

PNI Political Strategy to Win the 1955 Election in Indonesia

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Abstract

This article aims to reveal the reason and how the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) succeeded in becoming the winning party of the General Election (Pemilu) in Indonesia in 1955 by gaining the most votes as many as 8,434,653 votes, followed by the Indonesian Muslim Shura Council Party (Masyumi) of 7,903,886 votes and Nahdlatul Ulama Party (NU) of 6,955,141 votes. The 1955 election was the first direct election in Indonesia to be the most democratic in history since the campaign did not only take place in big cities, but had reached villages and even remote villages. The atmosphere of contestation was very strong, but it was not accompanied by a violent conflict even though the contestation was from political parties with very different ideological backgrounds. In this context, the political strategy pursued by the PNI is very interesting, that is by consolidating politics both internally and externally. To examine the problems, historical methods were used in which data were excavated from primary sources including news and articles in newspapers and magazines, as well as minutes of parliamentary meetings regarding the Election. The results of the analysis showed that the PNI performed politics consolidation through cooperation with various groups and political parties of any ideology. In addition, the PNI also adopted the conception of Sukarno's thinking to mobilize supporters, including through meetings, open meetings attended by the people by presenting prominent nationalist figures as their orators. The issues raised in the campaign had distinctive characteristics of nationalism, citizenship, and mutual cooperation.

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Introduction

Democracy always needs a balanced structure of strength and flexibility to translate public opinion as the highest sovereignty holder of the state, so that effective policies can be established and protecting the rights of all groups and individuals. For the new democracies, establishing balance is a daunting challenge. In this context, political parties have become an essential component (Reilly, 2003, p.3). Political parties play a crucial role not only representing various interests, combining choices, and forming governments, but also resolving conflicts and supporting a stable political life.

Meanwhile, van Biezen (2012) referred to political parties as political institutions in a modern democratic state which is an expression and manifestation of political

participation and pluralism. Pasquino (2012) said consolidation efforts towards modern democracy always occur in countries that are mainly free from authoritarian regimes recently. The main focus is on political, social, and economic organizations. In a more recent development, the consolidation efforts towards modern democracy are rested on the movement of political figures in a political party. The direction of consolidation of political parties is mainly focused on influencing and building public awareness regarding an ideal political and democratic life (Pasquino, 2012, p. 42).

Reilly (2003) exemplified some countries with quite dynamic democratic evolution in Asia Pacific along with their problems. These countries are Papua New Guinea which has hundreds of languages; Indonesia with separatist movements that threaten its unity; the Philippines which seeks to balance the interests of parties and social problems; and Thailand which is dominated by the power of one political party. The main discussion of Reilly's study on Indonesia is focused on political constellation during the period of Liberal Democracy.

Previous studies have shown that both the system of government and democracy in Indonesia have undergone several transitional periods, especially in the early days of independence (Benda, 1964). However, not all those transitional periods received attention. Lev (1967) provided an overview of the study on political parties in Indonesia which is more directed at the dynamics of political parties during the Guided Democracy and PKI received the greatest attention. Meanwhile, there are very few studies of post-revolutionary political parties. Lev (1967) cited the emergence of parties in Indonesia as a political component since the enactment of Ethical Politics by the Dutch Colonial Government in the early 20th century. In the 1910s to 1920s, the Nationalism, Islamism, and Communism movements grew and raised hostile to the Dutch. Its activities were centered in Java and spread unevenly in Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi.

In the 1930s, the movement of non-cooperative nationalist organizations received pressure from the Dutch Colonial Government and was prohibited through *verbod vergader* and led to the arrest of Sukarno (Utomo, Supriyono, & Indriyanto, 2021). Nevertheless, the pressure was actually increasing the stir of movement of the organizations to carry out propaganda actions to raise the spirit of nationalism, both in the form of speeches and writings on mass media articles. During the Japanese occupation, the political components were barely given space and only Islam was encouraged to form an organization.

Only in 1945, after Indonesia's independence was proclaimed, political components which were initiated by national movement figures rose and political parties began to be established. Vice President Notice No. X of 1945 concerning the election of members of the House of Representative in January 1946 became one of the manifestations of democratic consolidation. After the presidential cabinet was replaced by a parliamentary cabinet led by Sjahrir, the general election was used as a government program as contained in Government Notice dated November 14, 1945 which, among other things, reads, "Other democratic actions must immediately be used as a way to hold general elections, so that the representatives who are elected in

an independent manner can take the right part in carrying out the politics of the government and the course of the country" ("Pemilihan umum dan fungsinya," 1952, p. 3).

Post-enactment of the Government Notice of 14 November 1945, political parties began to be established. The nationalist wing raised the banner of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI). There was also the Indonesian Muslim Shura Council Party (Masjumi), an Islamic ideology party that also accommodated the Islamic Association Party of Indonesia (PSII), Nahdatul Ulama (NU), and Muhammadiyah. In 1947, PSII separated and stood as an independent party followed by NU in 1952 (Believer, 2015, p. 487-494). In the next political contestation, the Indonesian Muslim Shura Council Party (Masyumi) became a strong rival of the PNI.

This article examines the political strategy carried out by one of the major parties in Indonesia which became the winner in the first General Election in Indonesia, namely the PNI. According to Ufen (2008), political parties are the link between the state and the people. Therefore, the analysis of various consolidation efforts made by political parties, especially before the election, is a necessity. It is also stated in various mainstream literature of political science that well-functioning political parties must be able to recruit political elites, organize opposition, defuse conflicts by establishing connections with representatives of other political organizations or parties, offer accountability, and combine various interests. In the theory of democratic freedom, it is stated that general election is a link between the principle of people's sovereignty and the practice of governance by a small number of officials. In this context, the people elect their leaders (Liddle, 1978). Therefore, it is very natural that in Indonesia, during the period of liberal democracy, many parties fought to become the champion and defender of democracy, in the expectation of attracting people's sympathy ("Anggaran negara dan perjuangannya untuk demokrasi," 1952, p. 5).

Method

To examine the problems in the article, the historical method was used which is a set of principles containing systematic principles to find, test, and critically analyze past records and relics and then constructed them into a historical story (Garraghan, 1959, p. 33). The historical method consists of four stages, namely: heuristic, criticism, interpretation, and historiography.

Heuristics was done by searching newspapers and magazines archives, both offline and online. Newspaper and magazine articles published in Indonesia, such as *Merdeka*, *Merah Putih*, *Madjalah Merdeka*, and *Sikap Mimbar Indonesia* regarding the 1955 election was accessed in the National Library of the Republic of Indonesia (PNRI). In addition, articles from foreign media were obtained online, such as *The Advertiser (Adelaide)*, *The Guardian*, and so on. These sources were used to obtain facts about the 1955 elections and the consolidation carried out by the PNI. Meanwhile, to provide a broader context and as an analysis tool, articles from journals both national and international were used that were relevant to the research topic.

Political Parties and Elections 1955

As the first general election in Indonesia, the 1955 election becomes a very strong magnet and attracts the attention of both the Indonesian people and political observers abroad. The legal basis for holding of the 1955 Elections is article 19 of the Provisional Constitution (UUDS) of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, reads: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression" (Wirata, 1952). Meanwhile, technically, the Election Bill began to be discussed in parliament in the second semester of 1952 (Wilopo Cabinet).

The general elections had been a concern since Indonesia's independence was declared. Nevertheless, general elections cannot be held immediately for a number of reasons. The most powerful reason is because Indonesia has to fight the Allies during the revolution; secondly because there is no law governing the conduct of general elections. The bill governing the general election received attention only during the RIS period and was often delayed in its discussion as a result of political instability in Indonesia (Feith, 1954, pp. 236-254). On the other hand, from the observers' point of view in Indonesia, the general election is the only way to form an ideal cabinet in the midst of multiparty system. Hatta himself as a cabinet formateur stated that it is very likely that there is a "cow trade" in structuring the cabinet considering the party atmosphere in Indonesia which is feared to make politics a goal, instead of a path to national interests ("29 hari sebelum 26 September 1955," 1955, p. 5).

The bill governing general elections was proposed by the government during the period of Natsir Cabinet with a view to the 1948 law (Hatta Cabinet) on indirect general elections. However, the bill was rejected by the parliament before being discussed in the plenary meeting because they expected a direct general election. During the period of Wilopo Cabinet, the bill and the country's articles of association for the general elections of parliamentarians and constituents were again discussed in parliament at the insistence of various parties due to the unstable political situation in Indonesia ("Pemilihan umum dan fungsinya 1952, p. 2).

Sikap Mimbar-Politik magazine described the precarious situation that occurred in various areas in the early 1950s, including the events of the demonstration of October 17, 1952, followed by the events of the Brawijaya division of East Java, and the events of the division of Territorium VII of Makassar. The event had led many parties to urge the government to take a stance that could bring Indonesia to political order. One of them was through the discussion of the Law and the Articles of Association of the State aimed at public elections ("Anggaran negara dan perjuangannya untuk demokrasi," 1952, p. 5).

In the second semester of 1952, the government began proposing an Election Bill (RUU) for Constituent Members and the House of Representatives or known as the General Election Bill to the parliament. In general, the bill from the government (Wilopo Cabinet) did not get rejection from the factions in the Provisional House of Representatives (DPRS). That was because the General Election mechanism that

involved the people to vote directly had been expected by the DPRS for a long time. The first meeting, which was still conducted in a closed manner, discussed the conception of 15 electoral districts proposed by the government including East Java; Central Java; West Java; South Sumatra; Central Sumatra; North Sumatra; West Kalimantan; South Kalimantan; East Kalimantan; Sangihe-Talaud (has electoral subdistricts: Minahasa, North Sulawesi, Donggala, and Paso); Luwu (Mandar, Pare-Pare, Makassar, Bone, Bonthain, and Southeast Sulawesi); North Maluku (Central Maluku and Southeast Maluku), Former Timor Residency (Timor, Sumba, Flores, and surrounding islands); Bali (including Lombok); and West Irian. In determining the number of representatives, the minimum number was not applied but rather, adjusted to the number of residents of the chosen area. The general election committee consisted of party representatives and people's organizations ("Rantjangan Undang-Undang Pemilihan Umum," 1952, p. 4).

Regarding the conception of the electoral district, there was one party which had different opinion from the government, namely the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI). PSI proposed that approximately 40 electoral districts could be designated. The PSI conception allowed each region to have a minimum of one seat in the House and two seats in the Constituent Assembly. Nevertheless, the issue of electoral districts did not lead to much debate in the end. A debate took place when it came to establishing the manner in which minority representatives were nominated and elected. Anyone who wanted to be elected must submit a guarantee of Rp250 for individual candidates and individual candidates in the first list as well as Rp100 for candidates in the second list and so on. The existence of guarantees had caused debate from various parties. This was related to the number of voters from the electoral district who might also be included in the nomination requirements, that a minimum of 100 voters for individual candidates and 25 voters to nominate on the next lists. A quite interesting discussion was the opinion of a representative of European descent who expected the government to appoint one of their groups specifically for West Irian ("Rantjangan Undang-Undang Pemilihan Umum," 1952, p. 4).

When Ali Sastroamidjojo Cabinet fell a month before the planned general election time, concerns arose from parties who wanted elections to be conducted immediately. Moreover, the cabinet which replaced Ali Cabinet led by Burhanudin Harahap once stated that it took time and thorough checking of election preparations so that there was the possibility of the election being postponed ("Pemilihan umum dan alat permainan politik," 1955, p. 3). In order to review the preparation of the elections, Burhanuddin Harahap appointed an *ad hoc* committee chaired by the Minister of Home Affairs, Sunarjo. The purpose was to oversee the performance of the Indonesian Election Committee (PPI) chaired by S. Hadikusumo. Members of the PPI themselves consisted of representatives of parties contributing to the 1955 election. The establishment of the *ad hoc* committee itself marked Masyumi's dissatisfaction with the composition of the PPI which according to them was dominated by PNI representatives ("29 hari sebelum 26 September 1955, 1955," 1955, p. 5).

The planned postponement of elections by some circles was considered to be the effort of Burhanuddin Harahap to consolidate his forces in order to be better prepared for the elections. In fact, the Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet has Seven Work Programs of Cabinet mandated and emphasized by the Vice President Mohammad Hatta when appointing. One of the articles in the Seven Work Programs of Cabinet is to carry out the general elections according to the established plan and hasten the formation of a new parliament ("Susunan dan program Kabinet Mr. Burhanuddin Harahap, 1955). Based on the mandate and insistence of various parties, the Burhanuddin Harahap Cabinet finally held the elections according to the set time on September 29th for the Election of Members of the House of Representatives and on December 15th for the Election of Members of the Constitutional Assembly (Ayu, Sulistiyono, & Alamsyah, 2020, pp. 32-42).

The 1955 election has been a catalyst that was able to attract parties to consolidate, both internally and externally ("Opposisi hendaki intervensi negara-negara Barat," 1954). Approaching the 1955 election, campaign became the main agenda in every activity organized by political parties. The meetings were held not only to propagate their ideology, but also as a means of evaluating the extent to which the people knew their party, so that its activities were aimed at obtaining as many votes as possible. It was not uncommon for political parties to also give opinions about the state of the country through articles published by their propaganda newspapers.

The analyses delivered by political party leaders who did not support the cabinet regarding the domestic situation were signaled to be a series of interrogations in order to face the election, so that it seemed exaggerated. There were party leaders who used ways that were considered less constructive in campaigning ("Kampanje pemilihan," 1954). Nevertheless, various campaign activities were logical consequences of the election where people's sympathy was urgently needed. In a democratic country, the people were the determinants of the election and became the actual judges, so it was reasonable that political parties competed for the sympathy of the people (Muljani, Liddle, & Ambardi, 2011, p. 41).

One of the facts that concerned the public and even Western media was the competition between Masyumi and PKI. Both parties that were born from different ideologies claimed each other to win the election before the election was held (Tan, 1955). The belief in winning the election was conveyed by Burhanudin Harahap from the Masyumi, considering that Indonesia is a country that has a Muslim-population. On the other hand, if working hard, PKI was predicted to achieve success in the election. Two years before the election, tens of thousands of PKI sympathizers led by D. N. Aidit had done penetration in various cities. The coverage was also very deep up to the level of villages and hamlets (McCann, 1955).

The final result of the 1955 election was the majority vote for the PNI, which mainly came from Java. Meanwhile, Masyumi took second place with the majority vote from Sumatra. Masyumi managed to get 37 seats out of the 260 contested seats. The third position was the Nahdlatul Ulama Party (PNU). Meanwhile, surprising results were achieved by the PKI with more than five million votes and brought it to

the top four (McCann, 1955). The contestation between Masyumi and the PKI took place on the basis of Cold War ideology and alliances. Masyumi was known as an Islamic ideological party that although echoing neutrality, had a political preference for the West. This party was also known to have an anticommunist attitude so it rejected the existence of PKI. Meanwhile, PKI had been known as a party in alliance with Peking.

The first elections in Indonesia held 10 years (by Western researchers called "only" a decade) after Sukarno and Hatta declared Indonesia's independence had shown a good and dynamic progress in the democratic life. It became more and more interesting when looking at the contestation that occurred between parties that competed in the 1955 election, especially the contestation between major parties such as the PNI, Masyumi, NU, PSI, and unexpectedly the mass campaign of PKI. Coming to the 1955 election, Masyumi continued to express general opinions about the performance of the Ali-Arifin Cabinet which according to some circles was Masyumi's strategy to take the people's day.

An article in *Merah Putih* magazine stated that it was true that political parties were part of everyday life. It was also stated that the terms "nonparty" and "nonpolitical" had very different meanings. Non-party means non-partisanship and everyone was free to vote whether or not to sit in the party. However, non-party people did not always mean not being political because politics had a broad meaning and was attached to life. The main point of the article written by the editor of *Merah Putih* magazine highlights the contents of Eid al-Fitr Khutbah at Lapangan Banteng which was considered to contain political contents. The editor interpreted the contents of the Khutbah as an attempt to influence the audience to lean towards one of the political parties. It was pointed out that the party was an Islamic party but did not join the cabinet. The contents of the khutbah were considered inappropriate, especially because political orations or speeches should be carried out in forums, meetings, or congresses that involved the people to speak. The description was an example of how political parties leading up to the 1955 election tried hard to compete for the people's attention by consolidating various forces ("Politik kepartaian djanganlah mengganggu ketenangan suasana," 1955).

Foundation and Direction of PNI Political Strategy

Before the election, the PNI, which at that time became a government party, had to face political turmoil and economic crisis. Political and economic instability, as well as the threat of disintegration of the separatism movement in various areas led to the distrust motion proposed by Burhanuddin Harahap CS which was presented to the Ali-Arifin Cabinet. The unstable political and economic situation and the protests waged by the opposition had forced P.M. ALI SASTROAMIDJOJO to resign from his post in August 1955.

On August 11, 1955, Vice President Moh. Hatta confirmed Burhanuddin Harahap's cabinet. One of the articles in the seven programs mandated by Burhanuddin Harahap cabinet was to carry out general elections according to a

predetermined plan and hasten the formation of a new parliament. ("Susunan dan program Kabinet Mr. Burhanuddin Harahap, 1955).

The Central Council (DP) of the PNI itself interpreted the Election not as a "celebration" with passion, but rather a bridge that could plunge the PNI at any time into a deep abyss. The reason was the various problems faced by the Ali-Arifin cabinet. The PNI admitted that social and economic problems that ensnare the community were very likely to bring government support parties into defeat, especially the PNI as its matador and pioneer. Indonesia's political and economic instability in the early 1950s until the 1955 elections was not merely the fault of the PNI. In the cabinet itself, there were other parties, big and small, ranging from NU to the United Republican Party of Indonesia Raya (Partai Persatuan Indonesia Raya). Moreover, during the time of Ali-Arifin Cabinet, there were several corruption and nepotism violations that also received a spotlight. However, these issues did not necessarily discourage the PNI in supporting the 1955 election ("P.N.I. menghadapi Pemilihan Umum," 1955).

In the VII-th Congress held in Bandung, Sidik Djojokusarto reaffirmed several policies, attitudes, and patterns of PNI struggle for two years after the congress in Surabaya. The ideology of PNI was marhaenism with the symbol of the head of a bull. In the context of domestic affairs, the PNI moved based on close cooperation with all parties and groups. Broadly speaking, the PNI wanted cooperation in realizing national revolution that included three mainstream ideologies, namely national, religious, and socialist ("PNI sedia kerdjasama dengan partai partai manapun," 1954). The desire to cooperate with all groups had become the foundation for the PNI to be cooperative towards PKI. This attitude then became the consumption of opposition propaganda to attack the PNI ("Opposisi hendaki intervensi negara-negara Barat," 1954).

The foundation of PNI consolidation was clearly the national unity that had always been presented in every speech of Sukarno. However, as a party leading up to the 1955 election became a government party before it was finally replaced by Masyumi, the PNI tried not to exalt Sukarno's perception. This was evidenced by providing the right of political parties that had different views in terms of the principle to oppose. National unity is not always built by forcing ideological unity, party unity, and class unity. The national unity is emphasized in gathering national resources (both party and non-party) to carry out national duties ("Dengan kekuatan PERSATUAN Nasional," 1955, p. 1).

Responding to the harsh reaction of anticommunist political parties, especially Masjumi, the general chairman of the PNI stated that "PNI is not communist but also not anticommunist". The reason was simple, as an effort to consolidate national power ("Indonesia's Difficulties," 1954). Masjumi and PNI were known to have different views in many ways so that the nuance of competition between these two big parties was very strong. These differences concerned foreign politics, the economy, defense, and security, etc. Regarding foreign politics, PNI and Masjumi differed in their views on how to deal with the Dutch. The PNI had the courage to be harsh towards the Dutch who had many interests in Indonesia, including the West Irian. Meanwhile, Masjumi

argued that if Indonesia was too harsh to the Dutch, it was afraid that Indonesia would not achieve better results, based on the consideration that the Dutch was stronger because it had the support of large countries. As a result, these two big parties accused each other of leaning to a certain block. Masjumi accused the PNI of leaning towards the Eastern Block despite the fact that it was running an active-free foreign politics. Instead, the PNI accused Masjumi of having a tendency to side with the Western Block. Differences in views on foreign politics had also resulted in different attitudes in facing the separatism movement of Darul Islam /Indonesian Islamic Armed Force of Indonesia (DI/TII) ("Kabinet jang akan datang," 1956).

Various issues of foreign politics and domestic security (separatism movement) and West Irian were also the subjects of discussion in the consolidation carried out by the PNI. The first election in Indonesia itself by the PNI was interpreted as an effort to harmonize various political forces for the purpose of the country which also became an anticipatory attitude so that there was no cabinet crisis as happened before ("Crisis in Indonesia, 1955).

The ideological contents of nationalism were always conveyed in grand meetings held in various regions. In a meeting held in Pati, Sidik Djojokusarto (general chairman) voiced a general view of the foreign imperialism schools which were one of the sources of difficulties in Indonesia. The PNI was not hostile to parties allegedly ridden by foreign imperialism forces, but might remain vigilant and stick to the "marhaenism" believed by the PNI ("Imperialisme diluar dan dlm negeri musuh PNI," 1954).

The culmination of the consolidation of the PNI was an effort to support the holding of the People's Congress initiated by Sukarno. On the basis of the National Revolution, the PNI invited all political parties and community organizations to be actively involved in the People's Congress. In a speech at the introductory reception of the all-Indonesian People's Congress committee chaired by Arudji Kartawinata (PSII), Sukarno stated that the People's Congress was held with the aim of building national unity. Sukarno explained that the Indonesian national revolution had not ended. He exemplified the struggle of national figures that played an important role in Indonesia's independence efforts from various groups ("Kepertjajaan kepada potensi rakjat jg pernah berevolusi," 1955).

PSII's support for the Indonesian People's Congress was echoed at the PSII Congress held in Surakarta in April 1955. The results of the congress showed support for government programs that were also the focus of discussion in PNI congresses and meetings, including: the protocol for the dissolution of the Dutch- Indonesian Union, the Indonesian People's Congress, and the Asian-African Conference in Bandung. Furthermore, PSII emphasized the importance of national unity in order to carry out the national revolution ("Kongres PSII," 1955). Through speeches and concrete steps in promoting national unity, it was clear that the PNI had a consolidated direction that adhered to the spirit of nationalism.

The PNI itself tried to serve the interests of the community from all walks of life. This was evidenced by the victory of the PNI in North Sumatra. Although it was

ranked second after Masyumi, it was an achievement considering Sumatra was the basis of the Masyumi mass with the majority of the population was Muslim. The campaign strategy carried out by the PNI was generally the same as PKI, which targeted the lower class. For example, at the time of the bulldozing case conducted by the Governor Hakim, the PNI was among those who rejected the action. This made the people who were victims in that case easily put sympathy to the PNI (Lazuardi & Rochwulaningsih, 2020, pp. 11-21).

The strength of the PNI in campaigning was also influenced by the mass media. The daily newspaper *Waspada* became one of the most vivid newspapers voicing propaganda against the achievements of Ali cabinet and uncovering Masyumi's vicissitudes as an opposition party. *Merdeka* newspaper reported about the congresses and PNI resolutions in facing the 1955 elections. *Merdeka* newspaper and *Merah Putih* magazine also countered Masyumi's accusations to the mass media.

In general, the political strategy of the PNI in winning the 1955 Election was formulated in two ways, that were by voicing the Marhaenism ideology and enticing the people with Sukarno. Meanwhile, each region had its own peculiarities in the strategy of winning the general election. For example, Central Java, especially Semarang, also took steps to support the PNI strategy. These steps included holding group meetings in sub-districts or villages that were still not well acquainted with PNI. In addition, PNI cadres also held night patrols while reminding the community to choose PNI (Dewantarina, 2012, pp. 71-77).

Consolidation of Political Power to Achieve National Goals

Towards the 1955 election, political parties were established with various names sprung up like mushrooms. It was said to be like mushrooms because various questions arose, one of which addressed the ideology of political parties. In a speech, Sukarno questioned the basis of the political parties which were busy to attract the sympathy of the people. According to Sukarno, the ideology that developed in Indonesia in fact was not as much as the name of the party that emerged. The large number of competing parties had led to separate concerns, especially with regard to the number of cadres that were certainly reduced. As a result, the parties sought sympathizers by not considering personal qualities.

Many people who were actually not qualified as mature leaders also reaped the benefits of being politicians. In this context, the interests of the party had become the main goal, while loyalty to the actual goal, which was the goal of the state, became less prioritized. A lot of people were fussing about the political struggle. In fact, according to Sukarno, political struggle was only a tool to achieve the common interest which was the goal of independence. Development that was necessarily a common purpose had escaped scrutiny. In the event of a mistake, the negligence of other people became the center of attention, instead of doing introspection. Indeed, that by being political then one had made use of his democratic rights. Nevertheless, all of them should be of equal size. ("Politik dan pembangunan," 1955).

One indicator of the neglect of the country's goals was leaders who transferred from one party to another because they saw good possibilities in the new party. It proved that there were some people who took advantage of political struggles to compete for power, so they forgot the state's goals. In carrying out national goals, the PNI placed their cadres in various regions and prepared them since they were young. Since the early 1950s, the Marhaenism movement and the Indonesian Democratic Youth (Pemuda Demokrat Indonesia) had held congresses and various trainings to prepare the cadres who would enter on the political stage. Although the two organizations were not directly affiliated with the PNI, the PNI had a basic movement based on Marhaenism. Congress had been conducted even outside Java to avoid the impression of "Java centric" (Mangunsarkoro, 1952).

This was done to avoid the stereotype "Java centric" in the body of the PNI. The PNI had stereotyped itself as an opportunist, conservative political party, and was dominated by Javanese *priyayi* elites. The PNI seemed to realize that the stereotype was very strong, so that in the early 1950s, the PNI held an expansion of supporters. PNI co-opted groups from various regions ranging from North Sumatra to South Sumatra, as well as North Sulawesi and Bali. When the PNI appeared as a government party, the PNI might utilize its bureaucratic base to organize branches in various regions, especially outside Java. The effort proved successful with the joining of former federal leaders from outside Java who decided to join the PNI. The mass expansion of members was increasingly carried out in 1954 with the awareness that the victory of the PNI in the 1955 election depended heavily on funds that were successfully collected and from the support of party members (Rocamora, 1970, pp. 143-181).

Internal consolidation carried out by the PNI included plenary meetings, both by central and regional governments through Regional Councils and congresses held annually. The Plenary Regional Council of the Central Java PNI, in its hearing in Semarang in August 1955, examined the domestic affairs, especially regarding corruption. On the other hand, the PNI fully supported the efforts to eradicate corruption but also feared that these measures would be abused by some people or groups to bring down political opponents. Therefore, the corruption issues might be addressed by law enforcement bodies so that its decisions could be accounted for. On that occasion, the Plenary Regional Council of the Central Java PNI sent a letter to the president, parliament chairman, attorney general, and other officials. A statement letter was also sent to the PNI DP containing recommendations that the non-participation of the PNI in the cabinet should be accepted with sincerity and should instead be used to provide control to the government. The position of the PNI at that time as affirmed in the statement letter was not only as a mere opposition, but also exercised the functions of control and correction of cabinet actions in the interests of the nation and state ("PNI mengawasi tindakan kabinet," 1955). Meanwhile, regarding the general election, the PNI invited the people to move simultaneously to promote the implementation of the election and reject the resignation of the election for any reason. The PNI recognized that the authority of the government relied heavily on the trust of the people.

Nationalism and Pancasila as the Basis of the PNI Struggle

Both in running the government and facing the general election, the PNI always consistently and obediently adhered to the ideology of nationalism. This is stated and implied in the discussions of the PNI meetings. The concrete step taken by the PNI from the beginning was to establish cooperation with various groups and political parties from various schools ("P.N.I menghadapi pemilihan umum," 1955).

At meetings held in various regions, the PNI always provided a good picture of cooperation with NU and PSII. For example, when meeting in Banten, Gatot Mangkupradja explained the good relationship between Marhaenism and Pancasila. Both ideologies had become the foundation of the PNI that could accept the establishment of NU and PSII, especially because government laws and regulations were also drafted based on religious law ("Gatot Mangkupradja: Kerdjasama PNI," 1954). The consolidation of PNI was also contained in PNI resolutions proposed since the VI-th PNI Congress in Surabaya.

The most important PNI resolution was the unilateral cancellation of conditions that harmed Indonesia's interests in Indonesia's economic and financial agreement with the Netherlands. This was related to the attitude of the Netherlands towards West Irian. The PNI also fully supported the Afro-Asian Conference which was followed by the Ali-Arifin Cabinet. The conference held in Bogor and attended by five Prime Ministers (Birma, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Sailan) was fully supported by the PNI in order to face the international political constellation ("Resolusi² PNI," 1954). The PNI resolution that sought peaceful coexistence was fully supported and affirmed at the VII-th PNI Congress held in Bandung.

The conception of co-existence was approved by considering several things, including: the international world political situation which was covered by the conflict between the Western and Eastern Blocks; the threat of the Third World War which certainly endangers the country's independence and sovereignty; active-free foreign politics which led to independence as a whole; cooperation with countries that have the goal of world peace; as well as "goodneighbourpolicy" and "Afro-Asian" politics. Based on these considerations, it was agreed that the principles of peaceful co-existence; non-interference in the domestic affairs of a country; mutual respect for state sovereignty; mutually beneficial cooperation with each other; and a country did not conduct aggression in any form against other countries ("P.N.I. menghendaki koeksistensi setjara damai," 1954, p. 1).

The Asia-Africa Conference was part of the conception of Sukarno that had inspired the PNI. In every campaign activity, the PNI almost always voiced Sukarno's conceptions. Although Sukarno was not structurally included in the members of the PNI, Sukarno's ideology and conception were an integral part of the PNI. It was seen in the election campaign of the Constituent Assembly after the election of members of the House of Representatives. Each political party proposed a basic conception of the state that would be fought for in constituent hearings. In this regard, the PNI was the

only party that absolutely followed Sukarno's conception, in order to maintain Pancasila as the basis of the state.

Soyomukti (2012) stated that Pancasila is the basis of the state that is very "sophisticated". This is mainly the nature of Pancasila which is a meeting point with humanity. Pancasila was created by the founders of the nation who aspired to an anti-colonial and anti-oppressive spirit. The founders of the nation were people who did not oppose to anti pluralism and religious pluralism. H.O.S. Cokroaminoto, for example, once wrote about Islam and socialism. Haji Misbach once called for an Islamic-Communist regime. Meanwhile, Sukarno recognized nationalism, Marxism, and Islam. Thus, the figures of basic constituents of the state consisted of people from various backgrounds, ranging from religion, ideology, beliefs, ethnicity, to race. The opinion of Soyomukti (2012) confirmed that Pancasila does have relevance to the basics of the struggle carried out by the PNI as a party that stands in the axis of nationalism.

However, Pancasila is a national policy that encompasses all groups. According to Sukarno, either the party with the ideology of nationalism or socialism have to maintain the basics of nationalism under the Pancasila. Everyone could give interpretations to each of them according to their religious understanding and beliefs, but they were not allowed to make a new state policy other than Pancasila. According to Muhammad Natsir, Pancasila is part of the Islamic goal that Masyumi fought for. Meanwhile, according to NU, nationalism under Pancasila is the basis of the state's view that must be completed with Islamic laws. For PNI, Pancasila is a basis that can be accepted by all Indonesian people. Therefore, the PNI consolidation movements were actually inspired by national movement figures who although different in direction and ideology, they had the same basis and purpose. It seemed that the PNI leaders were very aware that the party whose embryo had existed since the time before independence, has a successful period mostly because it adhered to the opinion that the PNI was "the party of Sukarno and Hatta". This was also approved by foreign scholars (Anggara, 2017, p. 662).

Conclusions

The success of the 1955 election had also shown the maturity of the Indonesian in democratic life. The PNI's support in the 1955 election proved that the nationalism ideology based on Pancasila was a middle course that was able to accommodate various schools and thoughts. The 1955 election is at the same time a sign that nationalism and Pancasila are the most relevant ideology and basis of the state for the Indonesian people. Those two things were the foundation and direction of PNI political consolidation, so that it was able to achieve a glorious victory in the first election in Indonesia which obtained recognition as the most ideal and democratic election. In addition, PNI also targeted people from various groups, especially from villages as Marhaenism was promoted by PNI leaders. Approaching the election, the PNI expanded supporters to outside Java by engaging various organizations and community groups to remove the stereotype of "Java centric".

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