Introduction

This article focuses on examining how, at the end of the Dutch East Indies Colonial Rule, Mangkunegaran still had good relations with the people, which can be proven by continuing to assist in the fields of education, economy, and infrastructure development such as irrigation facilities and roads. However, this relationship was inversely proportional during the social revolution because there were external factors where Surakarta became the centre of radical movements that joined the anti-autonomous movement until it collapsed.

At that time, Mangkunegaran still believed that the people and the Dutch East Indies Colonial Government were still on their side. The Dutch East Indies colonial government was powerless to help Mangkunegaran, and the people to whom Mangkunegaran had assisted were vulnerable to provocations from radical movements in Surakarta. Through historical methods and socio-political approaches, this research has an essential meaning in building historical writing about the social revolution in the Surakarta region, which focuses on the consequences of the inappropriate decision of Mangkunegaran by committing betrayal of the Republic of Indonesia, which leads to power competition between Anti-Autonomous groups who are willing to overthrow the power of the Government of Mangkunegaran, with Palaces or traditional rulers insisted on maintaining their power which received little attention.

The Proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia is a magical word that can move the entire Indonesian nation to realize and maintain it. The words of the proclamation spoken by President Soekarno contain two meanings, namely, the transfer of power and the formation of government both at the central and regional levels. Even though it was expected to take a short time, this energy transfer process is characterized by chaos and takes a relatively long time. Some events, such as the *Kenpeitai* raid in Surakarta, the battle of Kota Baru in Yogyakarta, as well as other events in several cities, clearly show that the process of transferring power was carried out by shedding blood (Julianto, 2010, p. 92).

Transferring power in Surakarta continued with heroism and power struggles that led to the Social Revolution in Surakarta. The social revolution in Surakarta had different characteristics from the social revolution in other regions because it occurred in conditions of economic and social crisis. The social revolution in Surakarta is a meeting between people's hatred of indigenous leaders and the interests of political power and national interests. Political and armed forces succeeded in creating or giving birth to an anti-autonomous government. In this case, Surakarta saved a lot of "fuel" that was flammable by fire. The "fuel" in this context is the domination of the palace over its people, the suffering of the people due to Dutch colonial rule and Japanese occupation, the rivalry between the two palaces, namely the Kasunanan Hadiningrat Palace and the Mangkunegaran Government, and the palace's indifference to the revolution. Therefore, the "fire" in the interest of political or armed forces can burn Surakarta (Julianto, 2010, pp. 152-153).

The Social Revolution in Surakarta was very different from Yogyakarta. There are differences in actions or positions in decisions between the Surakarta and Yogyakarta Palaces during the crisis after the Proclamation of Indonesian Independence. In the end, Yogyakarta remained a particular region, but Surakarta had to lose its special region status. In the Surakarta region, Mangkunegara and Susuhunan, as traditional rulers, did not sympathize and took progressive action against the social revolution. They betrayed the Republic of Indonesia and hoped for the restoration of Dutch rule, which eventually caused them to lose the loyalty of their people. In the end, it became the reason for the resistance of a group of people who

didn't want the nobles to rule anymore. This group managed to take advantage of the chaotic political situation in Surakarta, influencing and gathering the people to carry out actions against Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran leaders of the Anti-Autonomy group (Archive Rekso Pustoko Mangkunegaran Number 11). The Social Revolution in Surakarta was a period of upheaval as Surakarta City became a centre of communist activities, class warfare, kidnappings, and general chaos that spread to other parts of Java and influenced the Indonesian Revolution (Larson, 1990, pp. 2-3).

The existence of the Social Revolution in Surakarta, especially in the territory of Mangkunegaran, was also motivated by the stubborn and determined attitude of Mangkunegara VIII, who did not want to relinquish the sovereignty of Mangkunegaran to the Anti-Autonomous group during a socio-political crisis in the Surakarta region. Mangkunegara VIII was a charismatic figure with high authority and wisdom in running the government at the Mangkunegaran Palace. However, the Anti-Autonomous group considered Mangkunegara VIII too young. It did not have much experience, so the Mangkunegaran Government was in an emergency during the Surakarta Social Revolution (Kahin, 1995, p. 320).

Thus, people can understand that the Social Revolution in Surakarta, particularly in Mangkunegaran, was a movement of the lower-class tidal wave that could not be avoided or noticed during the Indonesian Revolution. Clashes between revolutionary organizations and elements of the old order or upper class were inevitable. Revolutionary organizations that embrace new political structures destroy dominant colonial powers and traditional structures. Radical structural changes lead not only to participation in political mobilization but also to conflict and violence that are characteristic of social revolutions (Sandhy, 2022, p. 3).

Based on the above background, the research problem in this article can be formulated, namely the inability of Mangkunegaran to make the right decisions, such as the Yogyakarta Palace coupled with the wrong position during a situation of socio-political crisis during the social revolution and not realizing the external factors where Surakarta became the centre of the radical movement belonging to the Anti-Autonomous movement, this caused the Government of Mangkunegaran to collapse. The research questions can be formulated as follows: (1) What impact did the Proclamation of Independence of the Republic of Indonesia have on the socio-political conditions in the Surakarta region? (2) Why did the Yogyakarta and Surakarta palaces exhibit contrasting actions following the Proclamation of Indonesian Independence, leading to divergent outcomes for each palace? (3) What motivates the Anti-Autonomous group to be highly determined in overthrowing Mangkunegaran customary rule? (4) What are the repercussions of the conflict between Mangkunegaran and the Anti-Autonomous group?

There are several points of discussion in this article to answer research questions. The first part of this article discusses the condition of the Republic of Indonesia in the early days of independence, starting with the proclamation of Independence of the Republic of Indonesia in 1945, marked by a national revolution. The second part describes the different actions taken between the Surakarta Palace and

Yogyakarta after the Proclamation of Independence of the Republic of Indonesia, which resulted in the status of the particular region in Yogyakarta remaining. Still, it could no longer maintain the status of the specific region in the Surakarta area. The third part discusses the socio-political crisis in Surakarta during the Indonesian independence revolution, which caused the people of Surakarta, through the Anti-Autonomous movement, to carry out revolutionary social actions against the traditional ruler, namely Mangkunegaran. The fourth part of this article focuses on the impact of clashes between anti-autonomy groups and the Mangkunegaran Duchy, representing traditional power.

Studies on the Social Revolution in Surakarta have been carried out previously in various paradigms, such as that by Julianto (2010), who discussed crime and violence in Surakarta during the independence revolution. Julianto stated that forms of violence and crime, such as robbery and murder, were reflected in the palace rulers. It aims to destroy the remnants of feudalism rooted in the Surakarta area. In connection with this research, Larson (1990) discussed that the riots and murders in Surakarta were related to a decisive period for the Surakarta region, namely the Indonesian Independence Revolution. Larson analyzes the kingdom's political life before the revolution, which was marked, among other things, by competition between the Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran palaces and the succession of traditional power. However, Larson only explains the condition of Surakarta before independence, so there are fewer details regarding the condition of Surakarta after Indonesian independence. Anderson (1988) analyzed the origins of the Indonesian Revolution and revealed important characteristics that require clarification to explain the modern revolution.

Then Prasadana and Gunawan (2019) studied the process of the collapse of the traditional bureaucracy in Surakarta when Indonesia became independent, causing the conventional bureaucracy in Kasunanan to be destroyed and replaced by a modern bureaucracy. In this regard, Sutiya (2017) examines the fate of Surakarta during the revolution. Sutiya stated that Anti-Autonomy or Anti-Feudalism in Surakarta resulted in the palace losing political power and its territory becoming part of the Central Java administrative region. Musaparsih (2005) discusses the social revolution in Surakarta at the beginning of independence, which resulted in the loss of royal power that previously dominated Surakarta.

Meanwhile, Hapsari (2011) examines the political history of two traditional rulers in Surakarta who maintained their existence under the pressure of radical forces during the independence revolution. Samroni (2010) analyses the status of the Surakarta Special Region and the anti-autonomous movement, which resulted in the loss of Surakarta's privileged status or the collapse of the Duchy's power. However, the weakness in his work is that it requires a comprehensive explanation of the problems that influence or impact typical Surakarta food. Thus, the weakness of the paradigm studied previously was the discussion, which did not focus on the slow response of the Mangkunegaran Duchy and the inappropriate position in making decisions during a socio-political crisis. It would have fatal consequences during the

social revolution if you became a victim of the revolution. They have to imitate the sense of the situation of the Yogyakarta Palace.

Method

This article was prepared according to the historical method. The historical method includes four steps that must be carried out, namely heuristics (gathering sources), testing sources (criticism), interpretation, and historiography (Notosusanto, 1984, p. 22-23). Heuristics is a process to find and collect primary and secondary historical sources (Garraghan, 1957, p. 33). The primary sources used by the author are written sources and photographs in archives. Meanwhile, the secondary sources are scientific articles, dissertations, thesis, and scientific books by scholars and experts related to research. The primary and secondary sources were obtained from the Archipelago Library (Khastara), the National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia (ANRI), the Surakarta National Press Monument, the Rekso Pustoko Mangkunegaran Library, and the Diponegoro University's History Library.

The next stage is source criticism to filter the information obtained during the heuristic process or data collection to get authentic and credible data. In the next step, the researcher interprets or renders the facts to show a logical and chronological relationship regarding past events. The final stage is historiography, which is the activity of reconstructing past events in the form of systematic, rational and scientific historical stories by using sound and correct Indonesian language so that readers can easily understand and produce historical studies that are analytically descriptive by prioritizing high scientific and applicable aspects (Herlina, 2020, p. 30). This article uses a socio-political, historical approach based on *a theory of Collective Behaviour*. This approach is used to analyze matters related to the emergence of a social revolution in Surakarta due to social turmoil from a society to demand justice (Smelser, 1962, p. 8).

The Existence of the Indonesian Republic and the Revolution's Outbreak for Independence

News of Japan's defeat spread quickly in Jakarta. However, Sukarno and Hatta only became aware of this when the two figures were invited to Dalat on 9 August 1945 by Marshal Terauchi, Supreme Commander of the Japanese army and all of Southeast Asia (Larson, 1990, p. 3). The invitation was issued to discuss Japan's promise of Indonesian independence, which would be given on 7 September 1945. Two days later, when Sukarno, Hatta and Radjiman returned to their homeland from Dalat, Sutan Syahrir urged Sukarno to proclaim independence immediately. This was because he considered the results of the meeting in Dalat to be a Japanese trick. In this case, there is a difference of opinion between the old and young groups regarding implementing Indonesian independence. The senior group represented by Sukarno and Hatta did not believe that Japan had surrendered to the Allies, and it was felt that the proclamation of independence for the Republic of Indonesia could cause bloodshed and have fatal consequences if the Indonesian fighters were not ready. Soekarno reminded Sutan Syahrir that he had no right to proclaim independence because that

was the right of the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee (PPKI) (Notosusanto, 1976, p. 79).

Sutan Syahrir, as a young group, urged that the proclamation of independence be carried out immediately because Japan had surrendered to the Allies and considered PPKI to be a body made in Japan; if PPKI carried out the proclamation of independence, it was only a gift from Japan (Notosusanto, 1976, p. 79). Young people had heard the statement of the Japanese Emperor announcing in his speech on 15 August 1945 that Japan surrendered to the Allied forces. That created a tense situation in Indonesia, especially in Jakarta. The young group demanded that Soekarno immediately proclaim Indonesian independence free from Japanese influence. In contrast, the old figures or the old group who were members of the BPUPKI-PPKI with Soekarno and Hatta motorbikes wanted the proclamation to be carried out under the results of the PPKI meeting decision on 16 August 1945 (Yuniarti, 2003, p. 37). However, the first PPKI meeting, which was initially planned to be held on 16 August 1945, was cancelled due to different opinions between the younger and older groups, leading to Soekarno and Hatta being brought to Rengasdengklok on 16 August 1945 by the young group.

Hatta considered that the issue of Indonesian independence coming from the Japanese government or from the results of the struggle of the Indonesian nation itself did not matter because Japan had already lost. At the time, the Indonesian nation had to face allies trying to restore Dutch rule in Indonesia. Therefore, an organized revolution is needed to proclaim Indonesian independence. At the time, PPKI members had started arriving in Jakarta and were afraid of bloodshed. On the other hand, young people think bloodshed is a risk that cannot be avoided (Dumadi, 1988, p. 277).

The youth group met at the Bacteriological Institute in Pegangsaan Timur in this precarious position on 15 August 1945. The meeting's decision, chaired by Chairul Saleh, emphasized that Indonesian independence is a right and matter for the Indonesian people and cannot be dependent on other people and kingdoms. All ties and relations with the promise of independence from Japan must be severed, and instead, negotiations are expected with Soekarno and Hatta because they can declare the Proclamation (Malik, 1962, p. 35).

The failure of the young group's request for Soekarno and Hatta to declare independence from Japan immediately prompted them to hold another meeting. Apart from being attended by youths previously involved in meetings at the Bacteriology Institute, the conference was also attended by Sukarni, Jusuf Kunto, dr. Moewardi is from the Pioneer Front, and Shodanco Singgih is from Jakarta's PETA battalion. The meeting decided that Soekarno and Hatta should be removed from the city to keep them away from all Japanese influence (Adams, 1966, pp. 316-317). The plan was then carried out by bringing Soekarno and Hatta to Rengasdengklok on 16 August 1945. After going smoothly and through various negotiations, Indonesian independence was proclaimed by Soekarno on 17 August 1945 at Jl. East Pegangsaan No. 56, precisely at 10.00 WIB (Adams, 1966, pp. 85-87).



Figure 1. Soekarno accompanied by Mohammad Hatta declaring the independence of Indonesia at 10.00 am on Friday, 17 August 1945 in Pegangsaan Timur 56 (from Presidential Documents National Library of Indonesia, 1945).

On 18 August 1945, PPKI held its first meeting. The Constitution (UUD), drafted by a small committee within the Basic Law Committee chaired by Soepomo, was adopted as the Constitution for the State of Indonesia. The UUD became known as the 1945 Constitution. Besides deciding to ratify the 1945 Constitution as the Indonesian Nation's Constitution, the PPKI also made other important decisions. The critical decision was the appointment of Soekarno and M. Hatta as President and Vice President of Indonesia, respectively. In addition, through Soekarno's suggestion, a National Committee was formed, which could be assembled quickly at critical times and served as a presidential auxiliary body as long as Indonesia were still in an emergency circumstance (Bahar, 1995, p. 47). Meanwhile, the euphoria and revolution for independence and the formation of the National Committee at the national level soon spread at the local level throughout Indonesia, including Surakarta.

On 17 August 1945, the Government of the Indonesian Republic established the Constitution (Constitution), compiled into the National Constitution of the Indonesian Republic called the 1945 Constitution. In the Constitution, there is an explanation of Article 18 declaring two crucial things. First, the Indonesian Republic respects the position of particular regions; Second, all national regulations regarding the area will remember the rights of origin in the area. Following the content of Article 18 of the 1945 Constitution, on 19 August 1945, the President of the Indonesian Republic issued a charter establishing Paku Buwana XII and Mangkunegara VIII in their respective positions with the belief that the two kings would devote all their minds, energy, soul, and body to the security of the region as part of the Indonesian Republic. The Lord Paku Buwana XII and Mangkunegara VIII welcomed the trust well. The granting of the right to autonomy to the Mangkunegaran by the Indonesian Government eventually gave rise to the Anti-Autonomous Movement (Rekso Pustoko Mangkunegaran Archives Number 596).

The Different Actions of the Surakarta and Yogyakarta Palaces After the Independence of the Indonesian Republic

The formation of the Special Region of Surakarta started from the PPKI meeting on 19 August 1945, determining that the territory of the Indonesian Republic was divided into 8 Provinces, namely the Provinces of Sumatra, West Java, Central Java, East Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Lesser Sunda and added two particular regions, namely Yogyakarta and Surakarta. Besides, President Soekarno also made a charter of recognition for the two specific areas. For the Special Region of Yogyakarta, Sultan Hamengku Buwana and Paku Alam were appointed as Head and Deputy. In contrast, for the Special Region of Surakarta, Lord Paku Buwana and Mangkunegara were appointed as Head and Deputy (Mustagfirin, Firdaus, & Ghafur, 2016, p. 4). On 19 August 1945, the PPKI determination was inseparable from the existence of a letter on 18 August 1945 from the Surakarta Palace, namely Lord Paku Buwono XII and KGPAA Mangkunegara VIII, conveying support and congratulations on the Indonesian Government. On 18 August 1945, the ruler of the Yogyakarta Palace, namely Hamengku Buwana IX with Paku Alam VIII, also sent a congratulatory telegram on the implementation of the Proclamation of Indonesian Independence to Bung Karno and Bung Hatta and expressed their support (Moedjanto, 1994, p. 56).

After the Proclamation of the Indonesian Republic, there were differences between Yogyakarta and Surakarta in the struggle to abolish feudalism and develop democracy. Sultan Hamengku Buwana IX, as the king of Yogyakarta, was a democratic statesman and pioneer of social change, essential in maintaining the stability of a changing society (Soemardjan, 1991, p. 6). Sultan Hamengku Buwana IX had eroded the power and privileges of the nobles and tried to mix the nobles with the commoners. This policy disappointed some of the nobility, but it received strong support from the demands of its time. The people of Yogyakarta are very respectful and obedient to the king; one might even say they are very passionate towards their king. All requests or orders on behalf of the king were happy to carry out whatever the risk. Thus, in a critical situation, the sense of crisis of Sultan Hamengku Buwana IX was appropriately used when making decisions or positioning correctly to continue joining the Unitary State of the Indonesian Republic to make the Yogyakarta region safe (Atmakusumah, 2011, p. 259).

The opposite condition occurred in the Surakarta area during a crisis, namely the people demanding the abolition of colonialism/imperialism, anti-feudalism, and the development of democracy. The two traditional powers in Surakarta, both Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran Palace, could not act quickly in making decisions like what was done by The Yogyakarta Palace, which was indeed between Paku Alaman and the Sultanate Palace, had established a good synergy or cooperation so that it still enjoyed the status of a special region (Feith & Castles, 1988, p. 248). Neither Paku Buwono XII nor Mangkunegara VIII inherited the socio-magical of their parents and did not have experience in dealing with public interest matters, lacked serious character and courage to make decisions and did not understand the forces of revolution moving

towards Western democracy and popular sovereignty (Soemardjan, 1991, p. 73). In addition, there was competition between the two traditional rulers in Surakarta, causing no cooperation between the two traditional powers, namely Lord Paku Buwono and Mangkunegara. The Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran always competed in all respects, especially in terms of luxury or festiveness in religious and traditional ceremonies (Ariyanti, 2013, p. 126). This situation was enough to hinder the running of the government in Surakarta, and the people did not feel the contribution of the two traditional governments, resulting in growing hatred (Mustagfirin, Firdaus, & Ghafur, 2016, pp. 4-5).

The decision issued by the king of Surakarta in a critical situation was shocking, and the Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran eventually agreed to work together to support and believe in the restoration of Dutch power. This indicated that after the Proclamation of Independence of the Indonesian Republic, there was a change in action by the Surakarta's king, who initially supported the Independence of the Indonesian Republic, became a traitor by supporting the Netherlands (Sutiyah, 2017, pp. 197-198). This was happening because the Surakarta Palace wanted to continue perpetuating its traditional feudalistic power and the attitude of the Indonesian government which would carry out a policy of nationalization of economic assets or companies belonging to the Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran Palace as members of the *Kroon en Rijson Dememingen Soerakarta and Mangkunegaransche Eigendommenfonds* to strengthen the structure of the country's economy experiencing chaos during the early days of the Independence of the Indonesian Republic (Yoelistyanto & Indriyanto, 2021, p. 69).

Kroon en Rijson Dememingen Soerakarta manages several companies that are sources of income for the Surakarta Sunanate, such as the Manisharjo and Ampel Companies engaged in the sisal business as well as the Karanggeng and Tegalondo Companies involved in the sugar business. Meanwhile, *Mangkunegaransche Eigendommenfonds* managed several assets as incoming sources of Mangkunegaran Duchy, such as Colomadu Sugar Factory, Tasikmadu Sugar Factory, Kerjogadungan Coffee Factory, Betal Gamping Company, Rasamadu Batu Sugar Company, as well as houses and hotels owned by Mangkunegaran Duchy (Archives Rekso Pustoko Mangkunegaran Number 5286). The policies taken by the two traditional rulers in Surakarta in this critical situation can be analyzed as inappropriate positioning having fatal consequences, namely the tragic event in the form of a rebellion carried out by the members of the Anti-Autonomous because the policies or decisions made were not under the struggle to abolish feudalism and develop democracy (Poesponegoro & Notosusanto, 2008, p. 278).

Surakarta's Political Map: Mangkunegaran Versus Anti-Autonomous

Political tensions in Surakarta are increasingly heating up, especially in the Mangkunegaran area. This was motivated by the move of the capital from Jakarta to Yogyakarta. This movement of the centre of power greatly influenced the situation in Surakarta because opposition elements, political parties and struggle bodies also

moved (Anderson, 1972, pp. 262-263). This movement also caused the Surakarta area to have an important military position as a buffer area (subordinate area) (Mrazek, 1996, p. 555). Surakarta's important military position makes this area a safe place to protect radical struggle institutions. This was caused by the Social Revolution movement in Surakarta, which had begun to grow. One of the business organizations that moved to Surakarta was the Pioneer Front (Suishintai), which later became known as the Banteng Front, serving as Sukarno's bodyguard (Anderson, 1988, p. 254).

Movements also occurred in the Mangkunegaran Palace area due to the anti-autonomy movement led by dr. Moewardi (Soebagijo, 1981, pp. 26-42). The Social Revolution in Surakarta emerged because the Republic of Indonesia granted autonomy to Mangkunegaran on 19 August 1945, which was strengthened by the king's proclamation dated 1 September 1945, which contained: (1) That the Mangkunegaran Kingdom was a special region of the Republic of Indonesia. (2) All government affairs in the Mangkunegaran Kingdom are now determined and led by the Mangkunegaran Government with due observance of Indonesia's government regulations. (3) There is direct communication between the government of the Mangkunegaran Kingdom and the Republic of Indonesia. (4) Order all residents of the Mangkunegaran Kingdom to believe and act under this proclamation (Rekso Pustoko Mangkunegaran Archives Number 2422). This statement sparked responses from several groups in Surakarta Anderson, 1988, p. 138). They consider this contrary to the spirit of independence (Kartodirdjo, 1989, p. 47).

This then gave birth to the Anti-Autonomy Group. This group opposed feudalism and the system of government under the kingdom and believed that returning power to the kingdom would be detrimental to society. This movement changed the traditional politics and economy of the palace, which had been going on for a long time (Prasadana & Gunawan, 2019, p. 188). This group also gave birth to socio-political conflicts aimed at changing Special or Autonomous Regional Government regulations that were inappropriate for their time. This movement had widespread impacts, such as kidnappings, armed incidents, and struggles for influence (Kartodirdjo, 1989, p. 65). Thus, the social revolution in Surakarta was a meeting between people's hatred of traditional leaders and the interests of political forces who wanted to shake national leaders. The people were tired of being colonized by the Dutch, occupied by Japan, controlled by the palace, and the palace's indifference to the revolution (Julianto, 2010, p. 153).

The Anti-Autonomous Rebellion arose due to the stubborn attitude of King Mangkunegara VIII, who did not want to give up the special rights of autonomous government and wanted to remain as King Mangkunegaran. The anger and riots carried out by this group worried King Mangkunegara VIII, adding to the pressure on the political status of the Mangkunegaran Palace (Mawardi & Widyaningsih, 1995, pp. 50-51). The political conflict within the Mangkunegaran Palace occurred when officials criticized King Mangkunegara VIII for implementing a feudal and conservative government system (Moertono, 1985, p. 85). However, this condition did not last long because King Mangkunegara VIII was able to reduce the high tension that occurred in

the Mangkunegaran Palace area after speaking about his leadership, which was outside the concept of government at the Mangkunegaran Palace in front of Mangkunegaran officials (Wardhana, Pitana, & Susanto, 2019, p. 108).

After the political conditions at the Mangkunegaran Palace were successfully resolved, Mangkunegara VIII took the proper steps by ordering his royal troops to guard outside the Mangkunegaran Palace to prevent a rebellion by the Anti-Autonomy group led by Dr. Moewardi wanted to kidnap him (Kamajaya, 1993, p.10). This condition is inversely proportional to the Kasunanan Palace because they are more passive towards the Anti-Autonomy movement without riots or chaos like Mangkunegaran. The Kasunanan Palace quickly restored Surakarta's privileges, removing Surakarta's special status until the central government overcame the Anti-Autonomy movement (Ariyanti, 2013, p. 13). The Government of the Republic of Indonesia intervened to resolve the chaotic political situation in Surakarta, especially in the Mangkunegaran area.

This was proven by Ir. Soekarno, president of the Republic of Indonesia, who held a KNIP meeting on March 25 1946, in Surakarta to calm the masses, demonstrating against the government and the kingdom. Sukarno met with institutions involved in efforts to abolish autonomous regions and went to meet the Banteng Front. After meeting with bodies seeking the abolition of the Autonomous Government, Sukarno met with the government and asked it to be active in carrying out its political functions and handling security in Surakarta by collaborating with related institutions. During the meeting, the deputy regents of the two kingdoms wanted the president to take appropriate steps under applicable law (Rekso Pustoko Mangkunegaran Archives Number S 2391).

Following up on a report from President Soekarno, on April 4 1946, the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, Mr. Hermani, came to Surakarta to discuss Surakarta's problems. In the meeting, members of the Surakarta Anti-Autonomy KNID were represented by R.P. Suroso and Sutapa Adisputra. On the other hand, the royal party was represented by Bungkuman Pakubuwono Amin Singgih and Mr R.M.T. Sumardi (Mangkunegaran Pustoko Rekso Archives Number S 258).

The Anti-Autonomy or Anti-Feudal group felt that the efforts of the Republic of Indonesia could not resolve the crisis or problem of political turmoil in Surakarta, coupled with the controversial announcement issued by King Mangkunegara VIII on May 1 1946. This announcement marked that shortly Mangkunegaran would be appointed as head of Special Regions, which are directly under the President following the provisions of the Indonesian Law; in other words, the Mangkunegaran region is still maintained by the conservative party as an autonomous region (Anderson, 1988, p. 393). The announcement created political tension in Surakarta, and Mangkunegaran heated up again. (Kamajaya, 1993, p. 10).

The political chaos in the Surakarta area was caused by various frictions, one of which was carried out by the opposition in Surakarta. The opposition, chaired by Tan Malaka, established a cooperative relationship with the Banteng Front movement led by Dr. Moewardi. This prompted the opposition and the Bull Front movement to hold

a significant meeting on May 9, 1946 — the conference aimed to form a legislative body democratically through direct elections to determine its members. The meeting also sharply criticized King Mangkunegara VIII for issuing policies that caused political tensions to increase. After the conference was over, several members including dr. Mangkunegaran arrested Moewardi for strongly criticizing King Mangkunegara VIII (Anderson, 1988, p. 422).

Mangkunegaran's arrest of members of the meeting created members of the Anti-Autonomy opposition, and the Banteng Front movement went berserk. They moved with quite a large mass and put King Mangkunegara VIII in another dangerous condition. However, the King had anticipated this by drawing up a plan to order Mangkunegaran troops to stand guard outside the palace gates whose troops were equipped with complete weapons and cannons were also available at the Mangkunegaran Palace to prevent rebellion (Julianto, 2010, p. 164).

On May 28 1946, the situation heated up again when the Anti-Autonomy group, as members of the opposition and the Banteng Front, continued to divide or attack Mangkunegaran. This incident attracted the attention of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia by reminding King Mangkunegara VIII to give up his privileges as an autonomous region. However, King Mangkunegara VIII ignored this warning until he issued a proclamation and made a new law. The declaration states that Mangkunegara VIII continues to adhere to the principle of maintaining the privileges of the Autonomous Region and its territory and wants to remain as King of the Mangkunegaran Duchy (Sandhy, 2022, p. 83).

The friction between the Anti-Autonomous and Mangkunegaran groups occurred because of the political turmoil that spread into Surakarta's economic sector. The Anti-Autonomy group even succeeded in creating a power competition between the Duchy Government as a legitimate power recognized by the Indonesian Government and the Anti-Autonomy as members of KNIDS, which was not recognized by the Indonesian Government but received support from most political participants in Surakarta. This condition causes overlapping government administration, which significantly impacts the economic sector (Musaparsih, 2005, p. 96).

Agriculture and forestry, which are essential sectors in supporting the running of the Mangkunegaran economy, experienced a decline in production during the social revolution. Before the social revolution, agriculture produced tens of thousands or, more precisely, up to 16,400 tons (Sandhy, 2022, p. 4). However, agriculture could only produce tens to hundreds of kilos during the social revolution. The same condition is also experienced in the forestry sector, which is usually able to export forest products. However, with the Anti-Autonomy movement, production results were hampered and could no longer be sent (Julianto, 2010, p. 67).

The plantation sector, such as tea, coffee and sugar cane, is the most central sector that contributes to the Mangkunegaran economy because it produces the most significant profits compared to the agricultural and forestry industries. It was also affected by the social revolution, causing several factories in the Mangkunegaran area

to stop producing. They make the economy increasingly stagnant (Sandhy, 2022, p. 72). Therefore, the Anti-Autonomy group defeated King Mangkunegara VIII because the economic sector at the heart of Mangkunegara's economy was shaky due to their rebellion (Kahin, 1995, p. 321).

The Collapse of Mangkunegaran Autonomous Government and the Establishment of Surakarta Residency

The Declaration of the Head of the Surakarta Central Government on 14 June 1946 marked the end of the Mangkunegaran Autonomous government so that all employees of the Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran Palaces became Indonesian Government Employees (Announcement on 20 August 1946 to office administrators and employees of the Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran Companies). In this case, the Surakarta Regional Defense Council has the right to manage the Surakarta region (Antara, 15 June 1946). This declaration was strengthened by the arrival of the Deputy of the Surakarta Defense Council who arrived in Mangkunegaran on 24 June 1946 and stated that the Mangkunegaran and Kasunanan governments were united and managed by the Surakarta Regional Defense Council (Mangkunegaran Consanguineous Committee, 1971, p. 12). Apart from that, King Mangkunegara VIII also stated that he had given up in the face of the onslaught of the Social Revolution in Surakarta, which caused most of Mangkunegaran's incoming resources, such as economic assets or companies to fall into the hands of struggle agencies (Rekso Pustoko Mangkunegaran Archives Number B 580). This resulted in Mangkunegaran experiencing difficulties in financing its government because Mangkunegaran's financing subsidies had been cut off, and regulations regarding economic relations between the Indonesian Government and Mangkunegaran were unclear (Mangkunegaran Rekso Pustoko Archives Special Number).

The Indonesian Government then issued Government Decree Number 16/SD dated 15 July 1946 concerning the Government in the Special Region of Surakarta and Yogyakarta, the contents of which are as follows: (1) Before the form of Government for the Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran regions was determined by law, the areas of the Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran regions temporarily considered a Residency, led by a Resident who leads all civil servants and police and holds all powers as Resident in Java and Madura outside the Surakarta and Yogyakarta areas. (2) The governments in Surakarta and Yogyakarta are directly under the leadership of the central Government (Government Decree Number 16/SD, dated 15 July 1946). Based on this decree, the Indonesian Government wanted to designate the Surakarta region as part of Central Java Province even though King Mangkunegara VIII stubbornly refused to give up the special rights of his Special Region, thus making the Government of the Republic of Indonesia angry (Rudyatmo, 2013, p. 10).

The formation of the Surakarta Ministry was the government's response to various events that occurred in Surakarta by the Anti-Autonomy Movement. The central government's decision is one way to overcome the chaotic political situation (Toer, Toer, & Kamil, 1999, p. 60). The concept of the Special Region of Surakarta is

different from the concept of regional expansion in Government Regulation Number 78 of 2007 concerning Procedures for the Formation, Abolition and Merger of Regions. The people still elect regional heads in this area, so two leaders run the government of the Special Region of Surakarta (Moedjanto, 1987, p. 80). The residence is led by Resident Iskak Tjokroadisuryo and his deputy Soediro. His leadership was successful because he succeeded in resolving various problems, and his policies were constructive for the progress of Surakarta to become a unique region of the Republic of Indonesia. This concept is designed to replace the feudal structure with a new, more democratic structure based on the 1945 Constitution (Utamawan, 2010, pp. 25-26).

Conclusion

The Social Revolution in Surakarta is an interesting problem, focusing on the decision-making or position Mangkunegaran took during the crisis. Political contestation at the national level in granting regional autonomy rights to Surakarta by the Government of the Republic of Indonesia initiated the process of delegitimization in Surakarta on 19 August 1945. This was accompanied by the transfer of the capital of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia from Jakarta to Yogyakarta, which caused various impacts, one of which was competition with the opposition in Yogyakarta and spread to Surakarta. This was the background to the riots in the Surakarta area, which were marked by the birth of the Anti-Autonomy movement. This movement aims to revoke the Special Region of Surakarta and wants privileges for the two traditional powers in Surakarta, namely Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran. They hoped to take over the land controlled by the two feudalistic governments. This group became the actors in the riots, chaos and violence in Surakarta as a response to the political policies of King Mangkunegara VIII, which were further strengthened by supporting the restoration of Dutch rule so that the Indonesian Government did not nationalize its economic assets to improve the country's economic structure and continue to perpetuate its hegemony.

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