

Defending Indonesian Sovereignty through Mass Media: Radio Rimba Raya in the Revolutionary War

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Abstract

Radio as a medium of information plays an important role in the history of Indonesia's struggle. This study was conducted because of the previous studies on the movement to defend Indonesia's independence, only a few uses radio as a means of struggle. Radio Rimba Raya (RRR), which was established in Aceh. The aim is to analyze the role of RRR in defending Indonesian Independence, especially during the Second Dutch Military Aggression in 1948 and the General Offensive on March 1, 1949. Using the historical method, this study found that RRR became an important medium for nationalists to communicate orders and information, as well as providing an opportunity for Indonesia to thwart propaganda and dismiss Dutch provocations. Due to the importance of RRR in Indonesia's struggle, it can be concluded that one of the media for Indonesia's struggle and success against the Dutch was RRR with its messages that crossed the vast expanse of the contested area. The messages of struggle that were broadcast through the RRR were an important part of Indonesia's political strategy, both in dismissing Dutch propaganda and provocations and in guarding the agendas of Dutch-Indonesian diplomacy so that they were known to the public at home and abroad.

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Introduction

Radio is one of the media, which plays an important and strategic role in the delivery of information to the public. In addition, radio can be a propaganda medium (Salata, 2020; Barber & Miller, 2019; Goody, 2018). The power of radio propaganda lies in its ability to produce affective hearing, the intensification of one sense (listening) produces physical and emotive responses to the presence of sound (McHugh, 2016). In addition to being easily accessible, the news conveyed can vary, namely, news that is in accordance with the facts or otherwise, news of provocations, which can divide

unity and threaten the stability of a country.

In the beginning of Indonesia's independence, Radio was used as one of the mediums of struggle, especially in building the modern Indonesian nation. The history of broadcasting in Indonesia reveals something about the indigenous and national character, as well as the way and breadth of absorption of ideas from two foreign cultures (Dutch and Japanese) that dominate the archipelago in modern times (Wild, 1987). Before the existence of Radio Rimba Raya (RRR), Indonesia had a radio called Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI) (Puguh & Mufidah, 2020; Puguh, 2017). When RRI was founded on September 11, 1945, Indonesians who understand the media, who have studied its effectiveness as a propaganda tool, and who can operate it technically. There are many radio devices to ensure that a message will reach a point in each community when it can be spread word of mouth, as well as a tendency to listen wirelessly and to give some credence to its message (Wild, 1991).

Through the RRI broadcast, Sukarno delivered the news of the Proclamation of Independence of the Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1945. Indonesia managed to seize its independence from the previous invaders, the Dutch and Japanese. However, the Netherlands does not recognize Indonesia's sovereignty and seeks to re-establish its power, both through diplomatic and military channels. From this the role of radio becomes important in Indonesia's struggle, especially to disseminate information in various diplomacies conducted between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Diplomacy ultimately leads to resistance and battle.

The first diplomacy of the Netherlands-Indonesia is through the Linggardjati Agreement to agree on the de facto territory of the United States of Indonesia (RIS). The agreement was agreed and signed on March 25, 1947 (Soebandrio, 1948). However, the Dutch had a different interpretation and reneged on the agreement. The Dutch then carried out an attack, known as the First Dutch Military Aggression on July 21, 1947 (Van Der Kroef, 1953). Because it still leaves the dispute between Indonesia-Netherlands, the Renville Agreement (December 8, 1947, to January 17, 1948), the contents of which include; The Netherlands only recognizes Central Java, Yogyakarta, and Sumatra as part of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia. After the agreement was agreed, the Dutch declared a federal government in Sumatra. In fact, part of Sumatra is a territory of Indonesia. The Dutch, who had benefited from the Renville Agreement, reneged on it, then launched the Second Dutch Military Aggression offensive on December 19-20, 1948.

Indonesia felt that they were harmed in some of the agreements made, while the Dutch benefited. On the contrary, the Dutch who benefited from the agreement did not feel satisfied, and in the end, launched an attack on Indonesia. Indonesia-Netherlands relations continue to warm as a result of the absence of common ground in various diplomacy conducted earlier. Indonesia's reaction to the Second Dutch Military Aggression led to an event, known as the General Offensive of March 1, 1949. The purpose of this attack is to prove to the international community that the Indonesian National Army (TNI) still exists and is strong.

The period 1948-1949 was the most important period in the Republic of Indonesia. 19 December 1948 known as the Second Dutch Military Aggression (Heijboer, 1998), until the

General Offensive of March 1, 1949, as Indonesia's reaction to various attacks launched by the Dutch. Indeed, during the First Dutch Military Aggression, Indonesia was not successfully controlled by the Dutch, but at the time of Second Dutch Military Aggression, almost all of Indonesia such as Java, Madura, and Sumatra were affected (Kahin, 1952). The Dutch also arrested several Indonesian figures, among them, Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta as well as other important figures, who were considered to threaten their existence. As a result of the Dutch aggression and expansion of Indonesian territory made the territory of Indonesia becomes smaller.

As a result of the Dutch attack on Indonesia, radio transmitters including RRI, starting from the center of Yogyakarta, whose job it is to broadcast the voice of independent Indonesia to the rest of the world, cannot move. Communication devices, bombed and burned. Therefore, the news of the Second Dutch Military Aggression attack was circulated only by word of mouth (Sufi et al., 2010). Instead, news of Dutch provocations over their radios was transmitted from Batavia and Medan. The Dutch claim was also broadcast by Radio Hilversum (Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1948).

The study of the existence and role of radio in Indonesia has been widely studied by scholars and researchers before, especially those reviewed from historical approaches such as Witte's (1998), Mrazek (1997), (Wild, 1991, 1987), and Kementerian Penerangan, (1953). However, the studies conducted have not touched all radios in Indonesia, so their studies cannot be said to be comprehensive, and still require further research in filling the gaps. The study of radio continues to be the focus of scholars in the field of social sciences, especially in the New Order and Reformation era as did McDaniel (1994), Lindsay (1997), Sen & Hill (2001), Samuel (2002), and Jurriëns (2009).

Thus, the study reveals the role of the RRR in defending Indonesia's sovereignty from Dutch news of provocation and propaganda. The stimulus-response theory, pioneered by Ivan P. Pavlov, was used to analyze the study. A stimulus is an event that occurs in the human body that causes a change in behavior. Through stimulus theory, messages received by communicants over radio elicit responses or effects in the form of various actions, reactions, or answers, which can change the opinion, behavior, cognition of communicants. The response depends on the stimulus or is the result of the stimulus. The stimulus in this study was a provocation broadcast delivered by Radio Hilversum Netherlands, while the response was the RRR's reaction in countering the provocation of Dutch Radio. In addition, time communication theory is used to see how communication occurs through RRR broadcasts. Radio communication according to DeFleur (2010) is a linear process by which professional communicators use media to design and disseminate messages widely, quickly, and sustainably to evoke desired meaning in a large, diverse, and selective manner.

Method

This article was compiled using historical methods consisting of four stages, namely heuristic, source criticism, interpretation, and historiography (Moustakas, 1990; Renier, 1961). Data sources related to Radio Rimba Raya (RRR) are taken from written literature in the form of archives, research reports, and relevant historical documents. Written literature is important because history can only be brought by historians

through various publications (Jenkins, 1997). In addition to written literature, information was obtained from Mr. Tukiran as one of the living witnesses of Radio Rimba Raya. The information the author got when observing the RRR Monument in Rimba Raya Village. According to Albulescu (2018), empirical data through observation can confirm or invalidate the theory.

After reading on various sources, criticism of the source is carried out. Along with the discovery of historical sources, as well as the validation test of sources, which in historical writing is known as historical criticism, namely external criticism to ensure authenticity or authenticity of sources, and internal criticism to find out the credibility of sources, both archives and other supporting documents. Data and sources are tested for validity to find authentic sources, then interpreted. The interpretation of historical facts is very important, especially in reconstructing the realities of the past and providing a reinterpretation of the relationship between facts and data. Interpretation in historical studies is also called historical analysis, whose purpose is to synthesize facts recovered from historical sources. The facts are organized together with the theory into a comprehensive interpretation, both analysis of data, and separating data according to information, or synthesizing data between one source with the source that is design, in order to know the combination of the two. Finally, the stages of historical writing, which include the way of writing, exposure, or reporting history in accordance with the chronology of history.

The Role of Mass Media in Conveying the Ideas of the Nation's Struggle

On the first day of the Second Dutch Military Aggression, the Dutch fielded military forces at the airbase, which started from Maguwo to Yogyakarta. In overcoming these problems, the Indonesian government represented by Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta, and Agus Salim on December 19, 1948, held a Cabinet Meeting (Talsya, 1960), then took an important decision regarding the course of the struggle for independence, namely "We, the President of the Republic of Indonesia informed that on Sunday, December 19, 1948, at 6 am, the Netherlands had begun its attack on the city of Yogyakarta. If in these circumstances the government cannot carry out its obligations anymore, then we authorize Syafruddin Prawiranegara (Minister of Prosperity of the Republic of Indonesia) to form an Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PDRI) in Sumatra" (Talsya, 1990; Kahin, 1952).

News about the fall of Yogyakarta city on December 19, 1948, only reached Aceh in the afternoon. After receiving the news, A. Gani Mutyara as Officer and Head of Information TNI Division X Sumatra reported to Tgk. M. Daud Beureu'eh (Military Governor of Aceh). After that A. Gani Mutyara and Osman Raliby (Head of Aceh Regional Information Office) gave a speech at RRI Kutaraja Studio, which contained an explanation of the situation at hand and the steps to be taken. The next day, the Aceh Military Governor gave a passionate speech addressed to all the people, soldiers, and guerrilla forces in the area (Alfian, 1982). The Military Governor advocates and invites all elements that the attack that has begun, carried out with a victory.

One of the most necessary means by a country in times of war is the availability of communication devices such as radio transmitters (Hodge, 1995; Hale, 1975). With this

radio transmitter, people easily know the situation and developments that occur in a country that is precarious. Communication tools such as radio have their own advantages, are easy to hear with a wide distance and range, and cannot be done physically except through broadcasts in the form of important messages. Therefore, the newly independent Republic of Indonesia urgently needs communication tools such as radio in order to broadcast news, both from home and abroad.

The fighters and people of Aceh rely on communication networks between regions through radio transmitters. Of the several radios that play a role in maintaining the existence of Aceh territory and state sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia is Radio Rimba Raya. This radio is located in Bener Meriah precisely in Rimba Raya, which had previously experienced several displacements due to reconnaissance from the Dutch side.

When Radio Batavia and Radio Hilversum reported that the Republic of Indonesia no longer existed because Yogyakarta had been controlled by the Dutch, then the RRR firmly broadcast and dismissed all news that could harm the Republic of Indonesia, including Aceh in the eyes of the international community. RRR at that time became the only radio mouthpiece that denied Dutch radio by broadcasting news of the fact that the Republic of Indonesia still had territory and leaders (Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 1948).

The New Order period was also the subject of scholarly study. Lindsay (1997), who focused her attention on private radio and local identity in an Indonesian context, was interesting to take into consideration. Lindsay departs from his view that radio broadcasting in Indonesia has a strong tradition as a local community activity. Lindsay noted that in 1977, there were 700 private radio stations, all of which were commercial out of a total of 898 radio stations in Indonesia. This indicates that radio plays an important role for the people of Indonesia. However, his study only focused on private radio, whose studies were long after Indonesia's independence. While the discussion related to the existence and role of radio in the early days of independence as played by Radio Rimba Raya in dismissing Dutch propaganda news, escaped its study.

The existence of radio in Indonesia was also researched by Samuel (2002). His research focused on Indonesian radio broadcasting, particularly examining the changes brought about by the New Order and the Reformasi era. Similar studies can also be found in some parts of the book by Jurriëns. In general, Jurriëns (2009) provides a working definition of the Reformation and addresses a number of cultural-historical factors that contributed to radio's role as a medium of socio-political reform. Then, it provides a conceptual analysis of the Reformation and explains how or why radio journalism has contributed to the Reformation. Jurriëns (2009) concluded that Indonesian radio has become an efficient medium for disseminating people's thoughts and feelings as a result of some of its technological features, such as the oral and aural character of radio broadcasts and the relatively low cost of production, transmission, and program acceptance. However, his writing has focused more on change and continuity in journalism since the fall of Suharto in 1998 and the start of a process of social and political reform known as Reformasi. In contrast to the study to be studied, the author wants to see how the role of one of the radios that once existed in Indonesia, known as Radio Rimba Raya in defending the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia. Jurriëns' writings focus on the role of radio in the Reformation era in

response to New Order monologueism and social issues of the Reformation period. While this study limited its study from 1948 to 1949 in the Old Order era, where one of Indonesia's radios (RRR) played a role in dismissing news of Dutch provocations.

Much has been written about the movement in seizing and defending Indonesia's independence. For example, studies conducted by Sulasman (2017), Siong, (2001), and Gouda (1997), but little analysis focused on strategy, particularly radio as an information medium, used in the international diplomatic lobby that accompanies guerrilla resistance, both at the local and national levels. This paper is not a detailed history of the media of Indonesia's struggle to achieve and maintain independence, but it attempts to reveal the role of the RRR, which is linked to that struggle. It specifically analyzed how the RRR's role was in dismissing Dutch propaganda news in the events of the Second Dutch Military Aggression of 1948 and the General Offensive of March 1, 1949, as part of Indonesia's strategy of struggle and defense. In the last section, this paper presents the factors supporting RRR involved in maintaining Indonesia's independence.

Existence of RRR: Smuggling and Transfer of Radio Device

The state of Indonesia in the early days of independence cannot be said to be stable and safe from colonial interference. Dutch Military Aggression I and II greatly disturbed Indonesia, which has just gained independence. The aggression made the public and freedom fighters aware of the importance of radio in dismissing Dutch propaganda news. On July 23, 1947, the Army's X-Division force successfully brought into Indonesia a radio transmitter from Malaya (Nasution, 1979). Aceh became a storage area for a radio transmitter because it was considered strategic and safe from Dutch supervision. Efforts to bring in radio transmitters are not achieved easily, but full of obstacles, although finally, Indonesia succeeded. The landing of a radio transmitter from Malaya to Aceh came amid a cordon and a Dutch police blockade of Indonesian territory (Talsya, 1990). Smuggling is one effective way to escape such intense Dutch surveillance.

The smuggling of radio devices was carried out to escape the Dutch blockade, which was on guard in the waters of the Strait of Malacca. The smuggling of these radio devices took 12 victims, all of whom were soldiers of TNI Battalion B, under the leadership of Nip. Karim (Dailanu, 1986; Sitompul, 2017). The death of TNI soldiers from being shot dead shows how hard the struggle is to get a radio transmitter to defend Indonesia's independence.

It should be noted that in conjunction with the attempt to obtain a radio transmitter, known as the Great Jungle Radio, the "cunning" and shrewdness of the strategy played by John Lie. The transmitter was brought in by John Lie through Dutch forces who were watching the ships, through the Strait of Malacca. John Lie used two-speed boats, which contained groceries and food (Sufi & Wibowo, 2004). Speed boats carrying food and food are used as fishing rods if there is a chase from the Dutch side, who are on guard in the waters of the Strait of Malacca.

When John Lie's troops were in the middle of the ocean-facing the Dutch troops, the speed boat containing food and food was used as bait by increasing the speed of

the speed boat. Then they split up and separated from the speed boat containing radio devices so that the Dutch patrol was fooled as if the speeding speed boat was running away from Dutch police checks. These tactics and strategies provoked Dutch police patrols so that a chase was inevitable (Syam, 2015). Dutch police managed to disable the speed boat, which was used as a fishing rod. Finally, the speed boat carrying the radio device managed to escape the Dutch police patrol. The radio device was taken to the coast of Sumatra by TNI forces, then landed in the Yu Tamiang River, East Aceh (Syam, 2015). This radio transmitter is the forerunner of the RRR, which is obtained through the struggle of life and death.

After arriving in Aceh, the radio transmitter was first installed in Krueng Simpo, Bireun (about 19 Km from Bireun City, North Aceh) by W. Schulz and assisted by Lieutenant Sajuddin, Lieutenant R. Abdullah, Lieutenant Syarifuddin, and Ramli Melayu, who were also employees in the Postal and Telegram/Telephone Service. The Krueng Simpo area became the first installation site for security reasons, away from Dutch supervision. Moreover, at that time, Indonesia's condition was not stable so it was not possible if the newly obtained radio transmitter, was brought to Kutaraja (Banda Aceh). While the city of Bireun became the place where the radio studio was built (Zulfan et al., 2009).

After the condition has improved, and due to political considerations, as well as on the orders of Tgk. M. Daud Beureu'eh as the Military Governor of Aceh, the radio transmitter was transferred to Kutaraja. Political considerations are intended so that with the radio transmitter, the information conveyed can reach abroad. In addition, it is easier for the Aceh Military Governor to convey political policies for the sake of struggle, and facilitate the entry and exit of information related to Indonesia's struggle (Sufi & Wibowo, 2004). Until in Kutaraja, radio transmitters were installed at Cot Geeu, precisely at the foot of Mount Seulawah because it is suitable in terms of geography and safety (Zulfan et al., 2009). If at any time known by the Dutch, the radio transmitter can be easily moved to Mount Seulawah through Peukan Bilui in Sibreh, then to Seulimum (Sufi & Wibowo, 2004). Although the transfer, the Dutch attack on Indonesia is not over, which is marked by a blockade and propaganda played.

At first, radio broadcasts were conducted in Kutaraja, between the studio and the transmitter connected by a cable that was about 8 km away. Broadcasting is done using signal calling, a wave officially used by RRI in Kutaraja, which is emitted on waves of 19 meters. While the other transmitter waves, using signal calling RRR and Army Radio Division X. Radio broadcasting in Kutaraja is managed by the Army Division X Lighting Section, headed by A.G. Mutyara (Zulfan et al., 2009).

The existence of RRR in Kutaraja did not last long. The day after the Second Dutch Military Aggression on December 20, 1948, on the orders of Tgk. M. Daud Beureu'eh (Military Governor of Aceh) radio transmitters were forced to be moved to other areas, which were safe from the Dutch range. Initially, the radio was to be moved to the Burni Bius area near Takengon but failed due to unsafe circumstances. Seeing these conditions, the Aceh Military Governor invited all civilian, military, and community leaders to attend a special meeting, held in Kutaraja on December 19, 1948.

On that night, the Aceh Military Governor instructed that the radio transmitter at Cot Geeu be immediately brought to the mountains of Central Aceh. Immediately, the special forces of Division X brought a radio transmitter to Rimba Raya, as far as 260 km from the city of Cot Geeu. On December 20, 1948, RRR resumed operations with its broadcast, which contained the instructions of the Aceh Military Governor on the implementation of general mobilization of all Indonesians who had grown up in Aceh.

The transfer of radio transmitters from Kutaraja to Rimba Raya was pursued by Dutch military forces, causing trucks carrying the devices to infiltrate and take shelter in the forest. The fertile forest in Central Aceh became a hideout for troops carrying radio transmitters from attacks, so the Dutch lost track. Due to consideration of the situation, strategic analysis, and technical calculations, as well as advice from Colonel Husein Yusuf (1912-1978) and W. Schulz, presented to the Aceh Military Governor, the planned installation of radio transmitters in Burni Bius, Central Aceh, was canceled. Thus, the radio transmitter was transferred to Rimba Raya Village, Central Aceh.

The installation of radio transmitters encountered several obstacles, namely the absence of electrical connecting devices and the lack of cable availability making the broadcasting process disrupted. Considering that the electric machine is the main key to live radio broadcasts, the search for power connecting devices and cables is sought. The search was carried out by Ummi Salamah (wife of Colonel Husein Yusuf), who started from Bireun area, then to Lampahan, but failed because both places did not have electricity supplies. A new electrical connecting device was found, in the Kuala Simpang area. After being found, the device was immediately taken to Rimba Raya village, until the radio was operational again.

RRR Broadcasting Structure: Schedule and Content

RRR is led by Indonesians, especially those living in Aceh. Among them was Colonel Husein Yusuf (1912-1978) (Builder and editor) (Inawati et al., 2016), Tgk. H. Affan (Builder), Abdullah Syarif (Builder and Acehnese editor), and Lieutenant Syarifuddin (Vice-Chairman, and broadcasters in Indonesian-Netherlands). However, the RRR broadcasters are not limited to Acehnese but are also assisted by people from outside the region such as Ambon and Manado, as well as foreigners.

The broadcasting schedule by Radio Rimba Raya is carried out starting at 16.00 pm. In addition to using Indonesian, RRR broadcasts also use foreign languages (English, Indian, Arabic, Chinese), as well as regional languages according to the birthplace of an announcer such as Acehnese, Ambonese, and Manado. In broadcasting, the radio transmitter with a power of 1 Kw uses signal calling voice of the Republic of Indonesia, Signal calling *Suara Indonesia Merdeka*, RRR, Radio Division X, and RRI (Sufi & Wibowo, 2004).

In general, RRR broadcasts are divided into five broadcast schedules. At 16.00–18.00 WIB, RRR conducted telegraph relations with guerrilla transmitter stations inside and outside the Dutch-controlled city to find out the state and development of the Indonesian struggle on the battlefield. At 19.00–21.00 WIB, RRR held a special

domestic special for the benefit of the Indonesian people using signal calling votes of the Republic of Indonesia. At 21.00–23.00 WIB, RRR held a special broadcast abroad for the struggle of diplomacy by Indonesian envoys abroad, as well as informing the international community that the Republic of Indonesia still exists. At 23.00–24.00 WIB, RRR conducted a special broadcast to the front-line using signal calling of The Free Indonesia voice. At 24.00 WIB-morning, RRR held a telephone relationship with several Indonesian representatives abroad (Jakobi, 1995; Sufi & Wibowo, 2004).

Exchange of information through RRR broadcasts between Indonesia and Indonesian representatives abroad is intended to know the domestic situation, the progress of the struggle abroad, and the problems faced by Indonesia, at home and abroad, including the availability and needs of war, needed by Indonesian fighters. The information submitted by RRR to Indonesian representatives abroad uses symbolic language so as not to be suspected, for example, “hello, send us butter, milk, and rice”. The language of “food” is merely a symbol, but what is meant is actually the need for struggle, as the tools of war (Sufi & Wibowo, 2004). Thus, the existence and role of the RRR to bridge information from within to abroad are needed. Indonesia’s information to get abroad can only be done through Aceh as the establishment of RRR because, in other areas, almost all of them are controlled by the Dutch.

In general, RRR broadcast content contains a message of Struggle and Independence of Indonesia and concerns community activities or activities such as social, cultural, literary, artistic, and religious (Sufi & Wibowo, 2004). However, in a period of upheaval between Indonesia and the Netherlands, broadcasts related to the Indonesian struggle became a priority. The broadcast of independence did not escape from things, which are closely related to the politics of government. The purpose of the message of struggle was broadcast in order for Indonesia to gain power, thus gaining the right and authority to rule and lead the country. In this context, broadcasts containing messages of struggle as part of Indonesia’s political strategy can be understood as the process of exercising and maintaining the power they have. That means, in gaining power, the information media in this case radio, plays an important and strategic role.

Radio as an information media plays an important and strategic role in Indonesia’s struggle. When the Dutch actively conducted political propaganda over the radio to bring down Indonesia on the international scene. Indonesian fighters also did the same, broadcasting news over the radio to dismiss news of provocations and propaganda by Dutch radio, which disrupted the struggle, both physical and mental of Indonesian fighters (Alfian, 1982). Through RRR broadcasts, rebuttals to Dutch propaganda can be minimized. The RRR also broadcast emergency government calls to listeners, both at home and abroad, particularly on messages that could stir guerrilla fighting.

Since the Second Dutch Military Aggression until the establishment of the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PDRI), RRR acts as a media linking information between PDRI and Indonesian representatives abroad. The RRR broadcast guerrilla messages widely and intensively, launched by the TNI and the

Indonesian people, so that the Dutch could not deceive the eyes of the world against their claims of power to Indonesian territory.

Radio Rimba Raya also takes part in efforts to raise funds from the community for the needs of the struggle. In accordance with its function, RRR became an information media and handler of propaganda news broadcast by Dutch radio. RRR invites people throughout the region to help Indonesia's struggle (Alfian, 1982). In the economic field, RRR broadcasts news about Indonesia's economic activities and circumstances for war preparation, both in the form of income from the public and funds from abroad (Polim, 1996). This information is important as a form of openness and accountability to donors on the one hand and motivates contributors on the other. Balance sheet information is very helpful for freedom fighters in terms of regulating financial use for war readiness.

In addition, RRR content also contains information on socio-cultural activities of the community, especially in awakening the spirit of the nation's struggle and as the frame of Indonesia's independence struggle. For example, the broadcast of ceremonial events, which are rooted in the religious values of the community, such as the commemoration of the Prophet Muhammad's Maulid to gather Muslims and increase the spirit of struggle of Muslims (Polim, 1996). The author argues that the event aims to awaken the fighting spirit of figures and Muslims on the battlefield in the fight against the colonials in order to gain success in defending Indonesia from all Dutch threats, propaganda, and provocations.

RRR in Countering Dutch Provocation News

The capital city of Yogyakarta has an important role in the struggle to maintain Indonesia's independence from Dutch Military Aggression. When Yogyakarta was successfully controlled by the Dutch on December 20, 1948, all facilities including the transmitter of Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI), were taken over. The area that was not affected by the Dutch Military Aggression attack was Aceh as the area where RRR was established. This area became a defense base in strategizing Indonesian resistance against the Dutch. However, after Yogyakarta was successfully overrun by the enemy, the attack on Aceh became the next Dutch destination. attacks in the form of bombing and fire from the sea were repeatedly carried out by Dutch military forces.

The Dutch attack on Aceh made this area unstable. The precarious situation experienced by Aceh received attention and was immediately responded to by the Aceh Military Governor as well as regional officials and community leaders. The people of Aceh have a strong commitment to maintaining the unity of the Aceh region and Indonesian sovereignty. The commitment can be seen in the role of the Aceh Ulema Association (PUSA) which was established on May 5, 1939 (Yusuf, 2007). PUSA fought on the front lines against the Dutch, which can be proven by the edict of scholars inviting all Acehnese people to fight to defend Indonesian independence (Ibrahimi, 1982).

In a vacuum situation, precisely on December 20, 1948, after the Second Dutch Military Aggression, the RRR broadcast delivered its messages using a Division X

radio calling signal that worked at a frequency of 19.25 with a transmitter force of 1 Kw at an altitude of 61 meters (Tim Koordinasi Siaran Ditjen Kebudayaan, 1998). RRR denies that the Republic of Indonesia and the Aceh region still exist. There is still emergency management of the Republic of Indonesia led by Syafruddin Prawiranegara in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra. Then there are the Army of the Republic of Indonesia and the people of Indonesia including the people of Aceh (Melayu, 1995). Tukiran (2018) said that this news continues to be broadcast by the RRR during the day and night during the condition of Aceh and the Republic of Indonesia is still precarious until sovereignty is successfully recaptured by the people. The news was relayed by several radios such as RRI Kutaraja and All India Radio, as well as radio-radio liaison in Bukittinggi and Java Island. Thus, news broadcasts are heard all the way to Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Australia, and Europe. Through the RRR broadcast, the international community recognized the existence of Aceh and the Republic of Indonesia which was eventually recaptured through negotiations and diplomacy known as the Dutch-Indonesian Round Table Conference (KMB), which took place on 23 August until 2 Nov 1949.

RRR broadcasts its news using several languages, namely Indonesian, Dutch, Arabic, English, Chinese, and Urdu. Broadcasting news of the struggle in various languages is very helpful for the People of Aceh in fighting for diplomacy abroad for the unity of the Aceh region and to get recognition of the Republic of Indonesia from the international world. In addition to fending off propaganda news broadcast by Dutch radio, RRR also played a role in providing important instructions on the situation and condition of Aceh to the leaders and soldiers of the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia. This can be seen at the time of the transfer of Syafruddin Prawiranegara from West Sumatra to Kutaraja, which at that time was delivered directly through RRR broadcasts to Indonesian representatives abroad.

News of domestic struggles and developments becomes the basis of policymaking by foreign diplomats, both related to the progress of the struggle physically and diplomacy. The news results were broadcast by RRR regarding the situation and conditions of Aceh and the Republic of Indonesia. L.N. Palar (1900-1981) at the United Nations meeting declared to the international community that Aceh was still united under the rule of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Republic of Indonesia remained intact.

RRR in counterattacking the provocation of Dutch radio led by Colonel Husein Yusuf (1912-1978) and Captain A.G. Mutyara. Then there are several foreign nationals involved as broadcasters and technicians, Lieutenant Abdullah (radio announcer in English), Lieutenant Candra (radio announcer in Urdu), Wung Fei (radio announcer in Chinese), Lieutenant Nargis, and W. Schulz (Chief radio technician).

Information on the Dutch invasion of Indonesian territory was very quickly received by the international community and the United Nations. One of the factors that make this information spread very quickly did not escape the news by Dutch radio. Information on the attack on Indonesia was also clarified by the report of the Three Countries Commission (KTN) to the UN Security Council. The commission also

reported to the United Nations that the Netherlands violated the Renville Agreement, which had been agreed and signed between the two sides. The Dutch attack on Indonesia led the countries of the world to condemn the attack, one of which was India.

Nasution (1979) said one of the most valuable moral supports for Indonesia for the Dutch military aggression was the initiative of India and Burma to gather representatives of countries from 19 in Asia and Arabia to meet simultaneously at the Asian Conference in New Delhi. During the conference, India through Pandit Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru stated that what the Dutch did had violated the results of the Renville Agreement. Strictly speaking, the Indian representatives decided unanimously that the Dutch army should leave Indonesia immediately because what they did was considered to make the Indonesian people more miserable. India's concern for Indonesia can also be seen moments after the Second Dutch Military Aggression, India's representative at the United Nations urged the Security Council to quickly resolve the Indonesia-Belanda dispute.

The broadcasts delivered by RRR are relayed by All India Radio and Australia Broadcasting. Because of the torrent of information abroad and thanks to the persistent struggle of Indonesian diplomats abroad, the opinions of Asian countries sided with the Republic of Indonesia. When the Asian Conference took place on 20-25 January 1949 in New Delhi, it was opened by Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) as Prime Minister of India (Mukherjee, 2018). An important point resulting from the conference was that Yogyakarta should be returned to Aceh and the Republic of Indonesia, the Dutch army should be withdrawn from Indonesia, and the Indonesian leaders held captive should be released. The representatives of Indonesian diplomats who attended the Asian Conference were Sumitro Djoyohadikusumo (1917-2001), Sudarsono (1911-1976), H.M. Rosyidi (1915-2001), Utoyo Ramelan, and Alexander A. Maramis (1897-1977).

The representative office of the Republic of Indonesia in India at that time was located in Aurhubzob (New Delhi). From there Indonesia through RRR broadcasts news twice a day about the development of the struggle of the Indonesian people during the Second Dutch Military Aggression. The development of Indonesia's struggle was also conveyed by the representatives of the Republic of Indonesia at the conference. News of Indonesia's struggle was also quoted by All India radio, then spread to other regions.

The results of the Asian Conference for Indonesia held on 20-25 January 1949 in New Delhi encouraged the Round Table Conference (KMB), held in The Hague, The Netherlands, from 23 August to 2 November 1949. To control the news in this conference spread to all corners of the country, the RRR's working hours were extended considering the amount of news that must be sent to Indonesian representatives in the conference. The busyness of RRR broadcasts is most felt at 21:00 until the morning, which is when broadcasting special broadcasts abroad. The Round Table Conference finally paid off, namely the Netherlands ceded sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia. RRR continued to play a role in maintaining territorial unity until the time of the recognition of the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia by the Netherlands on December 27, 1949, in Jakarta as a result of the Round Table

Conference in The Hague, The Netherlands.

The role of the RRR not only refuted the provocations of Dutch radio but also participated in the events of the General Offensive of 1 March 1949. This attack was led by Lieutenant Colonel Suharto and the people's army forces who at that time stormed and blockaded the headquarters of Dutch troops in Yogyakarta (Abdullah, 2015). This attack has been prepared since the Second Dutch Military Aggression in Yogyakarta on December 19, 1948.

On Tuesday, March 1, 1949, Yogyakarta began to be attacked from various directions by the Guerrilla Army of the Republic of Indonesia by mobilizing the RRR as a means of communication and command. Sub Wehrkreise (SWK) 102 attacked from the south, SWK 103 troops from the West, SWK 104 troops attacked from the North, and SWK 105 from the east as well as tasked with expelling Dutch troops coming from Tanjungtirto (southward) and cornering Dutch troops in the Maguwo area to prevent any assistance and flight activities (Djumarwan & Pratiwi, 2016). The General Offensive of 1 March 1949 was unbeknownst to the Dutch. Guerrilla forces emerging from the south were able to infiltrate the area around the Post Office and Benteng Vredenburg and the northern square until it managed to knock out three tanks and mines, they installed (PUSSEMAD Indonesia, 1965).

The Offensive of 1 March 1949 attack lasted for an hour. The people's guerrilla army of the Republic of Indonesia managed to paralyze and isolate the city of Yogyakarta for six hours from the Dutch side. But after that, the Dutch began to prepare themselves inside the headquarters of Major General D. R. A van Langen (1898-1983) and brought troops from Magelang under the leadership of Colonel J. Adrianus van Zanten (d. 1964). The Dutch then carried out a counter-attack on Indonesia by land and air. The guerrillas were forced to withdraw due to the unbalanced force of the weapons compared to those of the Dutch. This situation is used by the Dutch to control strategic areas. As a result of the retaliatory attack, the victims from the Indonesian side including civilians reached 300 people (PUSSEMAD Indonesia, 1965).

The General Offensive of 1 March 1949 was disseminated by the RRR and several other radios, which were in the mountainous areas of Java. The news was relayed by All India Radio until it was heard abroad including the UN Council. In its broadcast, RRR reported the chronological General Offensive of 1 March 1949 carried out by the guerrilla army of the Republic of Indonesia in controlling the city of Yogyakarta for six hours. This news aims to convince the world that the Republic of Indonesia still exists. This news is widespread in various countries including India. L.N. Palar (1900-1981) as a diplomat of the Republic of Indonesia in India explained the situation and conditions on March 10, 1949, in a United Nations forum to let the world know that Indonesia still has defense and remains sovereign. RRR also broadcast statements delivered by L.N. Palar (1900-1981) at the UN Council until the news spread to various countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, New Delhi, and several other countries in Europe. After the news, the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia is still recognized by the world.

Defending the Sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia

RRR had strong commitment to broadcasting news of the struggle in defending Aceh territory and the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia from the Second Dutch Military Aggression (Jakobi, 1995). The basic values of the RRR are contained in the "Tri Prasetya Pledge", which is: (1) We must save the radio broadcasting device from anyone who wants to use it to destroy our country. Defending the device with all the soul of the body under any circumstances and with any effect. (2) We must drive the RRR broadcast as a tool of struggle and a tool of revolution throughout the Indonesian nation, with a purely national spirit, a clean and honest heart, and a loyal mind full of love and loyalty to the homeland and nation. (3) We must stand above all streams and beliefs of parties or groups by prioritizing the unity of the nation and the safety of the country and holding on to the soul of the Proclamation (Saifullah et al., 2017).

Another factor is the edict of the President of the Republic of Indonesia and the Military Governor of Aceh, Langkat, and Tanah Karo. Before the Second Dutch Military Aggression, in June 1948, President Sukarno visited Bireuen city, North Aceh, to give a speech in a giant meeting held in Cot Gapu square (Zulfan et al., 2009). The content of Sukarno's speech was essentially to unite and gather strength and invite the people of Aceh to defend the unitary territory of Aceh and the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia from Dutch intervention. This meeting was attended by about a hundred thousand people from various regions (Zulfan et al., 2009).

In addition, the appeal of Acehnese scholars for young people to join the jihad. On December 23, 1948, the scholars held a meeting and issued the same fatwa as delivered on October 15, 1945, the 'Sabil War'. Acehnese Ulema Tgk. H.M Hasan Krueng Kale said that the law of the 'Sabil War' against the Dutch invaders is 'obligatory' for every Muslim as is the duty of prayer, while those who help the enemy, both in deeds and words, are considered traitors, and deserve to be punished. Ulema who participated in the meeting included: Tgk. Sayed Abdullah Kajhu, Tgk. H. Ahmad Hasballah Indrapuri, Tgk. H. Makam Gampong Blang, Tgk. Mohd. Ali (Tgk. Lam Pisang Krueng Kale), Tgk.M. Daud Beureu'eh, and Tgk. Abdul Wahab Seulumum (Jakobi, 1995). The ulema mentioned are fighters in defending the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia.

Conclusions

Radio Rimba Raya (RRR) was established with the aim of supporting the Indonesian government's programs, namely as a medium of struggle responsible for broadcasting victory news and trying to counter the news of Dutch provocations containing "The Republic of Indonesia no longer exists". Such efforts were to safeguard the country's sovereignty from the Dutch colonial who wanted to reclaim Indonesian territory. In the early days of Indonesian independence, the RRR served as a funnel of information and a connecting media in broadcasting important information to the authorities of the Republic of Indonesia including when Indonesia formed an emergency government due to the Second Dutch Military Aggression in 1948. Not only that, RRR

was able to become a spokesman for independence during Indonesia-Netherlands negotiations and diplomacy, until the return of the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia. RRR also participated in broadcasting news about the condition of Indonesian territory at the time of the General Attack of March 1, 1949. The influence of the RRR is not only in the context of defending Aceh territory but for the return of sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia. Through its heroic broadcasts, RRR has the support of leaders and fighters of the Republic of Indonesia including scholars and the people of Aceh.

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